"Frankie and Jenny": Sex stereotyping and the cognitive miser revisited

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Martin ◽  
C. Neil Macrae
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 405-421
Author(s):  
John C. Blanchar ◽  
David J. Sparkman

The “cognitive miser” metaphor is a classic characterization of mental life wherein cognitive efficiency is favored over careful and reflective thinking. A presumed implication is that reliance on intuitive processing in the absence of reflective thinking should encourage stereotyping. However, research to date has not adequately tested whether proclivities to engage reflective thinking correspond with less stereotype endorsement, nor if their influence occurs independent of cognitive ability and epistemic motivation. In two studies, we conducted straightforward tests of this hypothesis by measuring individual differences in miserly or reflective thinking, cognitive ability, and epistemic motivation as unique predictors of stereotype endorsement. We utilized objective, performance-based measures of reflective thinking via the Cognitive Reflection Test. The results provide the first direct evidence for the cognitive miser hypothesis. Individual differences in miserly thinking predicted endorsements of racial/ethnic stereotypes independent of cognitive ability and epistemic motivation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3782
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Yang ◽  
Lai Wei ◽  
Qi Su

Due to the crucial role of knowledge in promoting public engagement with climate change, this study made an in-depths examination of the distribution of climate change knowledge among different demographic groups. Guided by information deficit model and cognitive miser model, two types of knowledge were investigated, including actual knowledge and illusory knowledge. Using a nationally representative survey in Singapore, this study found demographic effects in climate change knowledge distribution. Specifically, a series of independent sample t-test revealed that the males had more actual knowledge of climate change than the females. The middle aged and elderly adults had less actual knowledge but more illusory knowledge of climate change than the young adults. Compare to the more educated people, the less educated people had more illusory knowledge but less actual knowledge of climate change. People from low-income households reported lower levels of actual knowledge but higher levels of illusory knowledge than those from high-income households. Regarding these significant differences in climate change knowledge among different demographic groups, possible reasons for these variations and implications for designing public education programs are discussed.


PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (13) ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Robert Gore
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
pp. 111-118
Author(s):  
Pat Croskerry

Two cases are reviewed in Case 16; both demonstrate problems with “frequent flyers” in the emergency department (ED). The principal characteristic of these patients is that despite their symptoms and complaints being minor, they frequently present to the ED. Inevitably, ED staff tend to view their visits disparagingly. However, like the boy who cried wolf, they will occasionally have serious underlying conditions that need to be addressed. A prominent cognitive pattern is described: the cognitive miser function. It is the tendency to uncritically accept things at face value. Although this may be adequate for many routine decisions, the failure to unpack sufficient information will sometimes result in suboptimal decision making.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 515-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Orbell ◽  
Robyn M. Dawes

We propose a new model of cooperators' advantage depending neither on supplementary incentives nor on cooperators' capacity to recognize, and play selectively with, other cooperators. It depends, rather, on players' making the play-no play decision by the heuristic of projecting their own “cooperate-defect” choices onto potential partners. Cooperators offer to play more often, and fellow cooperators will more often accept their offer. When certain boundary conditions are met, this results in a higher expected payoff for cooperators than for defectors. Empirical support for this heuristic is suggested by expectations data from related social dilemma experiments. Moreover, its use can be justified in Bayesean terms. Our model brings behavioral decision theory's “cognitive miser” paradigm to bear on interdisciplinary concern with the evolution of cooperative behavior and shows how, if other mechanisms provide a suitable “initial kick,” cooperation can evolve in the absence of iteration and in large, mobile societies.


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