Leadership succession and retention: What do we know?

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Schiemann ◽  
Peter Cappelli ◽  
Joseph G. Rosse ◽  
Wayne F. Cascio ◽  
Denise M. Rousseau
Author(s):  
John L. Ward

The ATF case is a succinct opportunity to explore the many special features of leadership succession for a family business. In 2009 the company was passing the baton to the oldest of three sons in the second-generation family business. ATF produced metal and plastic fasteners for, primarily, the automotive industry. ATF had grown into a company with more than $50 million in annual revenues. The company had grown in large part through alliances with other family businesses around the world. First-generation patriarch Don Surber had led the company since he acquired it in 1982. Don was known for his charismatic leadership style and his focus on driving value through a network approach. The case traces the career paths of all three sons and looks at the succession through the eyes of the oldest son, Jason Surber. The elements, constituents, and challenges of succession are evident. The fundamental insight is that business leadership succession is far more than just passing the business leadership baton. It also requires attention to the family, the board, the whole system of external stakeholders, and the future of ownership. The epilogue in this note covers the period from 2009 to 2012 by describing what Jason did to earn credibility, to incorporate his brothers, and to define his personal leadership philosophy and style. The epilogue thus provides students with an opportunity to consider and define their own personal philosophy of management leadership and their own style. They will see the art of melding styles from the past with their own for the future.


Asian Survey ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 33 (12) ◽  
pp. 1163-1174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diane K. Mauzy

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-251
Author(s):  
Boo Teik Khoo

AbstractMalaysian politics has been turbulent over the past two decades, as seen in the damaged tradition of leadership transition, non-violent revolts against successive regimes, and unstable realignments of opposing forces. Two startling symptoms point to disorder. One is the heavy electoral losses and loss of legitimacy suffered by the post-Mahathir regimes. The other is the political re-entry of Anwar Ibrahim and Mahathir Mohamad. The persisting turbulence raises certain questions. Why has the ruling party, the United Malays National Organization, been susceptible to internal fighting, being at once a source of hegemonic stability and systemic instability? Why has the apex of the United Malays National Organization repeatedly jeopardised its traditions of leadership succession? Why has one leader, Mahathir Mohamad, been involved in all the disputes? How did the crisis of the party, not just the regime, become intimately tied to economic crisis? Conventional paradigmatic explanations of Malaysian politics – inter-ethnic rivalry in a plural society, elite solidarity, and regime type (semi-democratic, hybrid, or competitive authoritarian) – are of little help even if ethnicity, elite conduct, and authoritarian rule are relevant. Instead, this essay suggests that the turbulence is part of a long trajectory of oligarchic reconstitution bound to a peculiar nexus of state, ethnicity, and class. The paper does not construct a theory of Malaysian politics. It offers a historically informed exploration of a leitmotif of an unfinished project that runs through much of the past 20 years of political conflict and struggle.


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (7) ◽  
pp. 2014-2035 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Calabrò ◽  
Alessandro Minichilli ◽  
Mario Daniele Amore ◽  
Marina Brogi

Author(s):  
Patrick Rooney ◽  
Dwight Burlingame

Using results from 22 key informant interviews from 15 different universities, we analyze why various centers/programs on philanthropic and nonprofit studies started, their key revenue sources, the diversity of funding sources, the role of leadership, succession planning, and what they might have done differently to make things better. These case studies provide insights as to why some centers/programs fail, others barely survive, yet some thrive. While the old saying, “It’s better to be lucky than good” remains true. We found that many of the things we teach in our academic programs work well when leading academic centers: diversify income streams, do not become too reliant on one donor, provide for leadership transitions and succession plans, raise money for endowments, and build advisory boards.


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