Interpreting Faith and Reason: Denys Turner and Bernard Lonergan in Conversation

Horizons ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-202
Author(s):  
David Hammond

ABSTRACTThe dogmatic constitutionDei Filiusof the First Vatican Council held as a matter of faith that it is possible to prove the existence of God through the natural light of reason and apart from the aid of revelation. The doctrine has been criticized for its abstractness and lack of historical consciousness, in that it neglects the conditions in the human subject for the possibility of such a proof. Denys Turner has recently defended this claim ofDei Filius. InFaith, Reason and the Existence of God(Cambridge, 2004), however, Turner does not address the nuanced position of Bernard Lonergan, who interpretedDei Filiusin a way that defended its conclusion but severely limited its applicability. I propose to bring Turner and Lonergan into conversation on the matter ofDei Filius'doctrine regarding the possibility of proving the existence of God.

Author(s):  
C. Michael Shea

This chapter undertakes a comparison of John Henry Newman’s reflections on faith and reason with those of his French contemporary, Louis Bautain, and the German writer, Georg Hermes. Both writers faced scrutiny from ecclesiastical authorities on the issue of faith and reason in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. The analysis shows that Newman shared affinities with both thinkers on the level of technical language and teachings regarding faith and reason. Newman’s view of implicit reason was at times strikingly similar to Bautain’s notion of raison, and Newman’s passing statements on proofs for the existence of God and use of Butler’s language of probability bore close and sometimes misleading resemblances to Hermes’s notion of Wahrscheinlichkeit. There were also key differences between Newman and these writers, which are shown in later chapters to have played a role in the early reception of the Essay on Development.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 131-147
Author(s):  
Frederick D. Boley ◽  

Fr. Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) proposed that human desire can prove the existence of God. The structure of human thought implies a Final Answer to the set of all questions, which can only be what everyone calls “God”—but what implications does this fact have for human happiness, and for counseling? This paper argues that counseling must have, as its ultimate aim, helping people to know Goodness, Beauty, and Truth, which is God. The fact that we can observe the facts about human cognition means that Catholic Christian counselors can ethically and effectively work with people from any faith tradition.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
pp. 95-100
Author(s):  
Reyber Antonio Parra Contreras

The text analyzes the relationship between Science and Faith in the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. The analysis is based on the position of the Vatican Councils I and II about the importance of Faith and Reason for man, in his search for truth; simultaneously, the orientations of popes Leo XIII and John Paul II were taken into account, in their Encyclicals Aeterni Patris and Fides et Ratio, respectively; some speeches by Popes Paul VI, Benedict XVI and Francis before the Pontifical Academy of Sciences were also analyzed. The Church has sought - from the First Vatican Council to the present - to bring, harmonize and complement the relationship between Faith and Reason; its interest is not limited to promoting scientific research; it also aspires that knowledge be ordered to the welfare of the human being, and the horizon of faith is recognized in the search for truth.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 133-148
Author(s):  
Saja Parvizian ◽  

Commentators have noticed the striking similarities between the skep­tical arguments of al-Ghazālī’s Deliverance from Error and Descartes’ Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. However, commentators agree that their solutions to skepticism are radically different. Al-Ghazālī does not use rational proofs to defeat skepticism; rather, he relies on a supernatural light [nūr] sent by God to rescue him from skepticism. Descartes, on the other hand, relies on the natural light of reason [lumen naturale] to prove the existence of God, mind, and body. In this paper, I argue that Descartes’ solution is closer to al-Ghazālī’s than commentators have allowed. A close reading of the cosmological argument of the Third Meditation reveals that there is also a type of divine intervention em­ployed in the Meditations, which helps Descartes defeat skepticism. This reading may buttress the case made by some that al-Ghazālī influenced Descartes; but more importantly, it requires us to rethink key features of Descartes’ epistemology.


2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 401-412
Author(s):  
Tereza-Brindusa Palade

This paper intends to question the conventional wisdom that philosophy should limit its endeavours to the horizon of modern transcendentalism, thus rejecting the presuppositions of faith. By reappraising Edith Stein's views of faith and reason, which are also shared by the magisterial document of John Paul II, Fides et ratio, an argument for the possibility of “thinking in faith” is put forward. But why would it be important nowadays to engage in rational research in philosophy in a quest for truth which also draws its inspiration from faith? First of all, as I shall argue, because the two great modern transcendental projects, namely the Kantian and the Husserlian one, which were both in tune with Spinoza's project to liberate philosophical reason from theology, have failed. Secondly, because “faith” (fides) is not based on “irrational sentiments,” but is “intellectual understanding,” as Edith Stein argues. Third, because the natural light of the created intellect is, as was shown by St. Thomas Aquinas, a participated likeness of the supernatural light of the uncreated divine intellect. Therefore, even the natural philosopher gets their own light from the eternal Truth of faith. Finally, by following another Thomistic stance, one may argue that the end of human life is an intelligible one: the contemplation of God. In order to attain this end, the human being should endeavour to attain as much as is possible, in an intelligible way, the thing desired. Even if the philosophical inquiry has its own limits, it may however sustain such progress towards the end of human life.


