Differences in the coding of spatial relations in face identification and basic-level object recognition.

Author(s):  
Eric E. Cooper ◽  
Tim J. Wojan
2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 558-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Panqu Wang ◽  
Isabel Gauthier ◽  
Garrison Cottrell

Are face and object recognition abilities independent? Although it is commonly believed that they are, Gauthier et al. [Gauthier, I., McGugin, R. W., Richler, J. J., Herzmann, G., Speegle, M., & VanGulick, A. E. Experience moderates overlap between object and face recognition, suggesting a common ability. Journal of Vision, 14, 7, 2014] recently showed that these abilities become more correlated as experience with nonface categories increases. They argued that there is a single underlying visual ability, v, that is expressed in performance with both face and nonface categories as experience grows. Using the Cambridge Face Memory Test and the Vanderbilt Expertise Test, they showed that the shared variance between Cambridge Face Memory Test and Vanderbilt Expertise Test performance increases monotonically as experience increases. Here, we address why a shared resource across different visual domains does not lead to competition and to an inverse correlation in abilities? We explain this conundrum using our neurocomputational model of face and object processing [“The Model”, TM, Cottrell, G. W., & Hsiao, J. H. Neurocomputational models of face processing. In A. J. Calder, G. Rhodes, M. Johnson, & J. Haxby (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of face perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011]. We model the domain general ability v as the available computational resources (number of hidden units) in the mapping from input to label and experience as the frequency of individual exemplars in an object category appearing during network training. Our results show that, as in the behavioral data, the correlation between subordinate level face and object recognition accuracy increases as experience grows. We suggest that different domains do not compete for resources because the relevant features are shared between faces and objects. The essential power of experience is to generate a “spreading transform” for faces (separating them in representational space) that generalizes to objects that must be individuated. Interestingly, when the task of the network is basic level categorization, no increase in the correlation between domains is observed. Hence, our model predicts that it is the type of experience that matters and that the source of the correlation is in the fusiform face area, rather than in cortical areas that subserve basic level categorization. This result is consistent with our previous modeling elucidating why the FFA is recruited for novel domains of expertise [Tong, M. H., Joyce, C. A., & Cottrell, G. W. Why is the fusiform face area recruited for novel categories of expertise? A neurocomputational investigation. Brain Research, 1202, 14–24, 2008].


2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (8) ◽  
pp. 1406-1421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shlomo Bentin ◽  
Yulia Golland ◽  
Anastasia Flevaris ◽  
Lynn C. Robertson ◽  
Morris Moscovitch

Although configural processing is considered a hallmark of normal face perception in humans, there is ample evidence that processing face components also contributes to face recognition and identification. Indeed, most contemporary models posit a dual-code view in which face identification relies on the analysis of individual face components as well as the spatial relations between them. We explored the interplay between processing face configurations and inner face components by recording the N170, an event-related potential component that manifests early detection of faces. In contrast to a robust N170 effect elicited by line-drawn schematic faces compared to line-drawn schematic objects, no N170 effect was found if a pair of small objects substituted for the eyes in schematic faces. However, if a pair of two miniaturized faces substituted for the eyes, the N170 effect was restored. Additional experiments ruled out an explanation on the basis of miniaturized faces attracting attention independent of their location in a face-like configuration and show that global and local face characteristics compete for processing resources when in conflict. The results are discussed as they relate to normal and abnormal face processing.


Perception ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 22 (11) ◽  
pp. 1261-1270 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Duncan

Performance often suffers when two visual discriminations must be made concurrently (‘divided attention’). In the modular primate visual system, different cortical areas analyse different kinds of visual information. Especially important is a distinction between an occipitoparietal ‘where?’ system, analysing spatial relations, and an occipitotemporal ‘what?’ system responsible for object recognition. Though such visual subsystems are anatomically parallel, their functional relationship when ‘what?’ and ‘where?’ discriminations are made concurrently is unknown. In the present experiments, human subjects made concurrent discriminations concerning a brief visual display. Discriminations were either similar (two ‘what?’ or two ‘where?’ discriminations) or dissimilar (one of each), and concerned the same or different objects. When discriminations concerned different objects, there was strong interference between them. This was equally severe whether discriminations were similar—and therefore dependent on the same cortical system—or dissimilar. When concurrent ‘what?’ and ‘where?’ discriminations concerned the same object, however, all interference disappeared. Such results suggest that ‘what?’ and ‘where?’ systems are coordinated in visual attention: their separate outputs can be used simultaneously without cost, but only when they concern one object.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Umit Keles ◽  
Chujun Lin ◽  
Ralph Adolphs

