Why Thinking in Faith? A Reappraisal of Edith Stein’s View of Reason

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 401-412
Author(s):  
Tereza-Brindusa Palade

This paper intends to question the conventional wisdom that philosophy should limit its endeavours to the horizon of modern transcendentalism, thus rejecting the presuppositions of faith. By reappraising Edith Stein's views of faith and reason, which are also shared by the magisterial document of John Paul II, Fides et ratio, an argument for the possibility of “thinking in faith” is put forward. But why would it be important nowadays to engage in rational research in philosophy in a quest for truth which also draws its inspiration from faith? First of all, as I shall argue, because the two great modern transcendental projects, namely the Kantian and the Husserlian one, which were both in tune with Spinoza's project to liberate philosophical reason from theology, have failed. Secondly, because “faith” (fides) is not based on “irrational sentiments,” but is “intellectual understanding,” as Edith Stein argues. Third, because the natural light of the created intellect is, as was shown by St. Thomas Aquinas, a participated likeness of the supernatural light of the uncreated divine intellect. Therefore, even the natural philosopher gets their own light from the eternal Truth of faith. Finally, by following another Thomistic stance, one may argue that the end of human life is an intelligible one: the contemplation of God. In order to attain this end, the human being should endeavour to attain as much as is possible, in an intelligible way, the thing desired. Even if the philosophical inquiry has its own limits, it may however sustain such progress towards the end of human life.

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
pp. 95-100
Author(s):  
Reyber Antonio Parra Contreras

The text analyzes the relationship between Science and Faith in the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. The analysis is based on the position of the Vatican Councils I and II about the importance of Faith and Reason for man, in his search for truth; simultaneously, the orientations of popes Leo XIII and John Paul II were taken into account, in their Encyclicals Aeterni Patris and Fides et Ratio, respectively; some speeches by Popes Paul VI, Benedict XVI and Francis before the Pontifical Academy of Sciences were also analyzed. The Church has sought - from the First Vatican Council to the present - to bring, harmonize and complement the relationship between Faith and Reason; its interest is not limited to promoting scientific research; it also aspires that knowledge be ordered to the welfare of the human being, and the horizon of faith is recognized in the search for truth.


Author(s):  
Walter Kohan

Philosophy of childhood is an academic field born at least with Heraclitus and his connection between aion (time), pais (child), and basileie (kingdom). There are many ways of understanding the nature, scope, and interlocutors of a philosophy of childhood, depending basically on the way two questions are answered, explicitly or implicitly: “what is philosophy?” and “what is childhood?” Even more, a philosophy of childhood can begin by a consideration of the word “childhood.” In the ancient Greek language there were many words for “child” but no word for an abstract substantive (childhood). In Latin, infantia is a rather late word, meaning literally “lack of voice” but used in fact in court to refer to those who were not allowed to give testimony in their benefit. So, the lack designated by in-fantia is legal, political, and not linguistic. In romance languages all words designating childhood come from that one: enfance (French); infancia (Spanish); infanzia (Italian); infância (Português), etc. So that in English, infancy would be more literal but because of the common use, in this entry we’ll use childhood. Is childhood a stage of human life? Does childhood need to be associated with (aged) children? An affirmative answer to these questions is the “obvious” and normal response, but not the only one. When childhood is understood as a stage of life, the concept of childhood is intimately related to the concept of adulthood and child-adult is an intrinsic, contrastive pair, so that every conceptualization of childhood implies a conceptualization of adulthood as well. A concept of childhood, then, is closely associated to a concept of time. While the concept of childhood as a stage of life presupposes a chronological concept of time (numbered movements composed by the past and the future, being the present a limit between both), with alternative concepts of time, other concepts of childhood emerge. Examples of these hetero-chronological concepts of childhood in the so called Western tradition are: Nietzsche (In “The Three Metamorphoses,” the child is the last non-lineal but circular transformation of the Spirit; it is not at the beginning but at the end of life); G. Deleuze, who invented the concept of “becoming-child” which does not refer to any personal child but to an impersonal force, a space for the transformation of subjectivity; J.-F. Lyotard, according to whom childhood is a state that is present the whole life as a testimony of a debt taken by the being with the non-being before each human being is being born; G. Agamben, who proposed childhood as a condition for language, history, and experience; and Paulo Freire, who understood childhood as curiosity and as a possibility though the whole life of any human being regardless of her age. At the same time, philosophy of childhood in contemporary philosophy is closely connected to philosophical inquiry and practice with children, a field that received great support in the contemporary period from figures like Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp, and Gareth Matthews.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-140
Author(s):  
John Hacker-Wright

Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalists argue that moral norms are natural norms that apply to human beings. A central issue for neo-Aristotelians is to determine what belongs to the good human life; the question is complicated, since we take up a diversity of different lives, many of which seem good, and it seems unclear what the human species-characteristic life really is. The Aristotelian tradition gives some guidance on this question, however, because it describes us as rational animals with intellectual and appetitive powers; the perfection of those powers is what makes us good qua human. This is especially well spelled out in Thomas Aquinas; he takes moral virtues of courage and temperance to be perfections of our sense appetites, a power of going for things presented as good through our senses. These virtues thereby shape our passions, specifically the passions of fear, daring and concupiscent love, which are a result of the sense appetites pursuing what appears as good. This view provides a framework for virtue, which can then be taken as the perfections of distinct powers shared by all human beings, though actualized in a variety of ways. In this article, I will focus on the passion of fear, which I here describe, following Aquinas, as a movement of sense appetite away from evils that are difficult or impossible to avoid. My focus will be on showing that this passion is necessary, irreplaceable by our cognitive powers, and that the underlying sensitive appetites that produce fear must be perfected for any human being to count as good.


Author(s):  
John M. Cooper

This chapter discusses the Socratic way of life. For Socrates, philosophical reflection and analysis concerning the human good, as well as concerning human deficiencies, dictate a particular way of life. This way of life is, practically speaking, the best for a human being. It is a life in which the practice of philosophical discussion is itself the central activity. Although in principle the best life is one in which we possess and live on the basis of wisdom, in practice the best human life—the best life any actual human being is ever going to live—is the one in which, like Socrates, we constantly and ceaselessly pursue wisdom through philosophical inquiry and discussion. The practically best human life is a life, not of wisdom (sophia), but of philosophy (philosophia), wisdom's love and pursuit.


2009 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adriano Pessina

La Dichiarazione universale dei Diritti dell’uomo del 1948 dell’ ONU ha posto in termini politici, e non soltanto filosofici o religiosi, al centro stesso della logica della cittadinanza l’affermazione della dignità umana e della libertà come qualità innate e non acquisite. Affermare che tutti gli uomini nascono liberi ed eguali in dignità significa affermare di fatto che la dignità è un attributo ontologico, una qualità intrinseca (e quindi inalienabile) dell’essere umano, al di là di differenze di sesso, di salute, di stato sociale. L’uso della nozione di persona come sinonimo delle qualità dell’adulto rischia di frantumare questo guadagno della politica. La biopolitica liberale rischia di essere fonte di discriminazioni tra gli uomini quando adotta un concetto di persona distinto da quello di essere umano. In essa rivive il dualismo antropologico proprio del platonismo. Le tesi di Hannah Arendt, di Eva Kittay e di Martha Nussabaum ci permettono di evidenziare i caratteri della persona umana sia come soggetto sia come essere corporeo diveniente nel tempo, secondo quell’intuizione che fu propria di Tommaso d’Aquino. Se si torna a pensare alla persona umana come essere umano diveniente nel tempo, è possibile salvaguardare i diritti di tutti e in particolare difendere quelle fasi della vita umana in cui la persona umana è esposta, per le fasi dello sviluppo o per la malattia, alla dipendenza. Solo così si può pensare ad una giustizia che includa tutti e tutte le fasi dell’esistenza, anche quelle segnate dalla disabilità. ---------- The United Nations Universal declaration of human rights (1948) has centred the assertion of human dignity and freedom as innate (not acquired) qualities in the logic of citizenship itself; this claim has been made not only in philosophical and religious terms, but also in political terms. Affirming that all men born free and equal for what concerns their dignity means to affirm actually that dignity is an ontological attribute, an intrinsic quality (and therefore inalienable) of the human being, beyond sex, health and social standing differences. The use of the notion of person as synonym of the qualities of adult risks to crush this gain of politics. The liberal biopolitics risks to be a source of discriminations among men when it adopts a concept of person different from that of human being. According to this view, the anthropological dualism peculiar to the Platonism lives again. Hannah Arendt, Evas Kittay and Martha Nussabaum’s thesis allow us to underline the human person characteristics as both subject and bodily being, according to the Thomas Aquinas’ intuition. If we think again human person as human being, it is possible to safeguard the everybody rights and particularly to defend those phases of human life in which human person is exposed, for the phases of the development or for the illness, to the dependence. Only in this way justice could be thought including all and all the phases of the existence, also those marked by disability.