Author(s):  
Serge-Thomas Bonino

There are good reasons for thinking that Thomism (inspired by Thomas Aquinas), or at least a certain kind of Thomism, was undercut by the Second Vatican Council. Thomist categories are used sparingly and Thomist metaphysics hardly features. And yet a number of factors have enabled Thomism to renew itself in the post-conciliar Church. The persistence of institutions within which Thomism is taught, the vitality of recent historical studies on Thomas Aquinas, the renewal of a specifically theological interest in Thomas, and the persistent utility of Thomas in the exploration of the relationship between faith and reason have enabled Thomism to flourish.


1977 ◽  
Vol 70 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 327-341
Author(s):  
Edward K. Braxton

Can the existence of God be rationally demonstrated? This question has occupied philosophers and theologians for centuries and in a particular way since Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. This essay will examine the question of the knowledge of God as it is met by two contemporary Catholic theologians, Bernard Lonergan and Hans Küng. These two scholars are not chosen arbitrarily for comparison. Not only is each of them on the forefront of current theological development, but I shall argue that on the question of God the ambitious, but ultimately unsuccessful, efforts of the former are significantly complemented by the latter.


Author(s):  
Caterina Corbella

The article discusses the book by fr. Divo Barsotti “Dostoevsky. The Passion for Christ”. It carries a research project on the interpretation of F.M. Dostoevsky’s works by Catholic religious thinkers and theologians started in 2019. On the one hand, these analyses allow us to discover new ways of interaction between literature and theology, while highlighting Dostoevsky’s, although indirect, contribution to the change of the Catholic world after the second Vatican Council. The article presents the book, its structure, and main contents, and attempts to identify the peculiarities of Barsotti’s reception of Dostoevsky’s texts. Attention is focused on the concept of moral law as an evidence of the existence of God, and on the interpretation of Dostoevsky’s “profession of faith” and, consequently, on who Christ is for Barsotti and Dostoevsky.


1979 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis P. Pojman

In debate on faith and reason two opposing positions have dominated the field. The first position asserts that faith and reason are commensurable and the second position denies that assertion. Those holding to the first position differ among themselves as to the extent of the compatibility between faith and reason, most adherents relegating the compatibility to the ‘preambles of faith’ (e.g. the existence of God and his nature) over against the ‘articles of faith’ (e.g. the doctrine of the incarnation). Few have maintained complete harmony between reason and faith, i.e. a religious belief within the realm of reason alone. The second position divides into two sub-positions: (1) that which asserts that faith is opposed to reason (which includes such unlikely bedfellows as Hume and Kierkegaard), placing faith in the area of irrationality; and (2) that which asserts that faith is higher than reason, is transrational. Calvin and Barth assert that a natural theology is inappropriate because it seeks to meet unbelief on its own ground (ordinary human reason). Revelation, however, is ‘self-authenticating’, ‘carrying with it its own evidence’.1 We may call this position the ‘transrationalist’ view of faith. Faith is not so much against reason as above it and beyond its proper domain. Actually, Kierkegaard shows that the two sub-positions are compatible. He holds both that faith is above reason (superior to it) and against reason (because reason has been affected by sin). The irrationalist and transrationalist positions are sometimes hard to separate in the incommensurabilist's arguments. At least, it seems that faith gets such a high value that reason comes off looking not simply inadequate but culpable. To use reason where faith claims the field is not only inappropriate but irreverent or faithless.


2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (128) ◽  
pp. 407
Author(s):  
Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal

O presente artigo parte do famoso texto “Por que não sou cristão” de Bertrand Russell para apresentar algumas linhas fundamentais do debate atual sobre a relação entre fé e razão, e avaliar o quanto esse debate responde as indagações de Russell. Após expor as críticas do filósofo britânico aos principais argumentos em favor do teísmo, o artigo vai mostrar quatro abordagens da questão no debate atual. A primeira tenta dissolver o problema razão versus fé, ao defender que há concepções de fé que dispensam uma fundamentação da crença na existência de Deus. A segunda exemplifica as recentes abordagens da defesa argumentativa da crença na existência de Deus em termos indutivos e probabilísticos, apresentando algumas respostas às objeções de Russell. A terceira rejeita a tese fundamental de que a crença na existência de Deus só é racional se for baseada em argumentos. A quarta ataca o naturalismo cientificista pressuposto nas críticas de Russell à fé religiosa. Longe do que parecia no início do século XX, o debate sobre razão e fé está longe de resolvido.Abstract: This article stems from Bertrand Russell’s famous text “Why I am not a Christian” in order to present some fundamental lines of the current debate on the relationship between faith and reason and to assess to which extent this debate responds to Russell’s questions. After expounding the British philosopher’s criticisms to the main arguments offered to support theism, the article will show four approaches to the question in the current debate. The first one intends to dissolve the problem of faith versus reason by defending that there are alternative conceptions of faith which do not require a rational justification of the belief in the existence of God. The second exemplifies recent approaches concerning the arguments for the existence of God. This second approach uses inductive and probabilistic terms and presents some answers to Russell’s objections. The third one rejects the basic assumption that belief in the existence of God can only be rational if it is based on arguments. The fourth attacks the scientific naturalism which is presupposed by Russell’s criticisms towards religious faith. Different from what appeared to be at the beginning of the 20th century, the debate about faith and reason has yet to be resolved. 


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