Inference in Social Cognition

Inferences are ubiquitous in social cognition, governing everything from first impressions to the communication of meaning itself. Social cognitive inferences are typically varieties of diagnostic reasoning or, more properly, “abductive” reasoning, in which people infer simple but plausible—although not deductively certain—underlying causes for observable social behaviors. Abductive inference and its relationship to inductive and deductive inference are first introduced. A description of how abductive inference operates on a continuum between those that arise rapidly and automatically (and appear like deductions) and those that inspire more deliberative efforts (and thus often recruit more inductive information gathering and testing) is then given. Next, many classic findings in social cognition, and social psychology more broadly, that reveal how widespread this type of inference is explored. Indeed, both judgements under uncertainty and dual-process theories can be illuminated by incorporating the abductive frame. What then follows is a discussion on the work in ecological and evolutionary approaches that suggest that, although these inferences often go beyond the information given and are prone to predictable errors, people are good enough at social inference to qualify as being “ecologically rational.” The conclusion explores emerging themes in social cognition that only heighten the need for this broader understanding of inference processes.

Predicting Physical Activity Behavior by Automatic and Reflective Self-Regulatory Processes

In this study, we examined the interaction of automatic (i.e., automatic affective evaluations) and reflective [i.e., reflective intention and executive functions (EFs)] processes on physical activity (PA) behavior based on dual-process theories. We expected main effects as well as significant interaction effects between automatic associations, intention, and EFs on behavior. In particular, a well-controlled implicit-association-test (IAT) was applied to assess automatic affective evaluation. A prospective study with two points of measurement (N=212 students) was conducted. At t1, age, sex, PA behavior (control variables), automatic associations, EFs (shifting, updating, inhibition), and PA intention (predictors and moderators) were assessed with standardized questionnaires and tests. At t2 (4weeks later), PA behavior (dependent variable) was measured with a standardized questionnaire. A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis including two- and three-way interactions between IAT results, intention, and EFs on PA behavior was conducted. Results showed that the interactions Intention x Shifting and IAT x Intention x Inhibition were significant. Moderation analyses revealed that participants with higher intentions and lower inhibition values (improved inhibition abilities) showed a negative association between IAT and PA, while those with lower intentions and lower inhibition values showed a positive association between IAT and PA, which was documented in a significant slope difference test between these two groups. Thus, both automatic and reflective processes contribute and interact in predicting PA. As well as fostering more positive affective evaluations towards PA, interventions to strengthen PA intentions and to improve EFs could help to increase PA behavior.

EXPRESS: The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiments 1 and 4), likeability (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and physical brightness (Experiments 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Brightness judgments were made by evaluating the font shade brightness of the argument’s conclusion. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments (varied across experiments). However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

The inverse relation between risks and benefits: The impact of individual differences in information processing style

Existing research shows that evaluations of the risks and benefits of various hazards (i.e., technologies and activities) are inversely related. The affect heuristic explains the negative relation between risks and benefits, as based on the strength of positive or negative affect associated with a hazard. Research on the affect heuristic previously investigated under which conditions people judge risk and benefits independently, focusing on expertise as a factor that might exempt from inversely related judgements of risk and benefits. Measurements within Dual Process Theories have been found to be associated with rational, analytical decision making and accurate judgments. In this paper we investigated the extent to which rational information processing styles can predict the risk-benefit relation of technologies in a medical and food applications and whether the attitudes influence the strength or direction of the relationship. Using the Need for Cognition Scale (NFC), a psychometric-based risk scale and an explicit measure of attitude, in a representative sample of 3228 Swedes, we found that the high NFC group judged the risks and benefits of technologies to be inversely related. In contrast, the low NFC group judged the risks and benefits to be positively related. These results were confirmed across all studied technologies by applying moderation analysis. We discuss the results in light of recent research on cognitive processing and polarization over technologies’ risks.

Public engagement with emerging technologies: Does reflective thinking affect survey responses?

Researchers disagree on the extent that brief survey methods accurately reflect citizens’ opinions of unfamiliar scientific concepts. We examine whether encouraging participants to engage in more reflective thinking affects their perceptions of emerging climate technologies. Drawing on dual-process theories of reasoning, we apply experimental manipulations to encourage fast, intuitive thinking or slow, reflective thinking when responding to an online survey. Similarities in concept evaluation time between the Control and the Intuitive treatment groups indicates that citizens default to fast intuitive judgements to form opinions. However, despite a successful manipulation check, the reflective treatment group did not show any substantively different results. Therefore, encouraging additional thinking is unlikely to shift public perceptions. Post hoc analysis suggests participants with stronger views may nonetheless take more time to consider their response, without prompting. These findings support the validity of surveys as a method for eliciting stable and meaningful public perceptions of emerging technologies.

Smooth coping: an embodied, Heideggerian approach to dual-process theory

Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand ( Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.

Pre-Clerkship Medical Students’ Experiences and Perspectives of System 1 and System 2 Thinking: A Qualitative Study

Dual-process theories may be invoked to explain how physicians interact with, interpret, and draw inferences from clinical information. Stanovich and West’s model articulates two kinds of thinking—intuitive-based System 1 and analytical-based System 2—which have been under-investigated with physicians in training. This qualitative study explored pre-clerkship medical students’ retrospective perspectives and experiences of System 1 and System 2 thinking via 12 semi-structured interviews and abductive, progressive focusing. Participants identified patient interactions, clinical note writing, knowledge synthesis, problem list and differential diagnosis generation, evaluating evidence, and critical appraisal of literature as pre-clerkship opportunities to engage in System 1 or System 2 thinking. Six major themes emerged from analysis of participants’ interview transcripts: cognitive processes, deliberate practice, learning environment: being alone or being together, stickiness factor, biases and heuristics, and prior experience of attaining competence. Participants valued the anticipated role that System 1 and System 2 thinking will play in their future practice, and experienced nascent, self-regulated development of these cognitive processes during the pre-clerkship phase of their education without formal feedback or coaching from clinician preceptors. Pre-clerkship curricula should further embrace low-stakes, incremental teaching on metacognition and continuous monitoring of knowledge processing as a key competency for physician learners.