Res Judicata in the Court of Justice Case-Law

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Groussot ◽  
Timo Minssen

Forms of res judicata – Unwritten principle of EU law – National procedural autonomy v. EC supremacy – Revision of decisions v. state liability – Finality of administrative decisions v. judicial decisions – Higher respect for judicial decisions than for administrative decisions – Res judicata not absolute – ECJ itself under demands of legal certainty – Analogy between res judicata rules and rules of direct and indirect effect.

2020 ◽  
pp. 205-239
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars

This chapter addresses the Treaty's provisions on the enforcement of EU law, particularly looking at Articles 258–260 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). The European Commission's enforcement action, known as ‘infringement proceedings’, is set out in Article 258 TFEU. If the Commission proves an infringement has occurred, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will issue a binding verdict that requires the Member State to rectify the breach: in other words, to amend its domestic laws until they are compliant with EU law. Article 260 TFEU makes clear, however, that the CJEU can only order ‘compliance’. Article 259 sets out a very similar process, rarely used, for Member State v Member State infringement proceedings. The chapter then considers the CJEU's development of the principles of direct and indirect effect and state liability, and explores the remedies for breaches of EU law. It also assesses the impact of Brexit on the enforcement of EU law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-34
Author(s):  
Rob Widdershoven

This article examines the recent approach of the European Court of Justice of the EU towards the applicability of procedural national law in cases falling within the scope of Union law. It argues that the Court increasingly assesses such rules within the framework of the principle of effective judicial protection, as bindingly codified in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the EU since December 2009. This test is gradually replacing the rather deferential test on the Rewe principles of equivalence and effectiveness and implies a further limitation of procedural autonomy of the Member States. The reason for the shift seems to be the necessity to coordinate the Court's case law on Article 47 CFR with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 ECHR, because this coordination requires the application of a similar standard by both European Courts. As a result, the importance of, in particular, the Rewe principle of effectiveness, has already decreased to a considerable extent and might decrease further in future. Nevertheless, it is not to be expected that this standard will be abolished completely. First, because it may provide an adequate standard for assessing procedural issues that are not related to effective judicial protection or Article 47 CFR. Secondly, because incidentally it may be used by the Court for modifying national procedural law with a view to the effective application of substantive EU rules.


Author(s):  
Daniel HALBERSTAM

Abstract This article provides a constitutionally grounded understanding of the vexing principle of ‘national procedural autonomy’ that haunts the vindication of EU law in national court. After identifying tensions and confusion in the debate surrounding this purported principle of ‘autonomy’, the Article turns to the foundational text and structure of Union law to reconstruct the proper constitutional basis for deploying or supplanting national procedures and remedies. It further argues that much of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union may be considered through the lens of ‘prudential avoidance’, ie the decision to avoid difficult constitutional questions surrounding the principle of conferral. As the last Part shows, a constitutional understanding of ‘national procedural authority’—not ‘autonomy’—helps clear up some persistent puzzles, and provides critical guidance for when deference to national procedures and remedies is appropriate, and when such deference is misplaced. Comparative references inform the argument along the way.


Author(s):  
Margot Horspool ◽  
Matthew Humphreys ◽  
Michael Wells-Greco

This chapter focuses on direct actions before the Court of Justice. It is divided into two sections. Section I deals with direct actions relating to public enforcement of EU law between the Commission and Member States (Article 258 of the TFEU) and between Member States (Article 259 TFEU). The financial consequences of failure to remedy infringements are also covered (Article 260 TFEU). Section II deals with actions challenging the legality of binding institutional acts (action for annulment, Article 263 TFEU); action for failure to act (Article 265 TFEU); and the plea of illegality (Article 277 TFEU). It briefly examines the action for damages against EU institutions (Articles 268 and 340(2) TFEU), a Treaty-based action from which parallels can be drawn to the evolution of state liability, through the Court’s case law.


Author(s):  
Lorna Woods ◽  
Philippa Watson ◽  
Marios Costa

This chapter examines the scope of the doctrines of direct and indirect effect in the context of European Union (EU) law. These doctrines allow individuals to rely on EU law rights in national courts. It explains that while the Court of Justice (CJ) has emphasised that EU directives cannot have direct effect as against individuals (horizontal effect), its case law shows a range of developments which operate to undermine the simplicity of this position. The chapter suggests that granting individuals and national courts a role in the enforcement of Union law has ensured that EU law is applied and Union rights are enforced. It also considers questions concerning the idea of incidental direct effect, triangular situations and the consequences of the line of jurisprudence starting with the judgments in Mangold (case C-144/04) and Kücükdeveci (case C-555/07).


