Causal explanation, teleological explanation: On radical particularism in attribution theory.

1979 ◽  
Vol 37 (9) ◽  
pp. 1447-1457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arie W. Kruglanski
Author(s):  
Klaus Corcilius

This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 6 (MA 6). In this chapter Aristotle resumes the discussion of the common cause of animal self-motion. For this purpose the chapter introduces the technical vocabulary from De Anima III 9–11, e.g. desire, phantasia, nous, perception. The contribution argues, among other things, that MA 6 marks the beginning, not of Aristotle’s teleological explanation of animal motion, but of his common causal explanation of animal self-motion in the sense of the efficient cause common to all sublunary living beings capable of moving themselves locally.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-124
Author(s):  
Zdenko Kodelja

The reasons for education reforms – as a particular form of social reforms – are either consequentialist or non-consequentialist. However, the reasons for the education reforms that are briefly discussed from the perspective of the philosophy of education in the present paper are above all consequentialist. These are the reasons for proposed education reforms in EU countries whose strategic aim is equated with the enhancement of two values: creativity and innovation. It is supposed that these education reforms will have good effects and not that they are good in and of themselves. Therefore, although creativity and innovation might be seen as having intrinsic value, they are – in these education reforms – treated predominantly as instrumental values. It seems that the introduction of such education reforms can be understood as a decision founded not on causal explanation, but rather on the basis of a special type of teleological explanation, which has the logical form of a “practical syllogism”. In this case, the occurrence of an action is explained in terms of the goals and purposes of the agent; it shows that the agent did what s/he did because s/he tried to achieve a certain goal and believed that certain means were necessary or sufficient for achieving this goal.


1979 ◽  
Vol 37 (9) ◽  
pp. 1441-1446 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Harvey ◽  
Jalie A. Tucker
Keyword(s):  

1974 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur L. Beaman ◽  
Soren Svanum ◽  
Spencer Manlove ◽  
Charlotte Hampton
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Richard Healey

We can use quantum theory to explain an enormous variety of phenomena by showing why they were to be expected and what they depend on. These explanations of probabilistic phenomena involve applications of the Born rule: to accept quantum theory is to let relevant Born probabilities guide one’s credences about presently inaccessible events. We use quantum theory to explain a probabilistic phenomenon by showing how its probabilities follow from a correct application of the Born rule, thereby exhibiting the phenomenon’s dependence on the quantum state to be assigned in circumstances of that type. This is not a causal explanation since a probabilistic phenomenon is not constituted by events that may manifest it: but each of those events does depend causally on events that actually occur in those circumstances. Born probabilities are objective and sui generis, but not all Born probabilities are chances.


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