The Historic Origins of Liberalism

1954 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Dawson

The history of the secularization of modern culture has yet to be written, and the reasons for this are easy enough to understand. For on the one hand, the mind of the secularized majority has been so deeply affected by the process of secularization that it cannot view that process in an objective historical manner, while on the other, the religious minority has been forced into an attitude of negative opposition which is no less unfavorable to dispassionate study. Nevertheless, it is emphatically a problem which requires an historical approach. The process of secularization was a historical movement no less than the Reformation, a minority movement which was gradually transmitted to wider circles until it eventually won the key positions of social and intellectual influence through which it dominated European society. This movement, which was already known as the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, and the accompanying ideology, which later acquired the name of Liberalism, have long been studied by historians chiefly in Germany and France, though in a somewhat piecemeal fashion; but their work has not hitherto been fully assimilated by educated opinion in England and America. Here the tendency has been to concentrate attention on political and economic change, and above all on the American and French revolutions. But we have not paid enough attention to the intellectual revolution that had already taken place before there was any question of a political one. Yet it is this intellectual revolution that is responsible for the secularization of Western culture. This intellectual movement, like most of the movements that have changed the world, was religious in origin, although it was anti-religious in its results. It owed its dynamism to the resistance of a religious minority and its diffusion to the illjudged and unjust, though sincere, action of religious orthodoxy. It is indeed, the supreme example in history of the way in which religious persecution and repression defeats its own object and serves the cause it is attempting to destroy.

1994 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-64
Author(s):  
Klaus Nürnberger

AbstractThis article offers a condensed survey of justice and peace issues in Christian ethics. It was originally written for an evangelical encyclopedia but was not accepted by the editors, possibly because of its historical critical and social critical stance. It begins with the historical origins of the concepts of law in the Old Testament, namely covenant law and cosmic order, their profound transformations in biblical history and their final form in the New Testament. Then we mention a few important developments in the history of the church from the Constantinian reversal, over the Reformation and the Enlightenment to the modern revolutionary spirit. Then we highlight a few aspects of the modern discussion, such as the accelerating development of science and technology, the emergence of a global, highly imbalanced economy, the rise and fall of Marxist socialism, a renewed upsurge of ethnic sentiments, and so on. Finally we offer a few directives for the contemporary debate, focusing on the relation between justice and peace.


2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 132-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. I. Kriman

The article discusses the modern philosophical concepts of transhumanism and posthumanism. The central issue of these concepts is “What is the posthuman?” The 21st century is marked by a contradictory understanding of the role and status of the human. On the one hand, there comes the realization of human hegemony over the whole world around: in the 20th century mankind not only began to conquer outer space, invented nuclear weapons, made many amazing discoveries but also shifted its attention to itself or rather to the modification of itself. Transhumanist projects aim to strengthen human influence by transforming human beings into other, more powerful and viable forms of being. Such projects continues the project of human “deification.” On the other hand, acknowledging the onset of the new geological epoch of the Anthropocene, there comes the rejection of classical interpretations of the human. The categories of historicity, sociality and subjectivity are no longer so anthropocentric. In the opinion of the posthumanists, the project of the Vitruvian man has proven to be untenable in the present-day environment and is increasingly criticized. The reflection on the phenomenon of the human and his future refers to the concepts that explore not only human but also non-human. Very often we can find a synonymous understanding of transhumanism and posthumanism. Although these movements work with the same modern constructs and concepts but interpret them in a fundamentally different way. The discourse of transhumanism refers to the Cartesian opposition of the body and the mind. Despite the sacralization of technology and the desire to purify the posthuman from such seemingly permanent attributes of the living as aging and death, transhumanism in many ways continues the ideas of the Enlightenment. For posthumanists, the subject is nomadic and a kind of assembly of human, animal, digital, chimerical. Thus, in posthumanism the main maxim of humanism about the human as the highest value is rejected – the human ceases to be “the measure of all things.”


Author(s):  
Edeltraud Klueting

The chapter addresses the history of monasticism in the German-speaking territories of the Holy Roman Empire from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. Whether the Reformation movement unleashed by Martin Luther represented a continuation of late medieval monastic reforms or, rather, an abrupt departure from them, is a contentious issue. In the Catholic parts of Germany, after the Council of Trent, monasteries became significant agents in the renewal of the Church, especially in the areas of education and social and charitable activity. On the other hand, the Enlightenment, with its narrow conception of utility, called into question the very basis of monastic life, and hence the right of monasteries to exist. The fallout of the French Revolution and the French occupation of the left bank of the Rhine led to a great wave of monastic dissolutions. It was only under the influence of German Romanticism that monasticism experienced another revival.


