Confucianism and Same-Sex Marriage

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Tongdong Bai

Abstract In the majority opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court over same-sex marriage, a claim by Confucius was quoted, which led to an uproar among Confucian scholars in mainland China. In this article, I will first explain the background of the debate over same-sex marriage in the United States, and why Confucius's claim was quoted. I will then show how a contemporary Confucian philosopher Zhang Xianglong addressed the issue of same-sex marriage from a Confucian perspective. In my view, compared with other mainland Confucians' responses, Zhang's are one of the most scholarly and moderate responses that nevertheless follow Confucian values. But he eventually rejected same-sex marriage on the Confucian ground. I will argue that, based on some Confucian values and principles which are shared by Zhang, we can answer Zhang's concerns with same-sex marriage, thus offering an even more moderate Confucian stance that accepts same-sex marriage. But this stance is still different from the typical liberal one. We will also see that, in order to accept same-sex marriage, it is the liberals, not the Confucians, who will have to deal with an issue—the acceptance of polygamy—that poses a serious challenge to the principle of equality, which is fundamental to some liberals.

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Charles Gardner Geyh

Chapter 1 introduces the long-standing debate over how best to select judges in the United States and summarizes the positions of the disputants to the end of exposing the interminable and seemingly unresolvable nature of that debate. When a court issues a decision that at least some of the population finds objectionable, the fate of its judges may depend on whether they are appointed or elected. To illustrate, the chapter contrasts the lack of impact on the U.S. Supreme Court justices from any backlash in their upholding same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges versus the failure in retention elections of Iowa Supreme Court justices following their upholding same-sex marriage in Varnum v. Brien.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-227
Author(s):  
Norhabib Bin Suod Sumndad Barodi

In view of the recent development brought about by the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, jurisdictions that retain the traditional definition of marriage have sufficient reasons to revisit the concept of marriage under their own laws. This article is an academic effort to explore whether the traditional or historic definition of marriage adopted in the Philippines, as articulated in its Constitution and other pertinent laws like the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines can withstand the new norm that Obergefell established in the legal system or constitutionalism of the United States. It attempts to project how the issue of same-sex marriage would be treated and decided in the Philippine context had it been an issue for which the Philippine legal system or constitutionalism is made to respond. This article emphasizes the incompatibility of the Obergefell decision with the Islamic definition of marriage and finds that the same decision is not entirely square with how the issue of same-sex marriage will be dealt with in Philippine constitutionalism.


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