International Law in the American Courts – Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.: The Decision Heard ‘Round the Corporate World

2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 639-682 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristen Hutchens

On June 30, 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued Filártiga v. Peña-Irala. In this landmark case, the Paraguayan plaintiffs sought to hold Americo Norbeto Peña-Irala, a high-ranking Paraguayan police officer, liable for torture that led to the death of Joel Filártiga in Paraguay. They rested their main jurisdictional argument “upon the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which provides: ‘The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.'” The Second Circuit held, “[D]eliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus, whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our borders, § 1350 provides federal jurisdiction.” It added that “Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.”

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Burley

The Alien Tort Statute, originally enacted as section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, grants the district courts original jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” In 1980 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit breathed new life into these little-used and somewhat mysterious provisions. The case was Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, in which a Paraguayan family brought suit against a former Paraguayan police chief for the torture and death of one of its members. The court upheld federal jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute. Finding state torture to be a violation of “modern international law,” it pronounced itself willing to enforce this law even as between aliens whenever personal jurisdiction could be obtained over the defendant.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 4-8
Author(s):  
Geoffrey R. Watson

The decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. left open a number of questions about the scope of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). One such question is the extent to which Kiobel ‘s holding on extraterritoriality applies to the oft-neglected final words of the ATS: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”What if one such treaty obliged the United States to provide a civil forum for litigation ofhumanrights violations that occurred abroad and did not involve piracy?


2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 966-984 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chimène I. Keitner

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum is the United States Supreme Court’s second decision interpreting the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which was enacted by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The ATS provides that federal district courts “shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Absent the ATS, such claims could only be brought in state, not federal, courts.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 565-568
Author(s):  
Carlos M. Vázquez

Plaintiffs and respondents, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. and United Carriers, Inc., were respectively the charterer and owner of the Hercules, a crude oil tanker that was bombed in international waters by Argentine military aircraft during the war over the Malvinas or Falkland Islands. The ship was severely damaged and had to be scuttled off the coast of Brazil. After unsuccessfully seeking relief in Argentina, the companies filed suit against defendant and appellant, the Argentine Republic, in the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs argued that the federal courts had jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C. §1350 (1982)), which confers federal jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1602-1611 (1982)) (FSIA) is by its terms the sole basis of federal jurisdiction over cases against foreign states. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court (per Rehnquist, C.J.) unanimously reversed the Second Circuit and held that the FSIA provides the exclusive basis of federal jurisdiction over suits against foreign states.


1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 555-559
Author(s):  
William L. Rodgers

At the recent annual dinner of the American Society of International Law I listened with much interest to the eloquent and impassioned address of Judge Florence E. Allen, of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting that the conservation of peace has not hitherto been, and should be made, the principal objective in the development of international law. I think that her views might be summarized not unfairly in the form of a syllogism. Undeniable is its major premise that war is cruel, costly in life and resources, full of horror—a terrible infliction on those who resort to it. The minor premise is that means exist and others may be discovered whereby disputes may always be settled and peace enforced without recourse to war. And so comes the conclusion that all these means should be sought for, discovered and used, after which war will be unnecessary and will disappear from the world, leaving us under the rule of perpetual physical peace, no matter what may be the mental and emotional differences between nations.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 644-649 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene Kontorovich

In the first criminal piracy decision by a United States court in nearly a century, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the federal piracy statute’s reference to the “law of nations” explicitly ties the scope of the offense to evolving customary international law definitions of the crime. The court went on to find that under current customary and treaty law, attempted piracy falls within the scope of the international crime. In doing so, it joined several courts in nations around the world that have confronted the issue as a result of the outbreak of Somali piracy that began in 2008.


1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry J. Bourguignon

In an article published in this Journal in 1932, Professor Edwin Dickinson pointed out that the Supreme Court, in the first thirty years of its existence, dealt with 82 cases which raised questions of international law. The Court and counsel before it repeatedly cited the familiar writers on the law of nations: Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and Vattel. As Dickinson pointed out, “It is an ancient doctrine of the Anglo-American common law that the law of nations is incorporated in and in some sense forms part of the national law.” Largely through decisions based on the principles expressed by the classical writers, the law of nations was early incorporated as part of the law of the United States.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 13-19
Author(s):  
Marco Basile

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. may be a Trojan horse. Observers who are sympathetic to the adjudication in U.S. courts of international legal norms—such as those against torture— have criticized the decision for limiting federal jurisdiction over human rights abuses abroad. Yet, despite this price, Kiobel might ultimately strengthen the foundation of international legal norms in U.S. courts. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion, limiting the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) from reaching overseas, rested on the principle that one sovereign state should not usually apply its laws within the borders of another sovereign state, and that idea is a bedrock principle of international law. The majority avoided the connection to international law by dressing up the presumption against extraterritoriality in a foreign-policy rationale, but its argument does not square with the historical record, especially when it comes to piracy.


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