On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 473-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott D. Sagan ◽  
Benjamin A. Valentino
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Michael Walzer ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Noncombatant Immunity ◽  
Jeff Mcmahan ◽  
Just War Doctrine ◽  
Moral Philosophers

AbstractIn their contributions to the symposium “Just War and Unjust Soldiers,” Michael Walzer, Jeff McMahan, and Robert O. Keohane add greatly to our understanding of how best to study and apply just war doctrine to real-world conflicts. We argue, however, that they underestimate both the degree to which the American public seeks revenge, rather than just reciprocity, and the extent of popular acceptance of violations of noncombatant immunity by soldiers perceived to be fighting for a just cause. We call on empirical political scientists, lawyers, psychologists, and historians to engage with moral philosophers and political theorists in debates about the influence of just war theory and the laws of armed conflict.

scholarly journals Evaluating the Revisionist Critique of Just War Theory

Daedalus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
Noncombatant Immunity ◽  
Jeff Mcmahan ◽  
Military Objective ◽  
The Military ◽  
Morality Of War ◽  
Modern Analytical

Modern analytical just war theory starts with Michael Walzer's defense of key tenets of the laws of war in his Just and Unjust Wars. Walzer advocates noncombatant immunity, proportionality, and combatant equality: combatants in war must target only combatants; unintentional harms that they inflict on noncombatants must be proportionate to the military objective secured; and combatants who abide by these principles fight permissibly, regardless of their aims. In recent years, the revisionist school of just war theory, led by Jeff McMahan, has radically undermined Walzer's defense of these principles. This essay situates Walzer's and the revisionists’ arguments, before illustrating the disturbing vision of the morality of war that results from revisionist premises. It concludes by showing how broadly Walzerian conclusions can be defended using more reliable foundations.

Method in the Morality of War

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Michael Walzer ◽  
Jeff Mcmahan ◽  
Ethics Of War ◽  
Morality Of War

This chapter introduces the two main ways to think about the ethics of war. The first is to start by thinking about war. The second is to think about the ethics of killing outside of war, then apply those principles to the case of war. In contemporary just war theory, the first approach has most commonly been associated with those who broadly aim to vindicate international law, such as Michael Walzer and his contemporary defenders. The second approach is more frequently linked to the work of Jeff McMahan, and Walzer’s other revisionist critics. I show that this conflation is mere accident. Indeed, perhaps the richest terrain to be ploughed is in the combinations that have been relatively neglected—vindications of international law that start from cases based outside of war; critiques of international law based on the distinctive nature of war.

Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott D. Sagan ◽  
Benjamin A. Valentino
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Survey Experiment ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Women And Children ◽  
Just War Doctrine ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
Moral Equality Of Combatants

AbstractTraditional just war doctrine holds that political leaders are morally responsible for the decision to initiate war, while individual soldiers should be judged solely by their conduct in war. According to this view, soldiers fighting in an unjust war of aggression and soldiers on the opposing side seeking to defend their country are morally equal as long as each obeys the rules of combat. Revisionist scholars, however, maintain that soldiers who fight for an unjust cause bear at least some responsibility for advancing an immoral end, even if they otherwise fight ethically. This article examines the attitudes of the American public regarding the moral equality of combatants. Utilizing an original survey experiment, we find that the public's moral reasoning is generally more consistent with that of the revisionists than with traditional just war theory. Americans in our study judged soldiers who participate in unjust wars as less ethical than soldiers in just wars, even when their battlefield conduct is identical, and a large proportion supported harsh punishments for soldiers simply for participating in unjust wars. We also find, however, that much of the American public is willing to extend the moral license of just cause significantly further than revisionist scholars advocate: half of the Americans in our survey were willing to allow an unambiguous war crime—a massacre of innocent women and children—to go unpunished when the act was committed by soldiers fighting for a just cause. Our findings suggest that incorporation of revisionist principles into the laws of war would reinforce dangerous moral intuitions encouraging the killing of civilians.

Civil War and Revolution

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Parry
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Popular Support ◽  
Civil Conflicts ◽  
Ethics Of War ◽  
National Defence

The vast majority of work on the ethics of war focuses on traditional wars between states. This chapter aims to show that this is an oversight worth rectifying. The strategy is largely comparative, assessing whether certain claims often defended in discussions of interstate wars stand up in the context of civil conflicts and whether there are principled moral differences between the two types of case. Firstly, the chapter argues that thinking about intrastate wars may help us make progress on important theoretical debates in recent just war theory. Secondly, it considers whether certain kinds of civil wars are subject to a more demanding standard of just cause, compared to interstate wars of national defence. Finally, it assesses the extent to which having popular support is an independent requirement of permissible war and whether this renders insurgencies harder to justify than wars fought by functioning states.

