You are who your friends are?

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-251
Author(s):  
Fabian Winter ◽  
Mitesh Kataria
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Bayesian Learning ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Laboratory Environment ◽  
Trust Games

We study the existence of homophily (i.e. the tendency for people to be friends with people who are similar to themselves) with respect to trustworthiness. We ask whether two friends show similarly trustworthy behavior toward strangers, and whether such behavior is expected by a third party. We develop a simple model of Bayesian learning in trust games and test the derived hypotheses in a controlled laboratory environment. In the experiment, two trustees sequentially play a trust game with the same trustor, where the trustees depending on treatment are either friends or strangers to each other. We confirm the existence of homophily with respect to trustworthiness. The trustors’ beliefs about the trustees’ trustfulness are not affected by the knowledge about the (non-)existent friendship between the trustees. Behaviorally, however, they indirectly reciprocate the (un-)trustworthy behavior of one trustee toward his or her friends in later interactions.

scholarly journals When trust is lost: the impact of interpersonal trauma on social interactions

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 1041-1046 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Bell ◽  
Benjamin Robinson ◽  
Cornelius Katona ◽  
Anne-Kathrin Fett ◽  
Sukhi Shergill
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Trauma ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Traumatic Experience ◽  
Healthy Controls ◽  
Post Traumatic Stress ◽  
Negative Beliefs ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Trust And Reciprocity ◽  
Post Traumatic ◽  
The Impact

AbstractBackgroundTrauma due to deliberate harm by others is known to increase the likelihood of developing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This is the first study investigating basic and dynamic trust in ‘interpersonal’ PTSD.MethodsThirty-two participants with PTSD and 22 healthy controls played a novel multi-round version of a monetary investment protocol, the so-called ‘Trust Game’, a task from the behavioural economics literature, which is considered to involve trust and reciprocity. We used two ‘Trust Games’ including cooperative and unfair partners.ResultsFindings showed an effect for lower basic investment in PTSD compared to healthy controls, that trended towards significance (p = 0.09). All participants showed behavioural flexibility and modified their trust based on behavioural cues from their cooperative and unfair game partners. However, participants with PTSD made significantly lower investments towards the cooperative partner than controls. Investments towards the unfair partner did not differ between groups. Higher trauma scores were associated with lower levels of trust-related investments towards the cooperative but not the unfair game partner.ConclusionThe association between reduced trust towards cooperative others in individuals who experienced interpersonal trauma could indicate acquired insensitivity to social rewards or inflexible negative beliefs about others as a sequel of the traumatic experience, which increases in a dose response relationship with the severity of the trauma. A specific focus on cooperation and trusting behaviour could provide a treatment target for future cognitive and pharmacological interventions.

scholarly journals Watching, being watched, and human interactions: evidence from trust games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kiyotaka Yageta
Keyword(s):  
Controlled Experiment ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Synergy Effect ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Human Behaviors ◽  
Optimal Behavior ◽  
Human Interactions ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Trust And Reciprocity ◽  
Opposite Gender

AbstractFace-to-face communication increases human trust, which is crucial for making important decisions with others. Due to technological breakthroughs and the COVID-19 pandemic, human interactions now predominantly occur online, leading to two situations: other peoples’ faces cannot be seen, but yours can, and vice versa. However, the relationships among watching, being watched, and face-to-face interaction are unclear in existing papers. This paper separately measures the effects of both watching and being watched on human interactions using a trust game. I derive the optimal behaviors of senders and receivers in the trust game and empirically validate it through a controlled experiment. The results show that more than half of the participants perform the optimal behavior. They also indicate that both watching and being watched enhance human trust and reciprocity, while the synergy effect of face-to-face is not observed. Additionally, women reciprocate more when they are watched, and trust increases when participants are paired with the opposite gender and can watch their partner. This paper theoretically concludes that the former comes from women’s social pressure that they should be reciprocators, and the latter from participants’ beliefs that the opposite gender reciprocates more than the same gender does. These results propose a framework based on watching and being watched affecting human behaviors and emphasize the importance of face-to-face communication in online human interactions.

I’M SO ANGRY I COULD HELP YOU: MORAL OUTRAGE AS A DRIVER OF VICTIM COMPENSATION

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik W. Thulin ◽  
Cristina Bicchieri
Keyword(s):  
Social Norm ◽  
Helping Behavior ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Empathic Concern ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Moral Rule ◽  
Moral Outrage ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Victim Compensation

Abstract:Recent behavioral economics studies have shown that third parties compensate players in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games. However, there are almost no studies about what drives third parties to compensate victims in such games. It can be argued that compensation is a form of helping; and helping behavior, in a variety of forms, has been widely researched, especially with regard to motivators. Previous work on helping behavior has focused on empathic concern as a primary driver. In sharp contrast, anger is often seen as an antisocial motivator resulting in aggression. However, other research has shown that moral outrage, anger evoked by the violation of a moral rule or a social norm, can lead to the punishment of a perpetrator, often described as altruistic or pro-social punishment. Some of the motivations for pro-social punishment, namely a concern for justice or the restoration of community values, can also be realized through victim compensation. We therefore propose the hypothesis that moral outrage leads to compensating behavior above and beyond what is predicted by empathic concern, but only when a social norm has been violated. We test this hypothesis in two studies, both of which use modified trust games in which the investor experiences a loss due either to a social norm violation or some other cause. Study 1 shows that trait moral outrage predicts third-party compensatory behavior above and beyond empathic concern, but only when a social norm is violated. To better understand the causal mechanism, Study 2 directly manipulated moral outrage, showing again that moral outrage leads to compensation, but only when a social norm is violated.

Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tommaso Batistoni ◽  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Nichola Raihani
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Work ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Relative Strength ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Audience Effects ◽  
Interaction Partners

Third-party punishment has been hypothesised to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent. Previous theoretical and empirical work has shown that individuals might escalate signals of cooperative intent when there is competition to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate the hypothesis that competition to be chosen as a social partner leads to escalating investment in third-party punishment. In the same scenario, we also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Investments in third-party helping were higher than investments in third-party punishment – and also exhibited a more robust positive association with audience effects. We did not find a clear effect of partner choice (over and above simply being observed) on either punishment or helping investments. Third-parties who invested more in helping were preferred as partners and were sent more money in a subsequent trust game. Third-party punishers were slightly preferred as interaction partners but less so than third-party helpers. In addition, we found that the amount invested in third-party punishment or helping was a reliable indicator of the individual’s trustworthiness: those who invested more returned a higher proportion of any entrusted amount. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy, but the same was not true for individuals who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of help as a less ambiguous signal of cooperative intent.

Interpersonal Closeness Impairs Decision Memory

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-129
Author(s):  
Pınar Uğurlar ◽  
Ann-Christin Posten ◽  
Michael Zürn
Keyword(s):  
Trust Game ◽  
Interpersonal Closeness ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Self Construal

Abstract. We hypothesized that self-other confusion as a result of interpersonal closeness impairs people’s memory of their own decisions. Four studies (min  N = 352) tested whether closeness affects memory in cooperative decisions. Participants played trust games in which they entrusted resources to another person and then had to recall their own decisions. Study 1 showed that people with an independent self-construal recalled their decisions more accurately, suggesting that less self-other overlap results in higher accuracy. Studies 2–4 showed that people made more recall errors when they played the trust game with a close in comparison with a distant partner. The findings suggest that interpersonal closeness impairs people’s memory of cooperative decisions.

scholarly journals Quantifying the sensing power of vehicle fleets

2019 ◽  
Vol 116 (26) ◽  
pp. 12752-12757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin P. O’Keeffe ◽  
Amin Anjomshoaa ◽  
Steven H. Strogatz ◽  
Paolo Santi ◽  
Carlo Ratti
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Traffic Congestion ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Urban Environments ◽  
Diagnostic Information ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Street Network ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Natural Hosts

Sensors can measure air quality, traffic congestion, and other aspects of urban environments. The fine-grained diagnostic information they provide could help urban managers to monitor a city’s health. Recently, a “drive-by” paradigm has been proposed in which sensors are deployed on third-party vehicles, enabling wide coverage at low cost. Research on drive-by sensing has mostly focused on sensor engineering, but a key question remains unexplored: How many vehicles would be required to adequately scan a city? Here, we address this question by analyzing the sensing power of a taxi fleet. Taxis, being numerous in cities, are natural hosts for the sensors. Using a ball-in-bin model in tandem with a simple model of taxi movements, we analytically determine the fraction of a city’s street network sensed by a fleet of taxis during a day. Our results agree with taxi data obtained from nine major cities and reveal that a remarkably small number of taxis can scan a large number of streets. This finding appears to be universal, indicating its applicability to cities beyond those analyzed here. Moreover, because taxis’ motion combines randomness and regularity (passengers’ destinations being random, but the routes to them being deterministic), the spreading properties of taxi fleets are unusual; in stark contrast to random walks, the stationary densities of our taxi model obey Zipf’s law, consistent with empirical taxi data. Our results have direct utility for town councilors, smart-city designers, and other urban decision makers.

Belief in others’ trustworthiness and trusting behaviour

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Macko ◽  
Marcin Malawski ◽  
Tadeusz Tyszka
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
The Other ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Actual Rate ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Trust Games

Abstract Data from surveys indicate that people, in general, do not trust others. On the other hand, in one-shot trust games, where the player decides whether to send money to an anonymous partner, the actual rate of trust is relatively high. In two experiments, we showed that although reciprocity expectations and profit maximization matter, they are not decisive for trusting behaviour. Crucial factors that motivate behaviour in trust games seem to be altruism and a type of moral obligation related to a social norm encouraging cooperative behaviour. Finally, we were able to divide participants into specific profiles based on amount of money transferred to the partner, altruistic motivation, and belief in partners’ trustworthiness. This shows that the trust game is differently perceived and interpreted by different participants

A Simple Model of Corporate Fiduciary Duties: With an Application to Corporate Compliance

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
William C. Bunting
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Court System ◽  
Corporate Compliance ◽  
Corporate Loyalty ◽  
Audit Technology

Abstract This article models the duty of care as a response to moral hazard where the principal seeks to induce effort that is costly to the agent and unobservable by the principal. The duty of loyalty, by contrast, is modeled as a response to adverse selection where the principal seeks truthful disclosure of private information held by the agent. This model of corporate loyalty differs importantly with standard adverse selection models, however, in that the principal cannot use available contracting variables as a screening mechanism to ensure honest disclosure and must rely upon the use of an external third-party audit technology, such as the court system. This article extends the model to the issue of corporate compliance and argues that the optimal judicial approach would define the duty to monitor as a subset of due care – and not loyalty – but hold that the usual legal protections provided for due care violations no longer apply.

scholarly journals Trust Game Database: Behavioral and EEG Data From Two Trust Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chao Fu ◽  
Xiaoqiang Yao ◽  
Xue Yang ◽  
Lei Zheng ◽  
Jianbiao Li ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Trust Game ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
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