Neither a Conscript Army nor an All-Volunteer Force: Emerging Recruiting Models

This article develops an analytical model of force composition that combines the advantages of conscription with those of an all-volunteer force. Using Israel as a hypothesis-generating case study, it argues that mandatory military service has undergone changes centered on five key organizing principles: selective conscription, early discharges, elongated lengths of service, forms of voluntary service and differing pay-scales, and other material and non-material incentives for conscripts. These principles are “grafted” onto conscription creating a hybrid, “volunteer-ized” model. The utility of the theoretical model lies in explaining how these principles facilitate mobilizing a needed number or recruits, providing an adequate level of military expertise, as well as maintaining the legitimacy of the armed forces by meeting domestic social, economic, and political expectations about its composition and the use of personnel at its disposal. The system is adaptive and flexible, as shown through the comparisons throughout the paper.

The Motivation to Enlist Among Kurds

Although humans have voluntarily joined militaries throughout history, research on the motivation to enlist has increased dramatically since the adoption of the All-Volunteer Force in the United States. Moskos categorized the motivations to enlist as institutional (the value alignment of the individual with the military) or occupational (the seeking of monetary rewards for competencies at market rates). This study explores the prevalence of these two traditional motivations in addition to two less commonly studied motivations—group mobilization and revenge-seeking—in an important context: the Kurds of northern Iraq. A survey of 2301 Kurdish soldiers (Peshmerga) during their war against the Islamic State (IS) indicates that institutional motivations are the most prevalent, although all four motivations are present. The importance of group mobilization and revenge-seeking represent important variations from the better-studied Western contexts that complicate our understanding of the motivation to enlist.

Neither a Conscript Army nor an All-Volunteer Force: Emerging recruiting models

<p>This article develops an analytical model of force-composition that combines the advantages of conscription with those of an all-volunteer force. Using Israel as a hypothesis-generating case study, it argues that mandatory military service has undergone changes centered on five key organizing principles: selective conscription, early discharges, elongated lengths of service, forms of voluntary service and differing pay-scales and other material and non-material incentives for conscripts. These principles are “grafted” onto conscription creating a hybrid, “volunteer-ized”, model. The utility of the theoretical model lies in explaining how these principles facilitate mobilizing a needed number or recruits, providing an adequate level of military expertise, as well as maintaining the legitimacy of the armed forces by meeting domestic social, economic and political expectations about its composition and the use of personnel at its disposal. The system is adaptive and flexible, as shown in throughout the comparisons throughout the paper.</p>

Neither a Conscript Army nor an All-Volunteer Force: Emerging recruiting models

<p>This article develops an analytical model of force-composition that combines the advantages of conscription with those of an all-volunteer force. Using Israel as a hypothesis-generating case study, it argues that mandatory military service has undergone changes centered on five key organizing principles: selective conscription, early discharges, elongated lengths of service, forms of voluntary service and differing pay-scales and other material and non-material incentives for conscripts. These principles are “grafted” onto conscription creating a hybrid, “volunteer-ized”, model. The utility of the theoretical model lies in explaining how these principles facilitate mobilizing a needed number or recruits, providing an adequate level of military expertise, as well as maintaining the legitimacy of the armed forces by meeting domestic social, economic and political expectations about its composition and the use of personnel at its disposal. The system is adaptive and flexible, as shown in throughout the comparisons throughout the paper.</p>