Psychology and the Military: Congressional Action

Joel Spingarn's “Constructive Programme” and the Wartime Antilynching Bill of 1918

Journal of Policy History ◽

10.1017/s0898030600006928 ◽

1992 ◽

Vol 4 (2) ◽

pp. 134-161 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Mark Ellis

Keyword(s):

World War I ◽

World War ◽

Mob Violence ◽

Woodrow Wilson ◽

Colored People ◽

War Department ◽

Democratic Administration ◽

National Emergency ◽

The Military ◽

Congressional Action

In the summer of 1918, the white chairman of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Major Joel E. Spingarn, called for urgent congressional action on mob violence. He seized the opportunity of a post in the Military Intelligence Branch (MIB) of the War Department General Staff in Washington, D.C., to put forward a “constructive programme,” the central idea of which was the passage of a bill to make lynching in wartime a federal offense. Attempting to exploit the peculiar circumstances of the national emergency and the expansion of federal powers during World War I, Spingarn also proposed a series of more modest initiatives designed to lessen discrimination and raise black morale. The official reaction to the arguments he advanced in support of his program sheds light on the reluctance of the Democratic administration of Woodrow Wilson to develop a policy on race relations. It also suggests some of the problems and hazards facing a would-be reformer working from within.

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Democrazy—Dem Go Craze, O: Monitoring the 1999 Nigerian Elections

Issue A Journal of Opinion ◽

10.1017/s1548450500005862 ◽

1999 ◽

Vol 27 (1) ◽

pp. 29-33

Author(s):

Darren Kew

Keyword(s):

Transition Program ◽

The Political ◽

High Stakes ◽

Political Class ◽

Soccer Match ◽

The Public ◽

The Military

In many respects, the least important part of the 1999 elections were the elections themselves. From the beginning of General Abdusalam Abubakar’s transition program in mid-1998, most Nigerians who were not part of the wealthy “political class” of elites—which is to say, most Nigerians— adopted their usual politically savvy perspective of siddon look (sit and look). They waited with cautious optimism to see what sort of new arrangement the military would allow the civilian politicians to struggle over, and what in turn the civilians would offer the public. No one had any illusions that anything but high-stakes bargaining within the military and the political class would determine the structures of power in the civilian government. Elections would influence this process to the extent that the crowd influences a soccer match.

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