Truth, Lies and New Weapons Technologies: Prospects for Jus in Silico?

This article tests the proposition that new weapons technology requires Christian ethics to dispense with the just war tradition (JWT) and argues for its development rather than dissolution. Those working in the JWT should be under no illusions, however, that new weapons technologies could (or do already) represent threats to the doing of justice in the theatre of war. These threats include weapons systems that deliver indiscriminate, disproportionate or otherwise unjust outcomes, or that are operated within (quasi-)legal frameworks marked by accountability gaps. The temptation to abrogate (L. abrogare—repeal, evade) responsibility to the machine is also a moral threat to the doing of justice in the theatre of war.

Reading Kant’s Rechtslehre: Some Observations on Ripstein’s Kant and the Law of War

The chapter puts forward a semantic observation which he claims reflects not only Ripstein’s Kant interpretation, but also his own perspective as a long-term reader of Kant. Mertens observes that Kantian scholarship has become to a large extent an Anglo-Saxon affair, and Kant is read and interpreted against the background of political and legal problems of that world. History has shown that several readings of Kant are possible, and Ripstein presents a new, powerful reading of Kant which is indebted to that Anglo-Saxon background. Mertens discusses several intriguing questions, inter alia, Ripstein’s interpretation of Kant’s view on the law of war is the distinction between the just war tradition and the regular war tradition and Kant’s departure from both traditions.

Just and Unjust Uses of Limited Force

Limited force—no-fly zones, limited strikes, Special Forces raids, and drones strikes outside “hot” battlefields—has been at the nexus of the moral and strategic debates about just war since the fall of the Berlin Wall but has remained largely under-theorized. The main premise of the book is that limited force is different than war in scope, strategic purpose, and ethical permissions and restraints. By revisiting the major wars animating contemporary just war scholarship (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the drone “wars,” and Libya) and drawing insights from the just war tradition, this book teases out an ethical account of force-short-of-war. It covers the deliberation about whether to use limited force (jus ad vim), restraints that govern its use (jus in vi), when to stop (jus ex vi), and the after-use context (jus post vim). While these moral categories parallel to some extent their just war counterparts of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum, and jus ex bello, the book illustrates how they can be reimagined and recalibrated in a limited force context, while also introducing new specific to the dilemmas associated with escalation and risk. As the argument unfolds, the reader will be presented with a view of limited force as a moral alternative to war, exposed to a series of dilemmas that raise challenges regarding when and how limited force is used, and provided with a more precise and morally enriched vocabulary to talk about limited force and the responsibilities its use entails.

Jus post vim Revisited

This chapter revisits the theme of jus post vim in the non-ideal form. It begins by looking at the grey area between vim success and failure, characterized by shaky containment (the lingering doubt that the enemy is really contained) or by persistent contested order that threatens the ability of law enforcement mechanisms to uphold a minimalist view of order in certain states. Among the vim failures are the unjust escalation to war, the unfazed enemy outcome, the recurring last straw scenario, and the intractable contested and fragmented sovereignty dilemma. The chapter continues by exploring jus ex vi, or the ethical consideration of terminating the use of limited force, further to tease out what success and failure might look like. The key to defining success and knowing when to end vim operations depends on the just management of military risk principle. The chapter concludes by exploring moral options in cases of failure. Building on the observation that framing the use of force as punishment can be more restrictive than open-ended justifications based in self-defense constructed as prevention or protection against future acts of aggression, the chapter concludes by arguing states might have recourse to the punishment principles. Drawn from an interpretation of the just war tradition privileging a presumption against war as being at the heart of just war thinking, the escalation management and demonstrable retribution criteria depict the narrow moral logic where the legitimate goal of limited force is something other than the moral truncated victory of jus post vim.

Introduction

Limited force (vim) is different from war (bellum). Setting up and maintaining no-fly zones, conducting limited strikes, Special Forces raids, and the use of drones outside the “hot” battlefield have a different feel, seemingly falling below the threshold of war. They are different in scope, strategic purpose, and ethical challenges. While scholars tend to evaluate limited force according to just war principles, doing so misses considerable ethical precision and nuance. This lacuna warrants reformulating, reimagining, and recalibrating the just war framework and its principles better to understand the permissions and constraints of limited force. This chapter locates the pursuit of a moral framework of limited force, sometimes called force-short-of-war or jus ad vim, in the broader debates of the just war tradition. It poses three questions that set the tone for the wider inquiry. How are the moral concerns posed by using limited force different when compared to law enforcement and war? How does the ethics of limited force fit into broader debates about just war? What would a framework of the just and unjust uses of limited force look like? The chapter defends the choice of methodology—following in the footsteps of Michael Walzer’s turn to casuistry—as a commitment to the experience of using limited force, which entails discerning the plausible goals, engaging with how people talk about the various measures of limited force, and how they judge its use. Finally, it relates the status of the debate about vim and lays out the general plan of the book.

Epilogue

The epilogue briefly returns to the perennial debate between the just war and pacifist traditions of Christianity in the face of violence. The waste and destructive synergy of all violence, even reparative violence, suggests that the just war ethic attempts the absurd. Yet the just war wisdom of the Christian tradition insists that it is possible to find a productive logic in purposeful violence for the public common good. As the pacifist traditions make the gamble that it is not absurd to refuse the temptation of violence even in the face of aggression, and the just war tradition gambles that it is possible to restrain violence and direct it toward peace, these traditions should remain in conversation with one another and open to the possibility of glimpsing the witness of martyrdom in one another.

Combatants, Non-Combatants, and the Question of Innocence

Chapter 4 tackles issues surrounding the concept of combatant/non-combatant and the related notions of guilt/innocence, and the connection of these to the soldier/civilian distinction. The investigation is partly conceptual, but it also inevitably raises moral questions and their significance, since the tactical definition’s reliance upon such concepts relates immediately to the moral assessments enshrined in the just war principle of discrimination, which prohibits the direction of lethal violence at non-combatants and reflects a wider moral principle that prohibits violence against the innocent. Whether one or both of these principles should be rejected, modified, or allow of exceptions are further questions addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. The present chapter requires extended discussion of contemporary debates within the complex just war tradition, particularly between those loosely styled “traditionalist” and “revisionist.” It offers a judgment on the debate and discusses its relation to the author’s account of the nature of terrorist acts.