scholarly journals Does managed competition constrain hospitals' contract prices? Evidence from the Netherlands

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudy Douven ◽  
Monique Burger ◽  
Frederik Schut

AbstractIn the Dutch health care system, health insurers negotiate with hospitals about the pricing of hospital products in a managed competition framework. In this paper, we study these contract prices that became for the first time publicly available in 2016. The data show substantive price variation between hospitals for the same products, and within a hospital for the same product across insurers. About 27% of the contract prices for a hospital product are at least 20% higher or lower than the average contract price in the market. For about half of the products, the highest and the lowest contract prices across hospitals differ by a factor of three or more. Moreover, hospital product prices do not follow a consistent ranking across hospitals, suggesting substantial cross-subsidization between hospital products. Potential explanations for the large and seemingly random price variation are: (i) different cost pricing methods used by hospitals, (ii) uncertainty due to frequent changes in the hospital payment system, (iii) price adjustments related to negotiated lumpsum payments and (iv) differences in hospital and insurer market power. Several policy options are discussed to reduce variation and increase transparency of hospital prices.

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lieke H. H. M. Boonen ◽  
Frederik T. Schut

AbstractWe investigate the impact of the transition towards managed competition in the Dutch health care system on health insurers’ contracting behaviour. Specifically, we examine whether insurers have been able to take up their role as prudent buyers of care and examine consumers’ attitudes towards insurers’ new role. Health insurers’ contracting behaviour is investigated by an extensive analysis of available information on purchasing practices by health insurers and by interviews with directors of health care purchasing of the four major health insurers, accounting for 90% of the market. Consumer attitudes towards insurers’ new role are investigated by surveys among a representative sample of enrollees over the period 2005–2009. During the first four years of the reform, health insurers were very reluctant to engage in selective contracting and preferred to use ‘soft’ positive incentives to encourage preferred provider choice rather than engaging in restrictive managed care activities. Consumer attitudes towards channelling vary considerably by type of provider but generally became more negative in the first two years after the reform. Insurers’ reluctance to use selective contracting can be at least partly explained by the presence of a credible-commitment problem. Consumers do not trust that insurers with restrictive networks are committed to provide good quality care. The credible-commitment problem seems to be particularly relevant to the Netherlands, since Dutch enrollees are not used to restrictions on provider choice. Since consumers are quite sensitive to differences in provider quality, more reliable information about provider quality is required to reduce the credible-commitment problem.


2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 405-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. HOLLAND ◽  
N.J.A. VAN EXEL ◽  
F.T. SCHUT ◽  
W.B.F. BROUWER

AbstractTo contain expenditures in an increasingly demand driven health care system, in 2005 a no-claim rebate was introduced in the Dutch health insurance system. Since demand-side cost sharing is a very controversial issue, the no-claim rebate was launched as a consumer friendly bonus system to reward prudent utilization of health services. Internationally, the introduction of a mandatory no-claim rebate in a social health insurance scheme is unprecedented. Consumers were entitled to an annual rebate of ₠ 255 if no claims were made. During the year, all health care expenses except for GP visits and maternity care were deducted from the rebate until the rebate became zero. In this article, we discuss the rationale of the no-claim rebate and the available evidence of its effect. Using a questionnaire in a convenience sample, we examined people’s knowledge, attitudes, and sensitivity to the incentive scheme. We find that only 4% of respondents stated that they would reduce consumption because of the no-claim rebate. Respondents also indicated that they were willing to accept a high loss of rebate in order to use a medical treatment. However, during the last month of the year many respondents seemed willing to postpone consumption until the next year in order to keep the rebate of the current year intact. A small majority of respondents considered the no-claim rebate to be unfair. Finally, we briefly discuss why in 2008 the no-claim rebate was replaced by a mandatory deductible.


2013 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 236-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. M. Maarse ◽  
D. Ruwaard ◽  
C. Spreeuwenberg

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wike Seekles ◽  
Guy Widdershoven ◽  
Paul Robben ◽  
Gonny van Dalfsen ◽  
Bert Molewijk

2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 564-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Berg ◽  
Tom van der Grinten ◽  
Niek Klazinga

References 8, 29, and 32 are incorrect as they appear in the article entitled “Technology assessment, priority setting, and appropriate care in Dutch health care,” by Marc Berg, Tom van der Grinten, and Niek Klazinga (Int J Technol Assess Health Care. 2004;20[1]:35-43). They should appear as follows: 8. Burgers JS, Bailey JV, Klazinga NS, et al. Inside guidelines: comparative analysis of recommendations and evidence in diabetes guidelines from 13 countries. Diabetes Care 2002;11:1933-1939.29. Zwart-van Rijkom JE, Leufkens HG, Busschbach JJ, et al. Differences in attitudes, knowledge and use of economic evaluations in decision-making in The Netherlands. The Dutch results from the EUROMET Project. Pharmacoeconomics 2000;2:149-160.32. Van der Grinten TED. Hervorming van de gezondheidszorg. Zal het deze keer wel lukken? Beleid & Maatschappij 2002;3:172-176.


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