2020 ◽  
pp. 111-143
Author(s):  
Marios Costa ◽  
Steve Peers

This chapter examines the scope of the doctrines of direct and indirect effect (including ‘direct applicability’) in the context of European Union (EU) law. These doctrines allow individuals to rely on EU law rights in national courts. It explains that while the Court of Justice (CJ) has emphasised that EU directives can apply against the state (vertical direct effect: starting with the Van Gend case), but cannot have direct effect as against individuals (horizontal effect), its case law shows a range of developments which operate to undermine the simplicity of this position. The chapter suggests that granting individuals and national courts a role in the enforcement of Union law has ensured that EU law is applied and Union rights are enforced. It also considers questions concerning the idea of incidental direct effect, triangular situations and the consequences of the line of jurisprudence starting with the judgments in Mangold (case C-144/04) and Kücükdeveci (case C-555/07).


2021 ◽  
pp. 249-299
Author(s):  
Margot Horspool ◽  
Matthew Humphreys ◽  
Michael Wells-Greco

This chapter focuses on direct actions before the Court of Justice. It is divided into two sections. Section I deals with direct actions relating to public enforcement of EU law between the Commission and Member States (Article 258 TFEU) and between Member States (Article 259 TFEU). The financial consequences of failure to remedy infringements are also covered (Article 260 TFEU). Section II deals with actions challenging the legality of binding institutional acts (action for annulment, Article 263 TFEU); action for failure to act (Article 265 TFEU); and the plea of illegality (Article 277 TFEU). It briefly examines the action for damages against EU institutions (Articles 268 and 340(2) TFEU), a Treaty-based action from which parallels can be drawn to the evolution of state liability, through the Court’s case law.


Teisė ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 78 ◽  
pp. 137-151
Author(s):  
Skirgailė Žaltauskaitė-Žalimienė

Straipsnyje analizuojamas nacionalinio teismo vaidmuo įgyvendinant Europos Sąjungos (ES) teisę, ypač atkreipiant dėmesį į Europos Sąjungos teisės viršenybės ir teisinio saugumo principų galimą koliziją bei jų suderinamumo problematiką, kuri straipsnyje atskleidžiama remiantis Europos Teisingumo Teismo (ETT) praktika. Nagrinėjamas ETT Lucchini sprendimas, šio sprendimo išvadų reikšmė res judicata prin­cipui jo ribojimo požiūriu. The article deals with the role of national court in implementation of the EU law. In particular, atten­tion is paid to the problem of possible collision and compatibility between the principles of supremacy of the EU law and legal certainty which is revealed relying on the ECJ case-law. The ECJ Lucchini judgment is also analysed as well as significance of its outcomes to the principle of res judicata in regard to the limitation of the latter.sp;


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 257-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorota Leczykiewicz

AbstractThe emergence of private party liability in damages is EU law has been much discussed by academics, but it is clear from the case law of the Court of Justice that we do not yet have a principle of private party liability analogous to the principle of Member State liability. This chapter examines under what conditions it would be justified to claim that there was indeed a general principle of private party liability in EU law. Furthermore, the chapter explains that the introduction of the general principle of private party liability would require a thorough clarification of some of the most fundamental, yet still unclear, concepts of EU law, such as direct effect, the horizontal applicability of EU norms and the principle of effective judicial protection. It is argued that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to introduce a general regime of private party liability in damages is not without controversy and that the judicial creation of the principle will be legitimate only if adequate normative justification is provided for its presence in EU law. In this respect, it has to be recognised that EU competition law is not an adequate legal setting for the general regime to be born, because it does not bring to light tensions arising in other contexts.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 257-282
Author(s):  
Dorota Leczykiewicz

AbstractThe emergence of private party liability in damages is EU law has been much discussed by academics, but it is clear from the case law of the Court of Justice that we do not yet have a principle of private party liability analogous to the principle of Member State liability. This chapter examines under what conditions it would be justified to claim that there was indeed a general principle of private party liability in EU law. Furthermore, the chapter explains that the introduction of the general principle of private party liability would require a thorough clarification of some of the most fundamental, yet still unclear, concepts of EU law, such as direct effect, the horizontal applicability of EU norms and the principle of effective judicial protection. It is argued that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to introduce a general regime of private party liability in damages is not without controversy and that the judicial creation of the principle will be legitimate only if adequate normative justification is provided for its presence in EU law. In this respect, it has to be recognised that EU competition law is not an adequate legal setting for the general regime to be born, because it does not bring to light tensions arising in other contexts.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document