Britain's paradox: cooperation or punishment prior to World War I

2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEVEN E. LOBELL

In the three decades prior to World War I, Britain's paradox was whether to cooperate with or punish an emerging Germany, Japan, France, Russia, and the United States. Based on the need for economy, successive Chancellors of the Exchequer pressed for cooperating with the contenders. Members of the services and Conservatives pushed to punish these contenders, countering that Britain could afford the rising naval expenditure needed to implement such a programme. The existing literature emphasizes the role of geopolitics, domestic constraints, and individual idiosyncrasies to explain Britain's foreign policy adjustment. I argue that the nature of the foreign commercial policy of the contenders guided Britain's response. Due to the special affinity among commercially liberal states, Britain cooperated with America and Japan, ceding regional governance to both aspiring regional hegemons. Britain did, however, punish non-liberal France, Germany, and Russia by implementing new naval construction programmes and concentrating freed-up military resources until these countries capitulated in their naval challenge.

Author(s):  
Elizabeth McKillen

This book explores the corporatist alliance between President Woodrow Wilson and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and how it sparked debates over his foreign policy programs within labor circles. During World War II, Wilson pledged to make the world “safe for democracy.” For Wilson, the cooperation of the United States and international labor movements was critical to achieving this goal. To win domestic and international labor support for his foreign policies, Wilson solicited the help of AFL's conservative leaders. This book traces the origins of the partnership that developed between the Wilson administration and AFL leaders to promote U.S. foreign policy, from its tentative beginnings during policy deliberations over how the United States should respond to the Mexican revolution, through World War I, to its culmination with the creation of the International Labor Organization (ILO). It details the significant opposition to the Wilson–AFL collaboration that arose among U.S., transnational, and international labor, Socialists, and diaspora Left groups and how this opposition affected Wilson's efforts to create a permanent role for labor in international governance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-36
Author(s):  
Diane M. T. North

The 1918–1920 influenza pandemic remains the deadliest influenza pandemic in recorded history. It started in the midst of World War I and killed an estimated 50–100 million people worldwide, many from complications of pneumonia. Approximately 500 million, or one-third of the world's population, became infected. In the United States, an estimated 850,000 died. The exceptionally contagious, unknown strain of influenza virus spread rapidly and attacked all ages, but it especially targeted young adults (ages twenty to forty-four). This essay examines the evolution of four waves of the 1918–1920 influenza pandemic, emphasizes the role of the U.S. Navy and sea travel as the initial transmitters of the virus in the United States, and focuses on California communities and military installations as a case study in the response to the crisis. Although the world war, limited medical science, and the unknown nature of the virus made it extremely difficult to fight the disease, the responses of national, state, and community leaders to the 1918–1920 influenza pandemic can provide useful lessons in 2020, as the onslaught of COVID-19 forces people worldwide to confront a terrible illness and death.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 69-75
Author(s):  
Anton B. Gekht

This article examines the role of Marcus Wallenberg Jr., a prominent financier and industrialist, one of the leaders of the financial and industrial group of the Wallenberg family, in the foreign policy of Sweden on the eve of and during World War II. Having concentrated in his hands the main threads of influence on the industry and the financial sphere of the kingdom, Marcus Wallenberg was unofficially involved in the development of the foreign policy of the kingdom, which sought to be out of direct involvement in the war. The article examines various contacts with representatives of the opposing sides, carries out with the active participation of this banker and industrialist, both as part of official delegations and as individuals – the main focus is on establishing interaction between the USSR and Finland in 1943-1944, as well as cooperation with the Allies – Britain and the United States. The article also analyses the non-institutionalised regular contacts of Marcus Wallenberg Jr. with the political leadership of Sweden during 1938-1945, including the difficulties faced by the financial and industrial group under his control in the period immediately after the end of World War II.


2015 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. E6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. Menger ◽  
Christopher M. Storey ◽  
Bharat Guthikonda ◽  
Symeon Missios ◽  
Anil Nanda ◽  
...  

World War I catapulted the United States from traditional isolationism to international involvement in a major European conflict. Woodrow Wilson envisaged a permanent American imprint on democracy in world affairs through participation in the League of Nations. Amid these defining events, Wilson suffered a major ischemic stroke on October 2, 1919, which left him incapacitated. What was probably his fourth and most devastating stroke was diagnosed and treated by his friend and personal physician, Admiral Cary Grayson. Grayson, who had tremendous personal and professional loyalty to Wilson, kept the severity of the stroke hidden from Congress, the American people, and even the president himself. During a cabinet briefing, Grayson formally refused to sign a document of disability and was reluctant to address the subject of presidential succession. Wilson was essentially incapacitated and hemiplegic, yet he remained an active president and all messages were relayed directly through his wife, Edith. Patient-physician confidentiality superseded national security amid the backdrop of friendship and political power on the eve of a pivotal juncture in the history of American foreign policy. It was in part because of the absence of Woodrow Wilson’s vocal and unwavering support that the United States did not join the League of Nations and distanced itself from the international stage. The League of Nations would later prove powerless without American support and was unable to thwart the rise and advance of Adolf Hitler. Only after World War II did the United States assume its global leadership role and realize Wilson’s visionary, yet contentious, groundwork for a Pax Americana. The authors describe Woodrow Wilson’s stroke, the historical implications of his health decline, and its impact on United States foreign policy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 12-34
Author(s):  
David F. Schmitz

It was while serving as the undersecretary of the navy during World War I that Roosevelt fully developed his internationalist view of foreign policy. For FDR, internationalism meant preparedness, collective security, and cooperation with other nations as the best means to defend American interests and values. When the United States rejected the Treaty of Versailles, Roosevelt spent the 1920s seeking alternative means to implement his internationalist views.


Author(s):  
David Milne

This chapter investigates the most ascendant ideas at work in America's rise to become a global power and then a superpower after the end of World War I. Segmenting US foreign policy since 1919 by “grand strategy” would seem to require grand simplification. Even those administrations commonly identified as practicing quintessential grand strategy appear more inchoate when approached from the protagonists’ perspectives at the time. To give one such example, the sequence of foreign policy innovations that the United States spearheaded from 1945 to 1949 were collectively possessed of considerable foresight. But they were also a series of strategies advocated by various actors at different times with motives that do not necessarily reduce to a mono-strategic essence. Even in regard to post-1945 US foreign policy, a period that has been sub-divided by many distinguished scholars, it is difficult to identify clearly demarcated grand strategies that provide overarching clarity. The chapter focuses on the ascendant ideas that have informed policymaking, shaped public discourse, forced other ideas into decline, and that can perhaps even be identified as “representative” of particular eras.


1976 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 477-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Costigliola

The foreign economic policy of the United States in the aftermath of World War I was not isolationist, but selectively interventionist. With a group of very able American businessmen-diplomats in the lead, the nation pressured the French to accept the Dawes Plan, which, it was hoped, would solve the reparations problem, encourage healthy economic recovery and growth (which would embrace large sales of American capital goods to Germany), and ensure peaceful contentment in two nations that were more bitter enemies than ever. But, Professor Costigliola shows, a plan to rebuild Germany that was half private business and half foreign policy, and that was manipulated to both ends, could not succeed in the marketplace, where it had to live or die.


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