Revolution and Reaction in the Chinese Countryside: The Socialist Education Movement in Cultural Revolutionary Perspective

1969 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 92-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Baum

At the time the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) issued its now-famous Circular Notice of 16 May 1966, which roundly criticized Peking's Mayor P'eng Chen and thereby ushered in a dramatic new stage of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a large-scale and intensive Socialist Education Movement was still being implemented systematically in the Chinese countryside.

1971 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 37-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald W. Klein ◽  
Lois B. Hager

In the half-century history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), only nine congresses have been held. Since six of these were convened during the first seven years, only three congresses have been held since the Sixth Congress in 1928. If the Seventh Congress in 1945 can be characterized as the consolidation of Mao's rule over the CCP, and the Eighth Congress in 1956 as the consolidation of the CCP's mastery over the China mainland, then the Ninth Congress, held in 1969, is the story of the victors and victims of the Cultural Revolution.


1973 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 331-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Parris H. Chang

When a memorial service was held in Peking on 14 December 1972 for the deceased Teng Tzu-hui, member of the Central Committee (CC) of the Chinese Communist Party and formerly Vice-Premier and Director of the Party's Rural Work Department, among those present to pay their last respects were a dozen or so veteran cadres making their first known public appearance for several years. Likewise, some 30 ranking civilian and army officials appeared publicly for the first time since the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution at a Peking reception given by the Ministry of Defence on the eve of Army Day, 31 July 1972. These men were among the victims of the Cultural Revolution – they were accused of a variety of serious political crimes, humiliated in public, and dismissed from their posts in the Party, government, or army. However, their appearance in public now, even on such purely ceremonial occasions, serves to indicate that they have been restored to good political standing. Some of them have already been assigned to new posts, but the present positions of most others have not yet been revealed.


1970 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 169-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Parris H. Chang

In the course of the Cultural Revolution, both Chinese official and Red Guard sources have revealed that the so-called Chung-yang kung-tso hui-i (Central Work Conference)—an institution hitherto not well known to outside observers—had met frequently during 1960–66 and that these meetings were connected with decisions on important policy issues. While its existence and jurisdiction have never been formally stipulated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Constitution of 1956 or 1945, the Central Work Conference appears to have become an important locus of decision in the Party during the 1960s. There are indications that it functioned alongside of the Party's regular decision-making bodies, the Central Committee (CC) and the Politburo, and that it replaced, and possibly pre-empted, the functions of other institutional devices which Mao Tse-tung has utilized during the second half of the 1950s. This article examines briefly the participants in, and functions of, the Central Work Conference and other types of Party meetings, attempting to shed some light on the loci of decision in the CCP. Appended to the article is a list of known Party meetings from 1949–66, compiled from official and Red Guard publications, which may be of some use to students of Chinese Communist affairs.


1977 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
pp. 473-497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürgen Domes

Early in March this year visitors to China reported seeing in Canton a wall-poster with the headline “ [I]t's not a ‘gang of four’ but a gang of five!” (pu shih ‘ssu-jen-pang,’ erh shih wu-jen-pang!). The poster alleged that the new chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and premier of the State Council, Hua Kuofeng, had been a loyal follower of the Cultural Revolutionary Left led by Chiang Ch'ing, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yüan from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. It went on to claim that although he had turned against the personnel of the Left, he nevertheless remained a supporter of Leftist policies even today. We do not know whether the wall-posters “vilifying Chairman Hua,” for which seven men and two women were reportedly executed in Hangchow on 11 March 1977, and 26 people in Shanghai in early April, had carried the same accusation. But there is some evidence that certain, as yet unidentified, forces in China take a different view of the policies and attitudes of Hua Kuo-feng during the intra-elite conflict of the last few years, from that of most foreign observers of Chinese politics. Such observers have generally argued, since the spring of 1976, that Hua is a “middle-of-the-roader,” a politician having more in common with the ideas and values of the now dominant complex of veteran cadres and generals than with those of their “radical” Cultural Revolutionary adversaries.


1984 ◽  
Vol 97 ◽  
pp. 24-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Young

The legacies of the Cultural Revolution have been nowhere more enduring than in the Chinese Communist Party organization. Since late 1967, when the process of rebuilding the shattered Party began, strengthening Party leadership has been a principal theme of Chinese politics; that theme has become even more pronounced in recent years. It is now claimed that earlier efforts achieved nothing, and that during the whole “decade of turmoil” until 1976, disarray in the Party persisted and political authority declined still further. Recent programmes of Party reform, therefore, still seek to overcome the malign effects of the Cultural Revolution in order to achieve the complementary objectives of reviving abandoned Party “traditions” and refashioning the Party according to the new political direction demanded by its present leaders.


1969 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 54-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merle Goldman

From its inception until at least the Cultural Revolution, the Communist regime in China has had a twofold aim for its intellectuals: it has sought to indoctrinate them with the exclusive ideologies of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and it has tried to utilize their skills to develop an industrialized and modernized society. The Chinese Communist Party has attempted to implement these two policies by an insistence on the strict orthodoxy of thinking individuals, on the one hand, and by the encouragement of intellectuals to work creatively at their jobs on the other. This contradictory approach has resulted in a policy toward the intellectuals that has been alternatively severe and relaxed. Though the main trend is usually in one direction or the other, there have always been counter-currents present which can be revived when necessary.


Asian Survey ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Cheng ◽  
Lynn White

This essay offers data about China's Central Committee, Politburo, and Standing Committee, e.g., turnover rates, generations, birthplaces, educations, occupations, ethnicities, genders, experiences, and factions. Past statistics demonstrate trends over time. Norms of elite selection can be induced from such data, which allow a broad-based analysis of changes in China's technocracy. New findings include evidence of cooperation among factions and swift promotions of province administrators.


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