Method in the Morality of War

Author(s):  
Seth Lazar

This chapter introduces the two main ways to think about the ethics of war. The first is to start by thinking about war. The second is to think about the ethics of killing outside of war, then apply those principles to the case of war. In contemporary just war theory, the first approach has most commonly been associated with those who broadly aim to vindicate international law, such as Michael Walzer and his contemporary defenders. The second approach is more frequently linked to the work of Jeff McMahan, and Walzer’s other revisionist critics. I show that this conflation is mere accident. Indeed, perhaps the richest terrain to be ploughed is in the combinations that have been relatively neglected—vindications of international law that start from cases based outside of war; critiques of international law based on the distinctive nature of war.

Daedalus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar

Modern analytical just war theory starts with Michael Walzer's defense of key tenets of the laws of war in his Just and Unjust Wars. Walzer advocates noncombatant immunity, proportionality, and combatant equality: combatants in war must target only combatants; unintentional harms that they inflict on noncombatants must be proportionate to the military objective secured; and combatants who abide by these principles fight permissibly, regardless of their aims. In recent years, the revisionist school of just war theory, led by Jeff McMahan, has radically undermined Walzer's defense of these principles. This essay situates Walzer's and the revisionists’ arguments, before illustrating the disturbing vision of the morality of war that results from revisionist premises. It concludes by showing how broadly Walzerian conclusions can be defended using more reliable foundations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Pattison

Recent discussions in Just War Theory have been framed by a polarising debate between “traditionalist” and “revisionist” approaches. This debate has largely overlooked the importance of an applied account of Just War Theory. The main aim of this essay is to defend the importance of this applied account and, in particular, a nonideal account of the ethics of war. I argue that the applied, nonideal morality of war is vital for a plausible and comprehensive account of Just War Theory. A subsidiary aim of the essay is to show that once we appreciate the importance of the applied, nonideal account, it becomes clear that the positions proposed by revisionists and traditionalists are, in fact, much closer than often presumed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-249
Author(s):  
Hanne M. Watkins

What is judged as morally right and wrong in war? I argue that despite many decades of research on moral psychology and the psychology of intergroup conflict, social psychology does not yet have a good answer to this question. However, it is a question of great importance because its answer has implications for decision-making in war, public policy, and international law. I therefore suggest a new way for psychology researchers to study the morality of war that combines the strengths of philosophical just-war theory with experimental techniques and theories developed for the psychological study of morality more generally. This novel approach has already begun to elucidate the moral judgments third-party observers make in war, and I demonstrate that these early findings have important implications for moral psychology, just-war theory, and the understanding of the morality of war.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanne M Watkins

What is judged as morally right and wrong in war? In the present paper I argue that despite many decades of research on moral psychology, and on the psychology of intergroup conflict, social psychology does not yet have a good answer to this question. However, it is a question of great importance, as its answer has implications for decision making in war, public policy, and international law. I therefore suggest a new way for psychology to study the morality of war, which combines the strengths of philosophical just war theory with experimental techniques and theories developed for the psychological study of morality more generally. This novel approach has already begun to elucidate the moral judgments we make in war, and I demonstrate that these early findings have important implications for moral psychology, just war theory, and our understanding of the morality of war.


Author(s):  
Helen Frowe ◽  
Seth Lazar

War is not the only or even the major cause of human suffering. But it is the cause for which we are most often most directly responsible. Our voluntary choices result in huge increases in mortality, massive refugee crises, and the dislocation of whole generations. So while there are other equally pressing problems facing humanity, none of them raises as pointed moral questions as those to do with whether and when we may take our polities to war and how we must fight if we do so. This Handbook offers a guide to thinking through the morality of war, from the perspective of contemporary analytical just war theory. This introduction explains the methodological and substantive choices made in designing the volume, then summarizes the key insights of the chapters to follow.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 473-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott D. Sagan ◽  
Benjamin A. Valentino

AbstractIn their contributions to the symposium “Just War and Unjust Soldiers,” Michael Walzer, Jeff McMahan, and Robert O. Keohane add greatly to our understanding of how best to study and apply just war doctrine to real-world conflicts. We argue, however, that they underestimate both the degree to which the American public seeks revenge, rather than just reciprocity, and the extent of popular acceptance of violations of noncombatant immunity by soldiers perceived to be fighting for a just cause. We call on empirical political scientists, lawyers, psychologists, and historians to engage with moral philosophers and political theorists in debates about the influence of just war theory and the laws of armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Paola Pugliatti

This chapter recounts how developments in the technology of battle had by Shakespeare’s time caught up with even the relatively resistant, cavalry-oriented English nobility. Outlining these technical advances, it discovers numerous moments in Shakespeare indicative of popular responsiveness to war and its new face. Alone among English writers, it was Shakespeare who (repeatedly) termed cannon-fire ‘devilish’; and the chapter demonstrates how different characters in 1Henry IV are on the turn in the long evolution from (equestrian) medieval chivalry, through (treacherous, infantry-deployed) gunpowder weapons, to the perfumed post-militarist courtier. It notes Shakespeare’s staged presentation of conscription as farcically at odds with the official theory of a voluntarism for able-bodied adults. Two soldiers miserably questioning the ethics of war the night before Agincourt prove well apprised of the Christian just war theory—yet Williams shrewdly contests its exculpation of royal leaders from responsibility for their subjects’ deaths.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly Hutchings

AbstractThis article uses the example of Wittgenstein’s decision to go to war in 1914 to frame a contrast between two different ways of thinking about moral stupidity and moral intelligence in relation to war, those of Jeff McMahan and Jane Addams. The article clarifies how pathways for thinking about the morality of war are blocked and enabled not only by different accounts of justice but also by different understandings of war. It is argued that if we want to be morally intelligent in our judgments about the ethics of war we should follow the pathway marked out by Addams and think less about justice and more about war.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Parry

The vast majority of work on the ethics of war focuses on traditional wars between states. This chapter aims to show that this is an oversight worth rectifying. The strategy is largely comparative, assessing whether certain claims often defended in discussions of interstate wars stand up in the context of civil conflicts and whether there are principled moral differences between the two types of case. Firstly, the chapter argues that thinking about intrastate wars may help us make progress on important theoretical debates in recent just war theory. Secondly, it considers whether certain kinds of civil wars are subject to a more demanding standard of just cause, compared to interstate wars of national defence. Finally, it assesses the extent to which having popular support is an independent requirement of permissible war and whether this renders insurgencies harder to justify than wars fought by functioning states.


While Just War Theory is the best account of the morality of war, along with many others, the author does not believe that actual decisions by states to go to war are often, or at all, informed by such ethical considerations. A much more plausible view is given by the doctrine of realism, familiar in international relations. This chapter discusses realism as a basis for evaluating weapons research in wartime, and here the author refers to Clausewitz views of war and politics. His conclusion, in a nutshell, is that since states on this account are only concerned with their own interests, there can be no assurance that the products of weapons design will not be used for aggression.


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