The holobiont mind: A bridge between 4E cognition and the microbiome

All life on earth is intrinsically linked. At the very foundation of every evolutionary interaction are microorganisms, integral components in the composition of both organisms and ecosystems. The available data and this perspective on the order of life challenge the traditional conception of monogenetic biological individuals, suggesting living beings are actually composite multi-species complexes: holobionts. In the present article, we introduce our perspective on the concept of the holobiont mind, a biogenic conception of cognition compatible with the 4E approach and the holobiont theory. We furthermore expand on the idea of the mind as the emerging product of multi-genomic morphology of a composite animal-agent, in ever-changing interaction with its ecological niche. We thus briefly review recent evidence on the brain–gut–microbiome axis and the Microbiome of the Built Environment in order to provide a bridge between the Holobiont Mind and the 4E approach to Cognition, two complementary lines of evidence that have not been linked before, opening novel venues for research with direct impact on health and disease.

Towards a functional classification of behaviour: a taxonomy based on outcomes

The classification of behaviour has historically been done using one of the two approaches, either through the hypothetical causes (such as ‘instincts’, ‘drives’ and ‘needs’) or through the cataloguing of the observable form of behaviour using an ethogram. This article offers an alternative framework for classification of behaviour based upon only the behavioural outcomes. The framework is specified from first principles of a state-space approach, allowing us to discuss intermediate outcomes that may have instrumental value. This approach could provide a firmer foundation to consider the hierarchical nature of goals and allows us to address both the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ questions within a single framework. This taxonomy is designed to complement rather than replace existing attempts; the classification of behaviour by outcome is orthogonal to questions of the mechanisms of decision making or of the implementation of actions. This article specifies nine basic classes of behaviour and provides precise definitions for each of these. We then develop a formal language for the description of observed activities, the representation of behavioural hierarchies and for the analysis of possibility sets for achieving future goals. We follow up with some critique and discussion of the problems such a framework poses.

Epilogue to “Questioning Life and Cognition” by John Stewart

In 2012, John Stewart contributed a book manuscript entitled “ Questioning Life and Cognition: Some Foundational Issues in the Paradigm of Enaction” to the Enaction Series in Online Collaborative Publishing, edited by Olivier Gapenne and Bruno Bachimont. Along with Mattéo Mossio, I was invited by Olivier to serve as a glossator of this text. The purpose was to thereby continue our long and fruitful dialogues with John that began when we were both students. I took advantage of the opportunity to also express my gratitude to John for his participation in that formative stage of my personal academic journey. My reflections were included as an epilogue to his book. In memoriam, the epilogue is reproduced in this report unchanged. I will always be grateful to John for making the research community of enaction feel like family to me and for helping me recognize that there is a place for my diverse interests in the continued pursuit of an academic career.

Editorial

This editorial presents the context of the special issue and some basic elements of John’s Stewart biography.

Living creatures, humankind, and the history of who we are

Breathing Life into Biology is a brave attempt to do science while wearing its values on its sleeves. It is written under the commitment that life is intrinsically valuable, and its value has to be taken seriously in doing biology. Stewart defends a conception of life in which every living organism has a subjective point of view from which it makes sense of the world. Under this conception and the commitment that life is valuable in itself, the book presents the story of life from its origin and our history as humankind. However, the book is more successful in presenting the former than the latter. Yet Stewart’s conception of enaction opens the possibility for cognitive science and his conception of what makes us human enables us to embrace the histories and the forms of life of those who have been systematically silenced.

Perceiving at a distance: enaction, exteriority and possibility – a tribute to John Stewart

The aim of this article is to offer a new approach of perception regarding the position of a distant object. It is also a tribute to John Stewart who accompanied the first stages of this research. Having already examined the difficulties surrounding questions of the perception of exteriority within the framework of enactive approaches, we will proceed in two stages. The first stage will consist of an attempt to explain distal perception in terms of individual sensorimotor invariants. This poses the problem but fails to solve it. The second stage will propose a new pathway to account for spatial perception; a pathway that does not deny the initial intuitions of the autopoietic enactive approaches, but one which radically changes the conception of cognition by considering, from the perceptual stage, the need to take into account interindividual interactions. The protocol of an original experimental study will characterize this new approach considering the perceptual experience of objects at a distance, in exteriority, in a space of possibilities without parting from the domain of interaction. To do this, we have to work at the limits of the perceptual crossing, that is, at the moment when the perceptual reciprocity between different subjects begins to disappear.

