The United States and the Reconstruction of Germany in the 1920s

1976 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 477-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Costigliola
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War I ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Recovery ◽  
World War ◽  
Private Business ◽  
Foreign Economic Policy ◽  
Capital Goods

The foreign economic policy of the United States in the aftermath of World War I was not isolationist, but selectively interventionist. With a group of very able American businessmen-diplomats in the lead, the nation pressured the French to accept the Dawes Plan, which, it was hoped, would solve the reparations problem, encourage healthy economic recovery and growth (which would embrace large sales of American capital goods to Germany), and ensure peaceful contentment in two nations that were more bitter enemies than ever. But, Professor Costigliola shows, a plan to rebuild Germany that was half private business and half foreign policy, and that was manipulated to both ends, could not succeed in the marketplace, where it had to live or die.

International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887–1934

1983 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Lake
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Economic ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
World War I ◽  
Economic Structure ◽  
The United States ◽  
West Germany ◽  
International Economy ◽  
World War ◽  
Foreign Economic Policy

American foreign economic policy between 1887 and 1934 was shaped in important ways by the international economic structure and the position of the United States as a “supporter” within it. As Britain's hegemony declined, and particularly after it joined the United States as a supporter just prior to World War I, American foreign economic policy became more liberal and active. Once Britain was transformed from a supporter into a spoiler in the late 1920s, leaving the United States as the sole supporter within the IES, both the international economy and American policy became more unstable and protectionist. During the 1970s, the United States, West Germany, and France all emerged as supporters within the IES, indicating that a moderately stable and liberal international economy may continue to exist in the future.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth McKillen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Governance ◽  
International Labor Organization ◽  
World War ◽  
American Federation ◽  
International Labor

This book explores the corporatist alliance between President Woodrow Wilson and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and how it sparked debates over his foreign policy programs within labor circles. During World War II, Wilson pledged to make the world “safe for democracy.” For Wilson, the cooperation of the United States and international labor movements was critical to achieving this goal. To win domestic and international labor support for his foreign policies, Wilson solicited the help of AFL's conservative leaders. This book traces the origins of the partnership that developed between the Wilson administration and AFL leaders to promote U.S. foreign policy, from its tentative beginnings during policy deliberations over how the United States should respond to the Mexican revolution, through World War I, to its culmination with the creation of the International Labor Organization (ILO). It details the significant opposition to the Wilson–AFL collaboration that arose among U.S., transnational, and international labor, Socialists, and diaspora Left groups and how this opposition affected Wilson's efforts to create a permanent role for labor in international governance.

Britain's paradox: cooperation or punishment prior to World War I

2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEVEN E. LOBELL
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War I ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regional Governance ◽  
World War ◽  
Commercial Policy ◽  
Policy Adjustment ◽  
Domestic Constraints

In the three decades prior to World War I, Britain's paradox was whether to cooperate with or punish an emerging Germany, Japan, France, Russia, and the United States. Based on the need for economy, successive Chancellors of the Exchequer pressed for cooperating with the contenders. Members of the services and Conservatives pushed to punish these contenders, countering that Britain could afford the rising naval expenditure needed to implement such a programme. The existing literature emphasizes the role of geopolitics, domestic constraints, and individual idiosyncrasies to explain Britain's foreign policy adjustment. I argue that the nature of the foreign commercial policy of the contenders guided Britain's response. Due to the special affinity among commercially liberal states, Britain cooperated with America and Japan, ceding regional governance to both aspiring regional hegemons. Britain did, however, punish non-liberal France, Germany, and Russia by implementing new naval construction programmes and concentrating freed-up military resources until these countries capitulated in their naval challenge.

