Does Decoherence Select the Pointer Basis of a Quantum Meter?

The consensus regarding quantum measurements rests on two statements: (i) von Neumann’s standard quantum measurement theory leaves undetermined the basis in which observables are measured, and (ii) the environmental decoherence of the measuring device (the “meter”) unambiguously determines the measuring (“pointer”) basis. The latter statement means that the environment monitors (measures) selected observables of the meter and (indirectly) of the system. Equivalently, a measured quantum state must end up in one of the “pointer states” that persist in the presence of the environment. We find that, unless we restrict ourselves to projective measurements, decoherence does not necessarily determine the pointer basis of the meter. Namely, generalized measurements commonly allow the observer to choose from a multitude of alternative pointer bases that provide the same information on the observables, regardless of decoherence. By contrast, the measured observable does not depend on the pointer basis, whether in the presence or in the absence of decoherence. These results grant further support to our notion of Quantum Lamarckism, whereby the observer’s choices play an indispensable role in quantum mechanics.

Protecting the quantum state from a finite temperature decoherence source by parity-time symmetric operation

We examine the validity of the parity-time ( P T )-symmetric operation in protecting quantum state and entanglement in the non-zero temperature environment. Special attention is paid to the dependence of quantum fidelity and entanglement on the temperature. In particular, by solving the master equation, we get the exact analytical or numerical simulation expressions of the explicit formulas of protection, showing explicitly that P T -symmetric operation does indeed help in protecting quantum state from finite temperature decoherence.

Can you sign a quantum state?

Cryptography with quantum states exhibits a number of surprising and counterintuitive features. In a 2002 work, Barnum et al. argue that these features imply that digital signatures for quantum states are impossible (Barnum et al., FOCS 2002). In this work, we ask: can all forms of signing quantum data, even in a possibly weak sense, be completely ruled out? We give two results which shed significant light on this basic question.First, we prove an impossibility result for digital signatures for quantum data, which extends the result of Barnum et al. Specifically, we show that no nontrivial combination of correctness and security requirements can be fulfilled, beyond what is achievable simply by measuring the quantum message and then signing the outcome. In other words, only classical signature schemes exist.We then show a positive result: a quantum state can be signed with the same security guarantees as classically, provided that it is also encrypted with the public key of the intended recipient. Following classical nomenclature, we call this notion quantum signcryption. Classically, signcryption is only interesting if it provides superior performance to encypt-then-sign. Quantumly, it is far more interesting: it is the only signing method available. We develop "as-strong-as-classical" security definitions for quantum signcryption and give secure constructions based on post-quantum public-key primitives. Along the way, we show that a natural hybrid method of combining classical and quantum schemes can be used to "upgrade" a secure classical scheme to the fully-quantum setting, in a wide range of cryptographic settings including signcryption, authenticated encryption, and CCA security.