The Role of Thought in Animal Voluntary Self-Locomotion

This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 7 (MA 7), in particular on the difficult passages that introduce the so-called ‘practical syllogism’; at this particular point of the treatise the practical syllogism is used as part of the answer to the question of why it is that an agent, by thinking, sometimes acts but sometimes does not act. The author argues that, according to the account given in MA 7, thought plays a twofold role in the initiation of action; it is an animal’s thought that connects its desire to an end, and that connects that end to a particular, here and now: i.e. to this action for it to do in furtherance of that end. Even if the immediate psychological cause of action is desire, that desire itself is by the thought that recognizes this as an instance of what its general desire is for.

Sigla

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Completing the Argument that Locomotion Requires an External and Unmoved Mover

This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 4–5 (MA 4–5). In these chapters Aristotle points out, among other things, that the earth is at the centre of the universe, but the force it would take to move the earth from its position at the centre of the universe is finite. How can this result be reconciled with Aristotle’s conviction that the universe is eternal and indestructible? The contribution shows that Aristotle’s solution depends on the assumption of a mover of the universe that is unmoved, not in the universe, and no part of it. He also shows how this account of cosmic motion paves the way for Aristotle’s explanation of animal motion.

The Inner Resting Point and the Common Cause of Animal Motion

This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 1 (MA 1). In this chapter Aristotle gives a general introduction to the treatise, posing the question of what the common cause or explanation of animal self-movement consists in. For the first time he formulates a general requirement for all kinds of movement, namely movement presupposes something that is unmoved. Afterwards, he points out that within animals the joints serve as inner resting points and that they are required in order to facilitate the animal’s self-movement. The author argues that the structure of joints or something he calls ‘the joint model’ is significant for the understanding of some of the treatise’s key tenets.

Voluntary or Not? The Physiological Perspective

This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 11 (MA 11). While the rest of the treatise was concerned with voluntary or intentional actions and movements of animals, in this final chapter Aristotle discusses the case of involuntary and non-voluntary movements. The contribution discusses whether and how the standard account of animal self-motion that was developed through the previous chapters is also applicable to these non-standard cases.

Aristotle and the Mechanics of Desire

This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 7 (second half) and 8 (MA 7, from 701b2 – MA 8). In this part of the treatise Aristotle focuses on the initiation and transformation of movement within the animal’s body; he presents a sequence of psycho-physical alterations, starting from sense perception, via thermic alterations (connected with episodes of desire) and expansions and contractions down the movement of the animal’s limbs. In doing so, Aristotle compares the animal to automatic theatres (automata) and points to the mechanic preconditions of animal self-movement. The contribution discusses to what extent animals are really thought to be like automata and whether this comparison provides an obstacle for the agent’s autonomy.

Articulating the De Motu Animalium

This contribution locates the treatise De Motu Animalium within the Aristotelian oeuvre as a whole. It pays special attention to a section in De Anima III 10, where Aristotle announces another treatment that will deal with functions that are common to body and soul. Accordingly, the contribution tries to specify the kind of hylomorphism that is implied by this announcement.

The Origin and the Instrument of Animal Motion

This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 9–10 (MA 9–10). In these chapters Aristotle first argues that all movement originates from a central region within the body and then identifies the instrument of animal movement with the connate pneuma. The contribution shows how Aristotle’s exploration of the internal unmoved origin of animal motion has led him from (i) the joints, with their relative origins which are unmoved in some cases but moved in others, to (ii) the middle part of the body; and then from the middle part of the body to (iii) the Aristotelian soul, an unextended entity which is the absolute origin of animal motion.

Resuming Discussion of the Common Cause of Animal Self-Motion: How Does the Soul Move the Body?

This contribution comments on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 6 (MA 6). In this chapter Aristotle resumes the discussion of the common cause of animal self-motion. For this purpose the chapter introduces the technical vocabulary from De Anima III 9–11, e.g. desire, phantasia, nous, perception. The contribution argues, among other things, that MA 6 marks the beginning, not of Aristotle’s teleological explanation of animal motion, but of his common causal explanation of animal self-motion in the sense of the efficient cause common to all sublunary living beings capable of moving themselves locally.

Introduction Part II

Recentiores, non deteriores According to the Philosopher, the bodily instrument by means of which desire produces animal self-motion—a subject central to MA—is to be examined within the treatment of the ‘activities common to body and soul’,1 i.e. in his so-called ‘Parva Naturalia...