Autopoiesis and evolution: the role of organisms in natural drift

Genetic reductionism is increasingly seen as a severely limited approach to understanding living systems. The Neo-Darwinian explanatory framework tends to overlook the role of the organism for an understanding of development and evolution. In the current fast-changing theoretical landscape, the autopoietic approach provides conceptual distinctions and tools that may contribute to building an alternative framework. In this article, I examine the implications of the theories of autopoiesis and natural drift for an organism-centered view of evolution. By shifting the attention from genes to ontogenetic organism-niche configurations and their transformations over generations, this approach presents a compelling perspective on the role of organismal behavior in guiding phylogenetic drift.

The design of self-organizing human–swarm intelligence

Human–swarm interaction is a frontier in the realms of swarm robotics and human-factors engineering. However, no holistic theory has been explicitly formulated that can inform how humans and robot swarms should interact through an interface while considering real-world demands, the relative capabilities of the components, as well as the desired joint-system behaviours. In this article, we apply a holistic perspective that we refer to as joint human–swarm loops, that is, a cybernetic system made of human, swarm and interface. We argue that a solution for human–swarm interaction should make the joint human–swarm loop an intelligent system that balances between centralized and decentralized control. The swarm-amplified human is suggested as a possible design that combines perspectives from swarm robotics, human-factors engineering and theoretical neuroscience to produce such a joint human–swarm loop. Essentially, it states that the robot swarm should be integrated into the human’s low-level nervous system function. This requires modelling both the robot swarm and the biological nervous system as self-organizing systems. We discuss multiple design implications that follow from the swarm-amplified human, including a computational experiment that shows how the robot swarm itself can be a self-organizing interface based on minimal computational logic.

Locomotion postural variability and coordination in boys with overweight

The purpose of this study was to examine the variability and coordination of postural adaptations in normal weight children and those with overweight in running and hopping. Fifty-six boys between 7 and 10 years were classified into groups as overweight ( n = 33) or normal-weight ( n = 23). They performed two trials of running and hopping over a 20-m straight line distance. Accelerometers were attached on the trunk and head for collecting body movements in different directions from 15 strides. Postural variability and coordination were calculated by multiscale entropy and cross approximate entropy for the running and hopping trials, separately. Findings highlight overweight boys had significantly higher trunk-head coordination in mediolateral direction than normal-weight boys (0.72 vs. 0.68). The hopping movement pattern had highest variability (9.88 vs. 8.77) and trunk–head coordination (0.61 vs. 0.67) than running. Excess body mass demands additional postural adaptations to compensate for reducing the risk of losing balance laterally in boys with overweight.

Converging enactivisms: radical enactivism meets linguistic bodies

We advance a critical examination of two recent branches of the enactivist research program, namely, Radically Enactive Cognition and Linguistic Bodies. We argue that, although these approaches may look like diverging views within the wider enactivist program, when appraised in a conciliatory spirit, they can be interpreted as developing converging ideas. We examine how the notion of know-how figures in them to show an important point of convergence, namely, that the normativity of human cognitive capacities rests on shared know-how. Radical enactivism emphasizes the diachronic dimension of shared know-how, and linguistic bodies emphasize the synchronic one. Given that know-how is a normative notion, it is subject to success conditions. We then argue it implies basic content, which is the content of the successful ongoing interactions between agent(s) and environment. Basic content does not imply accuracy conditions and representational content, so it evades Hutto and Myin’s Hard Problem of Content. Moreover, this account is amenable to the central claim by Di Paolo et al. that the participatory sense-making relations at play in linguistic exchanges are explained in continuity with explanations of biological organization and sensorimotor engagements.