Author(s):  
Erich Steiner

The paper starts by relating the notion of the "critical intellectual" to the notion of "agent of social change" on the one hand, and to other potential types of agents of change on the other: women in revolt, artists, exiles and queer agencies. Proceeding to a brief characterisation of the socio-cultural and political context "Germany", we shall explore some meanings of attributes such as post-modern and consumer for contemporary German society and culture, arguing that these are cultural and economic terms, which denote current forms of expression for what continues to be a capitalist economy and a bourgeois democracy. One recurrent question will be what the contours might be of the figure of the "critical intellectual" under present day conditions. This is followed by a brief sketch of the meanings of "kritische(r) Intellektuelle(r)" in a historical ("geistesgeschichtlicher") perspective, mainly from the enlightenment onwards. We shall move on to a methodologically very different, but complementary, perspective, which is the consideration of current usage of the term with the help of large-scale electronic corpora of spoken language and an on-line search on the web. As we shall see, an important share and quality of the relevant meanings of a term lies in current usage, which may or may not be directly related to what we know from the history of ideas and/ or etymology. I shall then use examples from my own professional field of work for an exploration of what the role of a critical intellectual in a German context might be, discussing the field of natural language technologies. These examples will illustrate the fact that such a role has to involve participation in, rather than exclusively detached contemplation of, the sphere of production. They will also show that the role of the critical intellectual is, indeed, a locus of contestation in several respects. We finally broaden our perspective into a wider set of questions relating to the role of the critical intellectual, in German (and other) contexts. One of these questions will revolve around the notions of "values" and "ethics": Do we assume that the role of the critical intellectual is inherently connected to some systems of values, either in the sense of the enlightenment, and/or Marxism, and/or some other Weltanschauungs-system, or else do we believe that the position of a critical intellectual could be defined within some entirely market-driven ideology? Is there something like "truth", "progress" or "justice", other than what is successful on the market? Another one of these questions will focus on whether we can identify some force that motivates change in societies, and cultures, and what the role of the critical intellectual might be vis-à-vis such a force. One of our arguments here will be that among such forces may well be "contradictions", that this category of "contradiction" is in no way exhausted by the category of "difference" as currently debated. It will be argued, finally, that whereas the figure of the "critical intellectual", as we have tried to sketch it here, may be situated in a German context, its essential characteristics defy any attempts at claiming it for any one particular culture.


Author(s):  
Andrey K. Sudakov ◽  

Fichte constructs the general part of his early ethics as a philosophy of concrete freedom in the shape of a history of moral self-consciousness, and in the course of this construction he discovers something what he, in Kantian stile, may call a “radical evil in human nature”, that is, a force of “inertness to reflection and to activity in accordance with such reflection” inherent to human nature. Schelling and some contemporary authors recognize in Fichte’s doctrine of evil a symptom of his return to the ethical naturalism of the Enlightenment. An anal­ysis of the dynamics of moral reflection in the I according to Fichte shows, however, that, exactly as the I itself is for Fichte essentially a duality, a subject-object, so is each particular position in the movement of the self-reflection of the I, on the one hand, conditioned by this spiritual inertness of human nature, but that same inertness is, on the other hand, a chain with which human free­dom retains itself, and therefore actually inexistent as a restraining force for a free I, conscious of his own ethical vocation, so that its dwelling within the limits of the customary (in the invariability of consciousness) is the subject’s own fault as “non-use of freedom”. The spiritual inertness, as an empirical con­dition of possibility of a bad choice, is nevertheless in Fichte a spiritual force of a specific kind, active even there where ethical choice in the strict sense of the term is not (yet) at issue. Schelling’s reproof must therefore be acknowledged as invalid, exactly because the history of self-consciousness is, in Fichte’s ethics, not so much an exposition of a real sequence, as a transcendental reflec­tion of grounds.