2018 ◽  
pp. 5-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanislav Darula

Three elements mainly wind, water and sun seemed to determine in ancient ages the basic phenomena of life on Earth. Architectural history documented the importance of sun influence on urban and building construction already in layouts of Mesopotamian and Greek houses. Not only sun radiation but especially daylight played a significant role in the creation of indoor environment. Later, in the 20th century, a search of interaction between human life in buildings and natural conditions were studied considering well­being and energy conscious design recently using computer tools in complex research and more detail interdisciplinary solutions. At the same time the restricted daytime availability of natural light was supplemented by more efficient and continually cheaper artificial lighting of interiors. There are two main approaches to standardize the design and evaluation of indoor visual environment. The first is based on the determination of the minimum requirements respecting human health and visibility needs in all activities while the second emphasizes the behaviour and comfort of occupants in buildings considering year­around natural changes of physical quantities like light, temperature, noise and energy consumption. The new current standardization basis for daylight evaluation and window design criteria stimulate the study of methodology principles that historically were based on the overcast type of sky luminance pattern avoiding yearly availability of sky illuminance levels. New trends to base the daylight standardization on yearly or long­term availability of daylight are using the averages or median sky illuminance levels to characterise local climatological conditions. This paper offers the review and discussion about the principles of the natural light standardization with a short introduction to the history and current state, with a trial to focus on the possible development of lighting engineering and its standards in future.


1970 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-402
Author(s):  
Zainal Arifin

This paper attempts to analyze the development of integrative science at two Islamic universities, namely UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta and UIN Malang. The changes are not just ordinary administrative changes, but based on the epistemological basis of integrated scientific development between science and Islam. The changing of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga and STAIN Malang also showed a new relationship between science (general sciences) and Islam, which requiresmutual relations, mutual dialogue, mutual reinforcement to solve the problems of postmodern human life. The purpose of this relation is to create the graduates who are capable of competing in the postmodern world that increasingly sophisticated and advanced science and technology, in addition, the value of religionbased morality is not abandoned, so they become the holistic human being. Tulisan ini mencoba menganalisis pengembangan keilmuan integratif pada dua universitas Islam negeri, yaitu UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta dan UIN Malang. Perubahan keduanya bukanlah hanya perubahan administrasi biasa, tapi didasari oleh basis epistemologi pengembangan keilmuan terintegrasi antara sains dan Islam. Perubahan IAIN Sunan Kalijaga dan STAIN Malang juga menunjukkan adanya relasi baru antara sains (ilmu-ilmu umum) dan Islam, yaitu relasi saling membutuhkan, saling berdialog, saling menguatkan untuk menyelesaikan problema kehidupan manusia postmodern ini. Tujuan relasi ini untuk mewujudkan lulusan yang mampu bersaing di dunia postmodern yang semakin canggih dan maju ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologinya, selain itu nilai moralitas yang berbasis agama tidak ditinggalkan, sehingga menjadi manusia yang utuh.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-143
Author(s):  
Elena I. Yaroslavtseva