Woodrow Wilson’s hidden stroke of 1919: the impact of patient-physician confidentiality on United States foreign policy

2015 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. E6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. Menger ◽  
Christopher M. Storey ◽  
Bharat Guthikonda ◽  
Symeon Missios ◽  
Anil Nanda ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War I ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
League Of Nations ◽  
American People ◽  
United States Foreign Policy ◽  
World War ◽  
The Impact

World War I catapulted the United States from traditional isolationism to international involvement in a major European conflict. Woodrow Wilson envisaged a permanent American imprint on democracy in world affairs through participation in the League of Nations. Amid these defining events, Wilson suffered a major ischemic stroke on October 2, 1919, which left him incapacitated. What was probably his fourth and most devastating stroke was diagnosed and treated by his friend and personal physician, Admiral Cary Grayson. Grayson, who had tremendous personal and professional loyalty to Wilson, kept the severity of the stroke hidden from Congress, the American people, and even the president himself. During a cabinet briefing, Grayson formally refused to sign a document of disability and was reluctant to address the subject of presidential succession. Wilson was essentially incapacitated and hemiplegic, yet he remained an active president and all messages were relayed directly through his wife, Edith. Patient-physician confidentiality superseded national security amid the backdrop of friendship and political power on the eve of a pivotal juncture in the history of American foreign policy. It was in part because of the absence of Woodrow Wilson’s vocal and unwavering support that the United States did not join the League of Nations and distanced itself from the international stage. The League of Nations would later prove powerless without American support and was unable to thwart the rise and advance of Adolf Hitler. Only after World War II did the United States assume its global leadership role and realize Wilson’s visionary, yet contentious, groundwork for a Pax Americana. The authors describe Woodrow Wilson’s stroke, the historical implications of his health decline, and its impact on United States foreign policy.

Exceptionalism and Internationalism

2020 ◽  
pp. 12-34
Author(s):  
David F. Schmitz
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War I ◽  
The United States ◽  
Collective Security ◽  
World War ◽  
Treaty Of Versailles ◽  
Alternative Means

It was while serving as the undersecretary of the navy during World War I that Roosevelt fully developed his internationalist view of foreign policy. For FDR, internationalism meant preparedness, collective security, and cooperation with other nations as the best means to defend American interests and values. When the United States rejected the Treaty of Versailles, Roosevelt spent the 1920s seeking alternative means to implement his internationalist views.

Grand Strategies (or Ascendant Ideas) since 1919

2021 ◽  
pp. 143-172
Author(s):  
David Milne
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War I ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
The United States ◽  
Us Foreign Policy ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
World War ◽  
Global Power ◽  
Grand Strategies

This chapter investigates the most ascendant ideas at work in America's rise to become a global power and then a superpower after the end of World War I. Segmenting US foreign policy since 1919 by “grand strategy” would seem to require grand simplification. Even those administrations commonly identified as practicing quintessential grand strategy appear more inchoate when approached from the protagonists’ perspectives at the time. To give one such example, the sequence of foreign policy innovations that the United States spearheaded from 1945 to 1949 were collectively possessed of considerable foresight. But they were also a series of strategies advocated by various actors at different times with motives that do not necessarily reduce to a mono-strategic essence. Even in regard to post-1945 US foreign policy, a period that has been sub-divided by many distinguished scholars, it is difficult to identify clearly demarcated grand strategies that provide overarching clarity. The chapter focuses on the ascendant ideas that have informed policymaking, shaped public discourse, forced other ideas into decline, and that can perhaps even be identified as “representative” of particular eras.

Sectoral conflict and foreign economic policy, 1914–1940

1988 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Frieden
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Economic ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War I ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Foreign Economic Policy ◽  
History Of

The period from 1914 to 1940 is one of the most crucial and enigmatic in modern world history, and in the history of modern U.S. foreign policy. World War I catapulted the United States into international economic and political leadership, yet in the aftermath of the war, despite grandiose Wilsonian plans, the United States quickly lapsed into relative disregard for events abroad: it did not join the League of Nations, disavowed responsibility for European reconstruction, would not participate openly in many international economic conferences, and restored high levels of tariff protection for the domestic market. Only in the late 1930s and 1940s, after twenty years of bitter battles over foreign policy, did the United States move to center stage of world politics and economics: it built the United Nations and a string of regional alliances, underwrote the rebuilding of Western Europe, almost single-handedly constructed a global monetary and financial system, and led the world in commercial liberalization.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document