Interpersonal Closeness Impairs Decision Memory

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-129
Author(s):  
Pınar Uğurlar ◽  
Ann-Christin Posten ◽  
Michael Zürn
Keyword(s):  
Trust Game ◽  
Interpersonal Closeness ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Self Construal

Abstract. We hypothesized that self-other confusion as a result of interpersonal closeness impairs people’s memory of their own decisions. Four studies (min  N = 352) tested whether closeness affects memory in cooperative decisions. Participants played trust games in which they entrusted resources to another person and then had to recall their own decisions. Study 1 showed that people with an independent self-construal recalled their decisions more accurately, suggesting that less self-other overlap results in higher accuracy. Studies 2–4 showed that people made more recall errors when they played the trust game with a close in comparison with a distant partner. The findings suggest that interpersonal closeness impairs people’s memory of cooperative decisions.

scholarly journals When trust is lost: the impact of interpersonal trauma on social interactions

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 1041-1046 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Bell ◽  
Benjamin Robinson ◽  
Cornelius Katona ◽  
Anne-Kathrin Fett ◽  
Sukhi Shergill
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Trauma ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Traumatic Experience ◽  
Healthy Controls ◽  
Post Traumatic Stress ◽  
Negative Beliefs ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Trust And Reciprocity ◽  
Post Traumatic ◽  
The Impact

AbstractBackgroundTrauma due to deliberate harm by others is known to increase the likelihood of developing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This is the first study investigating basic and dynamic trust in ‘interpersonal’ PTSD.MethodsThirty-two participants with PTSD and 22 healthy controls played a novel multi-round version of a monetary investment protocol, the so-called ‘Trust Game’, a task from the behavioural economics literature, which is considered to involve trust and reciprocity. We used two ‘Trust Games’ including cooperative and unfair partners.ResultsFindings showed an effect for lower basic investment in PTSD compared to healthy controls, that trended towards significance (p = 0.09). All participants showed behavioural flexibility and modified their trust based on behavioural cues from their cooperative and unfair game partners. However, participants with PTSD made significantly lower investments towards the cooperative partner than controls. Investments towards the unfair partner did not differ between groups. Higher trauma scores were associated with lower levels of trust-related investments towards the cooperative but not the unfair game partner.ConclusionThe association between reduced trust towards cooperative others in individuals who experienced interpersonal trauma could indicate acquired insensitivity to social rewards or inflexible negative beliefs about others as a sequel of the traumatic experience, which increases in a dose response relationship with the severity of the trauma. A specific focus on cooperation and trusting behaviour could provide a treatment target for future cognitive and pharmacological interventions.

scholarly journals Watching, being watched, and human interactions: evidence from trust games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kiyotaka Yageta
Keyword(s):  
Controlled Experiment ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Synergy Effect ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Human Behaviors ◽  
Optimal Behavior ◽  
Human Interactions ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Trust And Reciprocity ◽  
Opposite Gender

AbstractFace-to-face communication increases human trust, which is crucial for making important decisions with others. Due to technological breakthroughs and the COVID-19 pandemic, human interactions now predominantly occur online, leading to two situations: other peoples’ faces cannot be seen, but yours can, and vice versa. However, the relationships among watching, being watched, and face-to-face interaction are unclear in existing papers. This paper separately measures the effects of both watching and being watched on human interactions using a trust game. I derive the optimal behaviors of senders and receivers in the trust game and empirically validate it through a controlled experiment. The results show that more than half of the participants perform the optimal behavior. They also indicate that both watching and being watched enhance human trust and reciprocity, while the synergy effect of face-to-face is not observed. Additionally, women reciprocate more when they are watched, and trust increases when participants are paired with the opposite gender and can watch their partner. This paper theoretically concludes that the former comes from women’s social pressure that they should be reciprocators, and the latter from participants’ beliefs that the opposite gender reciprocates more than the same gender does. These results propose a framework based on watching and being watched affecting human behaviors and emphasize the importance of face-to-face communication in online human interactions.

Belief in others’ trustworthiness and trusting behaviour

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Macko ◽  
Marcin Malawski ◽  
Tadeusz Tyszka
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
The Other ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Actual Rate ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Trust Games

Abstract Data from surveys indicate that people, in general, do not trust others. On the other hand, in one-shot trust games, where the player decides whether to send money to an anonymous partner, the actual rate of trust is relatively high. In two experiments, we showed that although reciprocity expectations and profit maximization matter, they are not decisive for trusting behaviour. Crucial factors that motivate behaviour in trust games seem to be altruism and a type of moral obligation related to a social norm encouraging cooperative behaviour. Finally, we were able to divide participants into specific profiles based on amount of money transferred to the partner, altruistic motivation, and belief in partners’ trustworthiness. This shows that the trust game is differently perceived and interpreted by different participants

scholarly journals Trust Game Database: Behavioral and EEG Data From Two Trust Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chao Fu ◽  
Xiaoqiang Yao ◽  
Xue Yang ◽  
Lei Zheng ◽  
Jianbiao Li ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Trust Game ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Eeg Data