The article examines the impact of digitalization on human life and intellectual experience. The development of computer technology demands an understanding of new aspects of human development and requires a capability to overcome not only external conditions but also ourselves. Entering a new level of development cannot imply a complete rejection of previous dispositions, but should be accompanied by reflection on personal experience and by the quest for new forms of interaction in society and with nature. Communicative and cognitive activity of a person has an ontological basis and relies on processes that actually evolve in nature. Therefore, the creation of new objects is always associated with the properties of natural material and gives rise to new points of support in the development of man. The more audacious his projects, the more important it is to preserve this connection to nature. It is always the human being who turns out to be the initiator who knows how to solve problems. The conformity of complex technical systems to nature is not only a goal but also a value of meaningful construction of development perspectives. The key to the nature orientation of the modern digital world is the human being himself, who keeps all the secrets of the culture of his natural development. Therefore, the proposed by the Russian philosopher V.S. Stepin post-non-classical approach, based on the principle of “human-sizedness,” is an important contribution to contemporary research because it draws attention to the “human – machine” communication, to the relationship between a person and technological systems he created. The article concludes that during digital transformation, a cultural conflict arises: in an effort to solve the problems of the future, a person equips his life with devices that are designed to support him, to expand his functionality, but at the same time, the boundaries of humanity become dissolved and the forms of human activity undergo simplification. Transhumanism engages society in the fight against fears of vulnerability and memory loss and ignores the flexibility and sustainability of natural foundation.


Philosophy ◽  
1950 ◽  
Vol 25 (92) ◽  
pp. 3-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick C. Copleston

I. In the early part of the sixth century a.d. Boethius defined the person as “an individual substance of rational nature” (rationalis naturae individua substantia). This definition, which became classical and was adopted by, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, obviously implies that every human being is a person, since every human being is (to employ the philosophical terms of Boethius) an individual substance of rational nature. If one cannot be more or less of a human being, so far as “substance” is concerned, one cannot be more or less of a person. One may act as a human person ought not to act or in a way unbefitting a human person; one may even lose the normal use of one's reason; but one does not in this way become depersonalized, in the sense of ceasing to be a person. According to St. Thomas, a disembodied soul is not, strictly speaking, a person, since a disembodied soul is no longer a complete human substance; but every complete human substance is always and necessarily a person.


Author(s):  
Rik Van Nieuwenhove

Contemplation, according to Thomas Aquinas, is the central goal of our life; yet a scholarly study on this topic has not appeared for over seventy years. This book fills that obvious gap. From an interdisciplinary perspective this study considers the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the contemplative act; the nature of the active and contemplative lives in light of Aquinas’s Dominican calling; the role of faith, charity, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit in contemplation; and contemplation and the beatific vision. Key questions addressed are: What is contemplation? What is truth? How can we know God? How do faith and reason relate to one another? How does Aquinas envisage the relations between theology and philosophy? What role does charity play in contemplation? Throughout this book the author argues that Aquinas espouses a profoundly intellective notion of contemplation in the strictly speculative sense, which culminates in a non-discursive moment of insight (intuitus simplex). In marked contrast to his contemporaries Aquinas therefore rejects a sapiential or affective brand of theology. He also employs a broader notion of contemplation, which can be enjoyed by all Christians, in which the gifts of the Holy Spirit are of central importance. This book should appeal to all those who are interested in this key aspect of Aquinas’s thought. It provides a lucid account of central aspects of Aquinas’s metaphysics, epistemology, theology, and spirituality. It also offers new insights into the nature of the theological discipline as Aquinas sees it, and how theology relates to philosophy.


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