AbstractPeople spontaneously infer other people’s psychology from faces, encompassing inferences of their affective states, cognitive states, and stable traits such as personality. These judgments are known to be often invalid, but nonetheless bias many social decisions. Their importance and ubiquity have made them popular targets for automated prediction using deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs). Here, we investigated the applicability of this approach: how well does it generalize, and what biases does it introduce? We compared three distinct sets of features (from a face identification DCNN, an object recognition DCNN, and using facial geometry), and tested their prediction across multiple out-of-sample datasets. Across judgments and datasets, features from both pre-trained DCNNs provided better predictions than did facial geometry. However, predictions using object recognition DCNN features were not robust to superficial cues (e.g., color and hair style). Importantly, predictions using face identification DCNN features were not specific: models trained to predict one social judgment (e.g., trustworthiness) also significantly predicted other social judgments (e.g., femininity and criminal), and at an even higher accuracy in some cases than predicting the judgment of interest (e.g., trustworthiness). Models trained to predict affective states (e.g., happy) also significantly predicted judgments of stable traits (e.g., sociable), and vice versa. Our analysis pipeline not only provides a flexible and efficient framework for predicting affective and social judgments from faces but also highlights the dangers of such automated predictions: correlated but unintended judgments can drive the predictions of the intended judgments.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daria Proklova ◽  
Daniel Kaiser ◽  
Marius V. Peelen

AbstractHuman high-level visual cortex shows a distinction between animate and inanimate objects, as revealed by fMRI. Recent studies have shown that object animacy can similarly be decoded from MEG sensor patterns. Which object properties drive this decoding? Here, we disentangled the influence of perceptual and categorical object properties by presenting perceptually matched objects (e.g., snake and rope) that were nonetheless easily recognizable as being animate or inanimate. In a series of behavioral experiments, three aspects of perceptual dissimilarity of these objects were quantified: overall dissimilarity, outline dissimilarity, and texture dissimilarity. Neural dissimilarity of MEG sensor patterns was modeled using regression analysis, in which perceptual dissimilarity (from the behavioral experiments) and categorical dissimilarity served as predictors of neural dissimilarity. We found that perceptual dissimilarity was strongly reflected in MEG sensor patterns from 80ms after stimulus onset, with separable contributions of outline and texture dissimilarity. Surprisingly, when controlling for perceptual dissimilarity, MEG patterns did not carry information about object category (animate vs inanimate) at any time point. Nearly identical results were found in a second MEG experiment that required basic-level object recognition. These results suggest that MEG sensor patterns do not capture object animacy independently of perceptual differences between animate and inanimate objects. This is in contrast to results observed in fMRI using the same stimuli, task, and analysis approach: fMRI showed a highly reliable categorical distinction in visual cortex even when controlling for perceptual dissimilarity. Results thus point to a discrepancy in the information contained in multivariate fMRI and MEG patterns.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 574-574
Author(s):  
B. Duchaine ◽  
C. Rezlescu ◽  
D. Pitcher ◽  
N. Whitty

Perception ◽  
10.1068/p3329 ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 675-682 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murray White

In a face photo in which the two eyes have been moved up into the forehead region, configural spatial relations are altered more than categorical relations; in a photo in which only one eye is moved up, categorical relations are altered more. Matching the identities of two faces was slower when an unaltered photo was paired with a two-eyes-moved photo than when paired with a one-eye-moved photo, implicating configural relations in face identification. But matching the emotional expressions of the same faces was slower when an unaltered photo was paired with a one-eye-moved photo than when paired with a two-eyes-moved photo, showing that expression recognition uses categorically coded relations. The findings also indicate that changing spatial-relational information affects the perceptual encoding of identities and expressions rather than their memory representations.


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