scholarly journals Supplementary health insurance as a tool for risk-selection in mandatory basic health insurance markets

2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANCESCO PAOLUCCI ◽  
ERIK SCHUT ◽  
KONSTANTIN BECK ◽  
STEFAN GREß ◽  
CARINE VAN DE VOORDE ◽  
...  

Abstract:As the share of supplementary health insurance (SI) in health care finance is likely to grow, SI may become an increasingly attractive tool for risk-selection in basic health insurance (BI). In this paper, we develop a conceptual framework to assess the probability that insurers will use SI for favourable risk-selection in BI. We apply our framework to five countries in which risk-selection via SI is feasible: Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. For each country, we review the available evidence of SI being used as selection device. We find that the probability that SI is and will be used for risk-selection substantially varies across countries. Finally, we discuss several strategies for policy makers to reduce the chance that SI will be used for risk-selection in BI markets.

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 75-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Glazer ◽  
Thomas G. McGuire

Abstract In many countries, competition among health plans or sickness funds raises issues of risk selection. Funds may discourage or encourage potential enrollees from joining, and these actions may have efficiency or fairness implications. This article reviews the experience in the U.S., and comments on the evidence for risk selection in Germany. There is little evidence that risk selection causes efficiency problems in Germany, but risk selection does lead to an inequality in contribution rates. A simple approach to equalizing contribution rates that does not involve risk adjustment is presented and discussed.


Author(s):  
Daniel M. Hausman

Evaluating health care institutions and policies should depend on understanding the economic complexities of health care provision and on our values of compassion, choice, efficiency, fairness, and solidarity. These values may conflict, so applying them is difficult. We must also understand the problems with health care allocation, including employing markets. Regulations are needed first because of asymmetric information: doctors know more about treatments than patients and can exploit them. Second, health insurance is a better bargain for those who expect to be sick. Consequently, health insurance policies attract purchasers more likely to make claims. This adverse selection makes claims and premiums skyrocket, healthy people drop out, and private health insurance markets collapse, unless everyone is forced to buy insurance or insurers deny insurance to those with pre-existing conditions. Third is moral hazard: if insurance pays for a health problem, there is less incentive to avoid it or to economize on treating it. Health care policies must be economically sound and morally defensible.


2009 ◽  
pp. 253-291
Author(s):  
Peter Zweifel ◽  
Friedrich Breyer ◽  
Mathias Kifmann

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document