Varieties of dual-process theory for probabilistic reasoning

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 280-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Samuels

AbstractThough Barbey & Sloman (B&S) distinguish various frequentist hypotheses, they opt rapidly for one specific dual-process model of base-rate facilitation. In this commentary, I maintain that there are many distinct but related versions of the dual-process theory, and suggest that there is currently little reason to favor B&S's formulation over the alternatives.

2021 ◽  
pp. 105971232110173
Author(s):  
Zachariah A Neemeh

Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand ( Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.


2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans ◽  
Shira Elqayam

AbstractWe agree that current evolutionary accounts of base-rate neglect are unparsimonious, but we dispute the authors' account of the effect in terms of parallel associative and rule-based processes. We also question their assumption that cueing of nested set relations facilitates performance due to recruitment of explicit reasoning processes. In our account, such reasoning is always involved, but usually unsuccessful.


Diametros ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Wim De Neys

In this commentary, I warn against a possible dual process misconception that might lead people to conclude that utilitarian judgments are normatively correct. I clarify how the misconception builds on (1) the association between System 2 and normativity in the dual process literature on logical/probabilistic reasoning, and (2) the classification of utilitarian judgments as resulting from System 2 processing in the dual process model of moral reasoning. I present theoretical and empirical evidence against both premises.  


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wonseok Jang ◽  
Yong Jae Ko ◽  
Svetlana Stepchenkova

Advertisers put considerable effort into developing messages that appeal to a persuadable target group. Based on the characteristics of these audiences, as well as a number of situational factors, advertising messages can be described as primarily informational or emotional. The purpose of this study was to test how the value orientation of a sports-related event and situational involvement moderate consumers’ information processing and attitudes toward the event advertisement. Consistent with dual-process theory, the results indicate that, when dealing with information about a utilitarian sports career-fair event, consumers rely on either effortful or effortless processing depending on their level of situational involvement. However, consumers use both effortful and effortless processing for a hedonic sporting event. This study extends the dual-process theory and planning models by suggesting that a traditional, theory-based dichotomous dual-process model should give way to a co-occurrence model for hedonic sporting events in high-involvement situations.


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