2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-210
Author(s):  
Halina Walentowicz ◽  

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is a special personage in the history of Enlightenment philosophy and European thought in general. This is so, because, on the one hand, he propounded ideas that were typical for the Enlightenment and greatly influenced his contemporaries—after all, it was he who inspired Kant with the idea of the autonomy of the will as a source of moral and juridical law, a conception which became the foundation of Kantian practical philosophy—but on the other criticised many popular ideas of his day, which from our contemporary perspective appear to have been the superstitions of the Enlightenment period. Rousseau rejected the uncritical apology of (universalistically understood) reason together with the “ethical universalism” professed by rationalists since Socrates. In his claim that human history ran in a circle (from nature in its primeval purity to nature as the expression of civilisational decay), he contested the Enlightenment’s widespread belief that it was a linear, continuous, cumulative and by nature unchangeably progressive process. Because of his transgression of the Enlightenment paradigm, Rousseau is sometimes considered to have been the first modern philosopher. And, in my opinion, rightly so, because his thought stood ahead of its time, and in many ways anticipated contemporary philosophy. I believe that especially the Frankfurt School owes a lot to his achievements. Rousseau’s thought already carried the main seeds of critical theory: the intertwinement of progress and regression over human history, emphasis on the mastering of nature and the destruction of the human element in the course of civilisational evolution, a social-historical (and not purely theoretical, as in Kant’s case) critique of reason for the sake of reason and not from the position of irrationality. Long before Max Horkheimer and his associates at the Institute of Social Research, and even ahead of Sigmund Freud, he saw reasons to ambivalently evaluate the results of human self-creation and to highlight the regressive tendencies present in human history.


1984 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-470
Author(s):  
Frederick W. Norris

In Western culture, religion and the sciences often have found themselves to be more and more at odds since the period of the Enlightenment. The change which that era brought to the Christian community could be illustrated as follows. The analogy is perhaps a bit overdrawn, but it does indicate how important the historical shifts were. During the earliest phase of Christian belief, Christianity had to compete with other religions as one fruit-bearing tree within a varied orchard. When the Christian religion became established and dominant in the Middle Ages it tended to cause other trees to wither and die because of its enormous and on occasion darkening size. During the Reformation a radical pruning took place which gave life not only to the Protestant branch but also a new vitality to the Roman Catholic branch. What the Enlightenment represented was the first pervasive suggestion that most fruit trees — perhaps even the orchard — were unnecessary. One could find individual precursors of such attempts as well as a number of people during the Enlightenment who found various religions satisfying. But at no time in the history of Christianity had a large segment of the intellectual culture been so fascinated with the idea that religion in most all of its forms might be useless.


1932 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-125
Author(s):  
C. A. F. Rhys Davids

Of the five opportunities given me these thirty-nine years for such a talk on such an occasion as this, the present one may well be the last. I have on these occasions considered, in the Buddhist field, Women, the Will, Natural Causation, and the Man as Real. I would now say a few words on that which is, historically speaking, the most central subject of all—the subject which is, by general assent, within and without that religion, the New Word with which it was introduced, the first Mantra recorded as of the Founder of it, the so-called Benares ‘sermon’. For we may talk much about legends of him on the one hand, or about the many ways in which his teaching expanded at later periods, in so-called philosophy and in this and that word-value, obscuring the man-value, but the one thing of chief historical importance is and remains the Mantras he first uttered as teacher, and their significance in the religious history of the there and then. To this I would add, in the pertinent phrase of a recent synoptical narrative, “the meaning which these will have had in the mind of their original author.”


2015 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Ángel Giménez Martínez

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the circumstances that have conditioned the development of education in Spain from the enlightenment to the present day. Design/methodology/approach – Multidisciplinary scientific approach that combines the interpretation of the legal texts with the revision of the doctrinal and theoretical contributions made on the issue. Findings – From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the history of education in Spain has been marked by constant fluctuations between the reactionary instincts, principally maintained by the Catholic Church and the conservative social classes, and the progressive experiments, driven by the enlightened and the liberals first, and the republicans and the socialists later. As a consequence of that, the fight for finishing with illiteracy and guaranteeing universal schooling underwent permanent advances and retreats, preventing from an effective modernization of the Spanish educative system. On the one hand, renewal projects promoted by teachers and pedagogues were inevitably criticized by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, obsessed with the idea of preserving the influence of religion on the schools. On the other hand, successive governments were weak in implementing an educational policy which could place Spain at the level of the other European and occidental nations. Originality/value – At the dawn of the twenty-first century, although the country has overcome a good part of its centuries-old backwardness, increasing economic difficulties and old ideological splits keep hampering the quality of teaching, gripped by neoliberal policies which undermine the right to education for all. The reading of this paper offers various historical clues to understand this process.


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