Don't stand so close to me: The effects of self construal on interpersonal closeness

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rob W. Holland ◽  
Ute-Regina Roeder ◽  
Rick B. van Baaren ◽  
Aafje Brandt ◽  
Bettina Hannover
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Closeness ◽  
Self Construal

Don't Stand So Close to Me: The Effects of Self-Construal on Interpersonal Closeness

2004 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 237-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. W. Holland ◽  
U.-R. Roeder ◽  
B. Rick B.van ◽  
A. C. Brandt ◽  
B. Hannover
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Closeness ◽  
Self Construal

scholarly journals Social capital dynamics and collective action: the role of subjective satisfaction in a common pool resource experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 512-531
Author(s):  
Leonardo Becchetti ◽  
Stefano Castriota ◽  
Pierluigi Conzo
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Low Income ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Low Income Countries ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Environmental Resource ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Subjective Satisfaction ◽  
Trust Games

AbstractIn low-income countries, grassroots collective action for the management of a common environmental resource is a well-known substitute for government provision of public goods. In our research we test experimentally what its effect is on social capital. To this purpose we structure a ‘sandwich’ experiment in which participants play a common pool resource game (CPRG) between two trust games in a Nairobi slum where social capital is scarce but informal rules regulating the commons are abundant. Our findings show that the change in trustworthiness between the two trust game rounds generated by the CPRG experience is crucially affected by the subjective satisfaction about the CPRG, rather than by standard objective measures related to CPRG players' behaviour. These results highlight that subjective satisfaction in a collective action has relevant predictive power on social capital creation, providing information which can be crucial to designing successful self-organized environmental resource regimes.

scholarly journals The Pay-What-You-Want game: What can be learned from the experimental evidence on Dictator and Trust Games?

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Greiff ◽  
Henrik Egbert
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Pay What You Want ◽  
Goal Conflicts

Abstract This paper introduces the Pay-What-You-Want game which represents the interaction between a buyer and a seller in a Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) situation. The PWYW game embeds the dictator game and the trust game as subgames. This allows us to use previous experimental studies with the dictator and the trust game to identify three factors that can influence the success of PWYW pricing in business practice: (i) social context, (ii) social information, and (iii) deservingness. Only few cases of PWYW pricing for a longer period of time have been documented. By addressing repeated games, we isolate two additional factors which are likely to contribute to successful implementations of PWYW as a long term pricing strategy. These are (iv) communication and (v) the reduction of goal conflicts. The central contribution of this study is an attempt to bridge the gap between laboratory experiments and the research on PWYW pricing, which relies largely on evidence from the field. By reviewing the relevant experiments, this study identifies factors crucial for the success of PWYW pricing and provides guidance to developing long-term applications of PWYW pricing.

You are who your friends are?

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-251
Author(s):  
Fabian Winter ◽  
Mitesh Kataria
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Bayesian Learning ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Laboratory Environment ◽  
Trust Games

We study the existence of homophily (i.e. the tendency for people to be friends with people who are similar to themselves) with respect to trustworthiness. We ask whether two friends show similarly trustworthy behavior toward strangers, and whether such behavior is expected by a third party. We develop a simple model of Bayesian learning in trust games and test the derived hypotheses in a controlled laboratory environment. In the experiment, two trustees sequentially play a trust game with the same trustor, where the trustees depending on treatment are either friends or strangers to each other. We confirm the existence of homophily with respect to trustworthiness. The trustors’ beliefs about the trustees’ trustfulness are not affected by the knowledge about the (non-)existent friendship between the trustees. Behaviorally, however, they indirectly reciprocate the (un-)trustworthy behavior of one trustee toward his or her friends in later interactions.

Trust Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent Buskens ◽  
Vincenz Frey ◽  
Werner Raub
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Individual Behavior ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Economic Prosperity ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Game Theoretic

This article offers an overview of different variants of trust games and shows how game-theoretic modeling can contribute to an analysis of conditions for placing and honoring trust in such games. The focus is on explaining trust rather than on explaining consequences of trust for individual behavior or for outcomes such as societal cohesion or economic prosperity. Specifically, game-theoretic modeling allows for analyzing how the “embeddedness” of trust games in long-term relations between actors and in networks of relations can be a basis for informal norms and institutions of trust. Game-theoretic modeling also allows for analyzing actors’ incentives to modify embeddedness characteristics so that informal norms and institutions of trust become feasible. We discuss how game-theoretic models can be used to derive testable predictions for experiments with trust games and sketch empirical evidence from such experiments.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document