Phrases Don't Behave Like Words: Phrase Frequency Effects in Recognition Memory

Abstract We fully support dissociating the subjective experience from the memory contents in recognition memory, as Bastin et al. posit in the target article. However, having two generic memory modules with qualitatively different functions is not mandatory and is in fact inconsistent with experimental evidence. We propose that quantitative differences in the properties of the memory modules can account for the apparent dissociation of recollection and familiarity along anatomical lines.

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Real Ear Sound Pressure Levels Developed by Three Portable Stereo System Earphones

American Journal of Audiology ◽

10.1044/1059-0889.0104.52 ◽

1992 ◽

Vol 1 (4) ◽

pp. 52-55 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Gail L. MacLean ◽

Andrew Stuart ◽

Robert Stenstrom

Keyword(s):

High Frequency ◽

Sound Pressure ◽

Low Frequency ◽

Test System ◽

Output Frequency ◽

Frequency Effects ◽

Adult Men ◽

Frequency Responses ◽

Significant Difference ◽

Sound Pressure Levels

Differences in real ear sound pressure levels (SPLs) with three portable stereo system (PSS) earphones (supraaural [Sony Model MDR-44], semiaural [Sony Model MDR-A15L], and insert [Sony Model MDR-E225]) were investigated. Twelve adult men served as subjects. Frequency response, high frequency average (HFA) output, peak output, peak output frequency, and overall RMS output for each PSS earphone were obtained with a probe tube microphone system (Fonix 6500 Hearing Aid Test System). Results indicated a significant difference in mean RMS outputs with nonsignificant differences in mean HFA outputs, peak outputs, and peak output frequencies among PSS earphones. Differences in mean overall RMS outputs were attributed to differences in low-frequency effects that were observed among the frequency responses of the three PSS earphones. It is suggested that one cannot assume equivalent real ear SPLs, with equivalent inputs, among different styles of PSS earphones.

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Learning From (Test) Experience

Zeitschrift für Psychologie ◽

10.1027/2151-2604/a000424 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 228 (4) ◽

pp. 264-277 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Evan E. Mitton ◽

Chris M. Fiacconi

Keyword(s):

Recognition Memory ◽

Test Performance ◽

Memory Performance ◽

Judgments Of Learning ◽

Visual Images ◽

Memory Tests ◽

Recognition Memory Performance ◽

Study Test ◽

Explicit Feedback

Abstract. To date there has been relatively little research within the domain of metamemory that examines how individuals monitor their performance during memory tests, and whether the outcome of such monitoring informs subsequent memory predictions for novel items. In the current study, we sought to determine whether spontaneous monitoring of test performance can in fact help individuals better appreciate their memory abilities, and in turn shape future judgments of learning (JOLs). Specifically, in two experiments we examined recognition memory for visual images across three study-test cycles, each of which contained novel images. We found that across cycles, participants’ JOLs did in fact increase, reflecting metacognitive sensitivity to near-perfect levels of recognition memory performance. This finding suggests that individuals can and do monitor their test performance in the absence of explicit feedback, and further underscores the important role that test experience can play in shaping metacognitive evaluations of learning and remembering.

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Experience Matters

Zeitschrift für Psychologie ◽

10.1027/2151-2604/a000423 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 228 (4) ◽

pp. 254-263 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Pedro S. Mendes ◽

Karlos Luna ◽

Pedro B. Albuquerque

Keyword(s):

Word Frequency ◽

High Frequency ◽

Recall Test ◽

Judgments Of Learning ◽

Direct Experience ◽

Frequency Effects ◽

Actual Frequency ◽

Actual Word ◽

High Frequency Words

Abstract. The present study tested if word frequency effects on judgments of learning (JOLs) are exclusively due to beliefs or if the direct experience with the items also plays a role. Across four experiments, participants read prompts about the frequency of the words (high/low), which could be congruent/incongruent with the words’ actual frequency. They made pre-study JOLs (except Experiment 1b), immediate JOLs, and completed a recall test. If experience drives the effect, JOLs should be based on actual word frequency rather than the prompts. Results showed higher pre-study JOLs for prompts of high frequency, but higher immediate JOLs for high-frequency words regardless of the prompt, suggesting an effect of direct experience with the words. In Experiments 2 and 3, we manipulated participants’ beliefs, finding a small effect of beliefs on JOLs. We conclude that, regarding word frequency, direct experience with the items seems more relevant than beliefs when making immediate JOLs.

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Perceptual Effects and Recollective Experience in Face Recognition

Experimental Psychology (formerly Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie) ◽

10.1027/1618-3169.52.3.224 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 52 (3) ◽

pp. 224-231 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Chrisanthi Nega

Keyword(s):

Face Recognition ◽

Recognition Memory ◽

Congruency Effect ◽

Facial Recognition ◽

Memory Systems ◽

Study Time ◽

Perceptual Fluency ◽

Recollective Experience ◽

Trace Strength ◽

Size Congruency

Abstract. Four experiments were conducted investigating the effect of size congruency on facial recognition memory, measured by remember, know and guess responses. Different study times were employed, that is extremely short (300 and 700 ms), short (1,000 ms), and long times (5,000 ms). With the short study time (1,000 ms) size congruency occurred in knowing. With the long study time the effect of size congruency occurred in remembering. These results support the distinctiveness/fluency account of remembering and knowing as well as the memory systems account, since the size congruency effect that occurred in knowing under conditions that facilitated perceptual fluency also occurred independently in remembering under conditions that facilitated elaborative encoding. They do not support the idea that remember and know responses reflect differences in trace strength.

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