Rights to Oceanic Resources: Deciding and Drawing Maritime Boundaries. Edited by Dorinda G. Dallmeyer and Louis DeVorseyJr. , Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989. (Publications on Ocean Development, v. 13, Dean Rusk Center). Pp. xiii, 207. US$67.50, Dfl.125.00, UK$39.00. - The Legal Determination of International Maritime Boundaries: The Progressive Development of the Continental Shelf, EFZ and EEZ Law. By Gerard J. Tanja. Deventer, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990. (Publication of the T.M.C. Asser Institute for Private and Public International Law, The Hague). Pp. xxi, 360. US$73.00, Dfl. 120.00 (softbound). - The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries Resources: The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention Cooperation between States. By Ellen Hey. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989. (Published with Netherlands Institute for Social and Economic Law Research, Utrecht.) Pp. xii, 306. US$85.00, Dfl. 165.00, UK$56.00 (hardcover).

1992 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-97
Author(s):  
James H. Wolfe
Author(s):  
Erik Franckx ◽  
Aster Boeye

According to a 2018 count, there are twenty-two states that claim archipelagic state status. It was only after the independence of the Philippines and Indonesia at the end of the Second World War, when both countries made unilateral claims during the 1950s, that the demand for a specific regime for archipelagic states became articulated. Third states wanted to retain their navigational rights in archipelagic waters for economic and military purposes, while the archipelagic states wanted to claim these archipelagic waters as internal waters, following the swift development of the concept of coastal archipelagos after the 1951 judgement of the International Court of Justice through the creation, and codification a few years afterward, of the notion of straight baselines. The concept of an archipelagic state was only incorporated in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOSC), after nine years of negotiations on this issue during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III, 1973–1982), of which the first session was totally devoted to procedural matters. At the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I, 1958) and during its preparatory work undertaken by the International Law Commission (ILC, 1949–1956), the Special Rapporteur J. P. A. François already developed the concept of a group of islands or archipelagic states in 1953. States were, however, unable to find common ground because the concept at that time. Especially the legal nature of the waters on the inside of the archipelago proved to be elusive. It was consequently deleted from the ILC draft and even though specific proposals were introduced during UNCLOS I and II (1960) on this issue, neither conference reached any conclusion on the matter. The issue was picked up again during the work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (Sea-bed Committee) in 1971, which prepared the agenda for UNCLOS III. At UNCLOS III, the debate after a while (1976) totally narrowed down to mid-ocean archipelagic states, dashing the hopes of continental states, sometimes referred to as mixed states, to see their mid-ocean “archipelagos” included in the system being elaborated at that time. In the early 21st century, the provisions of Part IV of the 1982 LOSC determine the regime of archipelagic states in international law of the sea and can be considered as progressive development of international law. Never before had such a concept been written down in an international treaty. Due to the package-deal approach, a balance of interests can clearly be found in these provisions. New concepts are created such as archipelagic states, archipelagic baselines, and archipelagic sea-lanes passage, all of which are being carefully defined in the 1982 LOSC.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-23
Author(s):  
Pierre-Marie Dupuy

Twenty years have passed since the author's delivery in 2000 of the general course of public international law at the Hague Academy of International Law, titled ‘The Unity of the International Legal Order’. That course was designed to combat the all-too-common idea that international law was in the process of ‘fragmentation’. It did so by developing a theory focused on the existence of and tension between two forms of unity in the international legal order: the formal unity (concerning the procedures by which primary norms are created and interpreted, and their non-compliance adjudicated) and the material unity (based on the content of certain norms of general international law, peremptory norms). Twenty years later, the time is ripe to revisit this theory to determine the extent to which it is still valid as a framework for the analysis of international law, particularly as an increasing number of ‘populist’ leaders very much seem to ignore, or voluntarily deny, the validity of some of the key substantial principles on which the international legal order was re-founded within and around the United Nations in 1945. When confronted with the factual reality of the present state of international relations as well as with the evolution of the law, one can conclude that the validity of the unity of the international legal order is unfailingly maintained, and that its role in upholding the international rule of law is more important now than ever.


1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 871-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugo Caminos ◽  
Michael R. Molitor

For centuries the law of the sea operated efficiently on the basis of customs that had developed through uniform and consistent state practice and that were considered, in most instances, to be obligatory. It was not until the late 19th century that the evolution of the international community suggested the wisdom of codifying the existing and emerging customary norms. Although the early codification efforts were conducted by learned societies established for such purposes, the resulting studies eventually led to several multilateral treaty negotiations, including the Hague Codification Conference of 1930 and the three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea. The fruits of this evolution from the predominance of custom towards universal treaty law are found principally in the Geneva Conventions of 1958 and, more recently, in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 521-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
BÉRÉNICE BOUTIN

AbstractIn Nuhanović and Mustafić (5 July 2011), the Court of Appeal of The Hague held the Netherlands liable under Bosnian torts law in relation to acts of Dutchbat in the days following the fall of Srebrenica. The claims were brought by relatives of victims killed by Mladić's troops after being evicted from the Dutchbat premises, where they had sought refuge. When resorting to international law to attribute the conduct to the Netherlands, the Court shed light on the concrete meaning of ‘effective control’ when a wrongful conduct does not result from direct orders, thereby clarifying some of the questions surrounding the determination of responsibility for conducts in the framework of international organizations.


This chapter examines the concept of ‘force’ as invoked in public international law more generally and in Article 301 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) more specifically, with emphasis on its application as an aspect of global ocean governance. Article 301 adopts the formulation of the prohibition of force contained in the Charter of the United Nations, but a variation of this formulation can also be found in the definition of ‘innocent passage’ contained in Article 19(2) of UNCLOS. The chapter considers the scope of this prohibition and the actions — or activities — it was designed to address as well as the occasions when UNCLOS envisages some form of physicality or physical interposition by States occurring outside their respective jurisdictions. It also discusses the threat as well as the use of force as spelled out in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, along with emerging themes for ocean governance.


Author(s):  
Daniel Turp

SummaryIn light of the numerous secessionist claims witnessed by the international community, it is of great interest to ascertain if international law provides for a right of secessionist self-determination. An analysis of treaty provisions encompassing the right of self-determination of peoples, namely the United Nations Charter and the Human Rights Covenants, suggests that the latter treaties consecrate an authentic right to secede. Such a right appears to be unhindered by any customary norm which would prohibit secession as a means of implementation of the right of self-determination of peoples, seeing that the practice of States is clearly divided on the issue of secession. It is submitted, however, that there is a need for more detached criteria with respect to the right of secession, its beneficiaries and its conditions of exercise and, consequently, for an acknowledgement, to the benefit of the international community as a whole, of the legitimacy of national affirmations and secessionist claims.


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