Managing Racial Inclusion: The Origins and Early Implementation of Affirmative Action Admissions at the University of Michigan

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 462-489
Author(s):  
Matthew Johnson
Author(s):  
Matthew Johnson

This introductory chapter provides an overview of how elite universities responded to black campus activists by making racial inclusion and inequality compatible, focusing on the University of Michigan (UM). Since the 1960s, UM has gained national recognition for its racial inclusion programs. University and college leaders from around the country began visiting Ann Arbor because they saw UM as a model of inclusion. For the same reason, opponents of affirmative action and racial sensitivity training targeted UM in op-eds, books, and lawsuits. Given UM's reputation, it was no surprise when the university found itself at the center of two of the most famous affirmative action lawsuits of the twenty-first century: Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003). In the eyes of black students, however, UM has never represented a model of racial inclusion. Black students' share of the student body has never matched blacks' share of the state or national population, and the majority of black students have never reported satisfaction with the university's racial climate. Nevertheless, black students' critiques never stopped UM leaders from claiming that racial inclusion was one of the university's core values.


Author(s):  
Matthew Johnson

This chapter assesses how the five-year period between 1970 and 1975 changed the University of Michigan (UM). The university implemented the most ambitious affirmative action admissions policies in its history, increased the number of black officials on campus, and redistributed millions of dollars to inclusion initiatives. At the same time, UM administrators deployed new and old techniques to co-opt black campus activism. They added new disciplinary codes to deter confrontational activism; expanded the inclusion bureaucracy; and fought against black, Asian American, Chicano, and Native American activists who tried to build on the Black Action Movement (BAM) concessions. By 1975, BAM's revolutionary vision that called for a new institutional mission was nowhere to be found. The university still had not reached the 10 percent black enrollment goal, and the racial climate was still creating obstacles for black students on campus. The fact that black campus activists were not able to mobilize a campus strike that rivaled BAM's in response to these failures signaled that executive administrators had a firm grasp on racial inclusion once again.


Author(s):  
Matthew Johnson

This chapter describes how the University of Michigan (UM) leaders fought to preserve the new affirmative action policies. In this context, diversity—the idea that a racially heterogeneous student body improved education and prepared students for a multiracial democracy and global economy—became a tool to defend and sustain the new policies. Diversity helped sever the purpose of affirmative action from addressing the inequality rooted in cities, offered ambiguous goals that helped officials avoid accountability, and advanced administrators' interests in introducing a corporate model for the university. The diversity ideal, in other words, did not spark racial retrenchment. Instead, diversity became a tool to sustain the university's policies of retrenchment. Administrators still had to work to retain control over the meaning of diversity and ensure it supported the new policies. When diversity took hold among administrators, black students and their allies tried to employ diversity language to undermine the policies of retrenchment. Administrators ensured that never happened.


Author(s):  
Matthew Johnson

This chapter examines the origins of affirmative action in the University of Michigan (UM). The pressure that led to the university's first undergraduate affirmative action admissions program came from a federal bureaucrat and the president of the United States, who were both responding to black activism for workplace justice. Yet this pressure never threatened UM with the loss of lucrative federal contracts or potential court cases. UM adopted affirmative action in 1964 because people at the top of the institution wanted the university to change. This environment of weak federal coercion created a perfect recipe for co-optation. After the initial dose of federal pressure, UM officials took control of the purpose and character of affirmative action, creating a program that preserved the university's long-established priorities and values. It is no surprise, then, that between 1964 and 1967, black enrollment rose from only 0.5 to 1.65 percent of the student body. However, given that African Americans constituted more than 10 percent of the state population, affirmative action made a small dent in the racial disparities at UM.


2000 ◽  
Vol 25 (02) ◽  
pp. 565-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lani Guinier

Lempert, Chambers, and Adams's study of the careers of three generations of students of color admitted to the University of Michigan Law School fills several important gaps in our knowledge about the consequences and implications of affirmative action protocols in law school admission. First, it provides empirical data for the argument that conventional test-based admission policies both mask and support deep flaws in the way we allocate opportunity and privilege.


2000 ◽  
Vol 25 (02) ◽  
pp. 527-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Wilkins

Lempert, Chambers, and Adams's superb new study of the careers of minority and white graduates of the University of Michigan Law School will come as welcome news to those who value diversity on this nation's college and professional school campuses. Alongside the Bowen-Box study (1998), to which the authors link their work, the Michigan data provide powerful evidence of the many benefits of affirmative action for both minority and majority students, as well as for a constituency that is often overlooked in the debate over affirmative action—namely, the people these aspiring professionals are intended to serve. More important, the authors' careful analysis reveals what many have long suspected. LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs “seem to have no relationship to success after law school, whether success is measured by earned income, career satisfaction, or service contributions” (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams 2000, 401).


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