Defining the Divine

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Sandberg
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Century ◽  
Registrar General ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
English Law ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Church ◽  
Supreme Being

At first glance, it appeared to be a technical and dry decision about the operation of the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855, yet the Supreme Court judgment inR (on the Application of Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriageswas actually one of the most significant decisions related to law and religion in 2013. The Justices of the Supreme Court held that a church within the Church of Scientology could be a ‘place of meeting for religious worship’ within section 2 of the 1855 Act. In so doing, the Supreme Court overruled one of the most well-known decisions in English religion law,R v Registrar General, ex parte Segerdal. InSegerdal, although the Court of Appeal had held that a chapel within the Church of Scientology could not be registered under the Act, the reasoning of their Lordships differed: Buckley LJ and Winn LJ focused on what they perceived to be the lack of ‘worship’, refusing to define the ‘chameleon word’ religion, while Lord Denning emphasised the phrase ‘religious worship’, holding that this required ‘reverence or veneration of God or a Supreme Being’ and that this was not met in the case of the Church of Scientology, which was ‘more a philosophy on the existence of man or of life than a religion’. All of these statements have been questioned by the bold Supreme Court judgment inHodkin, which provides guidance on how the terms ‘religion’ and ‘religious worship’ are to be understood by English law in the twenty-first century.

1. Origins

2020 ◽  
pp. xx-13
Author(s):  
Linda Greenhouse
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
National Court ◽  
First Century ◽  
Secure Base ◽  
Early Twenty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
At Home

How does the Supreme Court in the early twenty-first century differ with regard to the intentions of the Framers in 1787? “Origins” looks at the Court’s development from a diffuse institution, with judges based at home or traveling around the country, to a secure base in the Capitol. Ever since Article III announced a national court with the authority to decide cases “arising under” the country’s Constitution, the role of the Supreme Court has been a matter of dispute. From the beginning, the Court has filled in the blanks contained in Article III. How has the modern Court become able to define and exercise its own power?

scholarly journals Canada's Re-emerging Division of Powers and the Unrealized Force of Reciprocal Interjurisdictional Immunity

2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 2011
Author(s):  
Dwight Newman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Century ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Division Of Powers ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
National Programs

In recent decades, up to the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Canadian division-of-powers jurisprudence seems to have been in a period of quiescence, with modern doctrine imposing few constraints on the federal government's implementation of national programs. In this paper, the author argues that adopting provincial interjurisdictional immunity as the Supreme Court of Canada clearly chose to do in the Canadian Western Bank case and other cases, must imply further changes to recent federalism doctrine, potentially including the reaffirmation of spheres of genuine provincial exclusivity or even provincial paramountcy. 

PROPRIETARY REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

2014 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 490-493
Author(s):  
Matthew Conaglen
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Informed Consent ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Fiduciary Duty ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Trade Finance ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
English Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

FHR bought a long lease for €211.5 million. Cedar Capital conducted the negotiations on FHR's behalf, but also received a €10 million commission from the vendor. On becoming aware of this commission, FHR sought to recover it from Cedar Capital. As its negotiating agent, Cedar Capital owed fiduciary duties to FHR, and had not obtained FHR's fully informed consent to the commission. Cedar Capital therefore had to account to FHR for the commission. However, applying the Court of Appeal's decision in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd. v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 347, [2012] Ch. 453, Simon J. held that the remedy was purely personal; FHR could not assert a proprietary constructive trust over the €10 million: FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious [2011] EWHC 2999 (Ch). The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal as to remedy, distinguishing the facts from those in Sinclair v Versailles, but also casting some doubt on the correctness of that decision: [2013] EWCA Civ 17, [2014] Ch. 1. The Supreme Court was thus required to pass judgment on the voluminous debate as to whether English law should follow Lister & Co. v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch.D. 1, or Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 A.C. 324.

The U.S. Supreme Court: A Very Short Introduction

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Greenhouse
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Century ◽  
Short Introduction ◽  
Early Twenty ◽  
Capitol Hill ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The World ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Supreme Court: A Very Short Introduction draws on the Court’s history and its written and unwritten rules to show how it operates in the early twenty-first century. Today’s Supreme Court, housed in a majestic building on Capitol Hill, bears little resemblance to the institution launched by the Framers of the Constitution and was originally seen as the weakest of the three branches of government. Over the next 200 years, the Court put the independence the Framers gave it to use and now largely defines itself. How do cases reach the Supreme Court? What features have other courts around the world taken from the Supreme Court, and what have they left?

A Note on Mandela v Executors, Estate Nelson Mandela 2018 (4) SA 86 (SCA) and the Conundrum around the Customary Marriage between Nelson and Winnie Mandela

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Eastern Cape ◽  
High Court ◽  
Nelson Mandela ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.

The Right to Housing: Challenges Associated with the ‘Waiting List System’ Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality V Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 5 2014 3 SA 23 (SCA)

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Waiting Lists ◽  
The State ◽  
Waiting List ◽  
Allocation Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.

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