A Response

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 99-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Walzer
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Noncombatant Immunity ◽  
Moral Decisions ◽  
Theory Of War

Responding to the critiques of the four previous authors, Walzer opens with a statement of the inherent imperfection of any theory of war. He reminds us that theories are merely frameworks for decisions and cannot provide answers in and of themselves. Moral decisions in war are especially difficult, for it is often necessary to choose between equally valid claims. Walzer continues the discussion of sieges initiated by both Koontz and Boyle and concedes the validity of Koontz's criticism of inconsistency in his theory of noncombatant immunity. Addressing the different authors' moral doctrines–Hendrickson's consequentialism and Koontz's and Boyle's deontology–Walzer argues that it is better to judge each case individually, weighing both the consequences and principles, rather than strictly adhere to one moral doctrine, an approach commended by Smith. Finally, in the search for a perfect just war theory, Walzer issues a realist reminder that there can be no such thing as a morally perfect war.

War in Political Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Frowe
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Ordinary Life ◽  
Unconventional Warfare ◽  
Noncombatant Immunity ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Just War Tradition ◽  
Changing Attitudes

We can distinguish between three moral approaches to war: pacifism, realism, and just war theory. There are various theoretical approaches to war within the just war tradition. One of the central disputes between these approaches concerns whether war is morally exceptional (as held by exceptionalists), or morally continuous with ordinary life (as held by reductive individualists). There are also significant debates concerning key substantive issues in the ethics of war, such as reductivist challenges to the thesis that combatants fighting an unjust war are the moral equals of those fighting a just war, and the challenge to reductivism that it undermines the principle of noncombatant immunity. There are also changing attitudes to wars of humanitarian intervention. One under-explored challenge to the permissibility of such wars lies in the better outcomes of alternative ways of alleviating suffering. The notion of unconventional warfare has also come to recent prominence, not least with respect to the moral status of human shields.

Just War Theory & the Conduct of Asymmetric Warfare

Daedalus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-70
Author(s):  
Allen S. Weiner
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Just War ◽  
Central Element ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Asymmetric Warfare

A central element of the dominant view of just war theory is the moral equality of soldiers: combatants have equal rights to wage war against one another and are entitled to certain protections if captured, without regard to which side's cause of war is just. But whether and how this principle should apply in asymmetric armed conflicts between states and nonstate groups is profoundly unsettled. I argue that we should confer war rights on fighters for nonstate groups when they are engaged in violence that has risen to the level of armed conflict, and when the state against which the war is being waged is not entitled to assert its monopoly on the legitimate exercise of force, either because 1) the nonstate group has established sufficient control over territory to assert its own governing authority; or 2) because the group is located abroad. Conferring war rights on nonstate fighters does not, however, permit them to engage in acts that violate the laws of war. Fighters who commit such violations are individually subject to prosecution without regard to their group's entitlement to war rights.

Ending War

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rodin
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Moral Assessment

In “The Ethics of America's Afghan War,” Richard W. Miller argues that reflecting on whether and how to end the war in Afghanistan exposes serious deficiencies in just war theory. I agree, though for different reasons than those canvassed by Professor Miller. Miller argues that by focusing on the traditional categories of just cause, proportionality, and necessity (or last resort), just war theory obscures the importance of broader geostrategic considerations that he believes are the most plausible—though ultimately for Miller insufficient—rationale for continuing with the strategy of large-scale counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. I doubt that geostrategic considerations can play the role in moral assessment that Miller believes they do. But the phenomena he is pointing to do illuminate important defects in traditional just war theory.

scholarly journals A fundamental asymmetry in judgments of soldiers at war

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanne M Watkins ◽  
Geoffrey Goodwin
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Two Factors

How should we judge a soldier who is fighting for an unjust cause? Is such a soldier the moral equal of a soldier fighting for an opposing, just cause? According to traditional just war theory (Walzer, 2006), soldiers on either side of a war are moral equals, regardless of the justness of the cause for which they fight (the “principle of combatant equality”). According to revisionist just war theory, however, the justness of the soldiers’ cause should inform moral judgments of their actions; on this view, our judgments of soldiers on either side of a war should therefore be asymmetric (McMahan, 2009). Despite intense philosophical debate between these two theories, little work has examined how they align with lay views. Assessing this correspondence is important because people’s attitude towards soldiers may have a variety of consequences, ranging from their support for war, to their acceptance, rejection, or valorization of individual combatants. Across eight studies, we find consistent evidence that ordinary individuals’ judgments of soldiers’ actions are influenced by the justness of the soldiers’ causes, contrary to the principle of combatant equality. Two factors (partially) explain this effect: first, people implicitly presume that soldiers identify with the cause for which they fight, which influences moral judgments of their actions; second, people implicitly align themselves with the just side of a war, treating combatants on the just side as part of their ingroup, thus rendering more favorable moral judgments of them. Several other possible explanations were not supported.

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