scholarly journals Design of risk sharing and coordination mechanism in supply chain under demand and supply uncertainty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chunyi Ji ◽  
Xiangxiang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Supply Uncertainty ◽  
Demand Forecast ◽  
Demand And Supply ◽  
Better Than

Perishable and short-life products can be seen everywhere in life. Due to the particularity of these products, they are more complicated in supply chain management. This paper studies whether the two-part tariff and ZRS contract can achieve the purpose of reducing risks and coordinating supply chain. We assume that market demand and supplier yield are uncertain, and we use game theory and probability distribution for research. The research results show that when the information is asymmetric, the manufacturer always ignore the demand forecast information provided by the retailer under the wholesale price contract. When the demand is uncertain, regardless of whether the information is symmetric or asymmetric, the two-part tariff contract and the ZRS contract can coordinate the supply chain and achieve maximum profit. When the retailer's degree of risk aversion is high, the ZRS contract is better than the two-part tariff, which can reduce the risk of retailers and achieve the purpose of coordinating the supply chain. When the supply is uncertain, the manufacturer can provide the supplier with a risk-sharing contract, including the return price and the sharing ratio that meet certain constraints. Such a contract can effectively reduce the supplier's risk and realize supply chain coordination.

Supply Chain Coordination for E-Commerce: Risk Penalty vs. Flat Rate

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ju Myung Song ◽  
Yao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Shipping Industry ◽  
Flat Rate

Problem definition: We study the coordination of an E-commerce supply chain between online sellers and third party shippers to meet random demand surges, induced by, for instance, online shopping holidays. Academic/practical relevance: Motivated by the challenge of meeting the unpredictable demand surges in E-commerce, we study shipping contracts and supply chain coordination between online sellers and third party shippers in a novel model taking into account the unique features of the shipping industry. Methodology: We compare two shipping contracts: the risk penalty (proposed by UPS) and the flat rate (used by FedEx), and analyze their impact on the seller, the shipper, and the supply chain. Results: Under information symmetry, the sophisticated risk penalty contract is no better than the simple flat rate contract for the shipper, against common belief. Although both the risk penalty and the flat rate can coordinate the supply chain, the risk penalty does so only if the shipper makes zero profit, but the flat rate can provide a positive profit for both. These results represent a new form of double marginalization and risk-sharing, in sharp contrast to the well-known literature on the classic supplier-retailer supply chain, where risk-sharing contracts (similar to the risk penalty) can bring benefits to all parties, but the single wholesale price contract (similar to the flat rate) can achieve supply chain coordination only when the supplier makes zero profit. We also find that only the online seller, but not the shipper, has the motivation to vertically integrate the seller-shipper supply chain. Under information asymmetry, however, the risk penalty brings more benefit to the shipper than the flat rate, but hurts the seller and the supply chain. Managerial implications: Our results imply that information plays an important role in the shipper’s choices of shipping contracts. Under information symmetry, the risk penalty is unnecessarily complex because the simple flat rate is as good as the risk penalty for the shipper; moreover, it is better for the seller-shipper coordination. However, under information asymmetry, the shipper faces additional shipping risk that can be offset by the extra flexibility of the risk penalty. Our study also explains and supports the recent practice of online sellers (e.g., Amazon.com and JD.com), but not shippers, to vertically integrate the supply chain by consistently expanding their shipping capabilities.

Supply Chain Coordination under Asymmetric Disruptive Demand

2010 ◽  
Vol 44-47 ◽  
pp. 96-100
Author(s):  
Chuan Bo Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Capacity ◽  
Capacity Reservation ◽  
Chain Operation ◽  
Baseline Case ◽  
Supply Chain Operation ◽  
Better Than

Under the circumstance of disruptive demand, the decision-making and coordination of enterprise’s capacity is directly related to the efficiency of supply chain operation. On the basis of the baseline case, capacity reservation contract sees that the performance of decentralized supply chain is equal to the centralized supply chain, and better than the level of the optimal supply chain capacity under the wholesale price contract. For disruptive demand, this paper discusses the conditions of capacity expansion and supply chain coordination through the capacity reservation contract in two cases, i.e., symmetric disruptive information, asymmetric disruptive information, and compares the optimal capacity and the corresponding profit.

scholarly journals Research on the supply chain model based on the differentiation of green agricultural products

2018 ◽  
Vol 232 ◽  
pp. 02012
Author(s):  
Hui Su ◽  
Yuquan Cui ◽  
Bingjie Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Chain Model

This paper studies the supply chain of green agricultural products with "agricultural super docking" mode based on the different management. The "agricultural super docking" mode is a direct connection between supermarkets and farmers (or cooperatives), what the supermarket needs and what the farmers produce. The green degree is used to indicate the quality level of health, safety and nutrition of agricultural products. The greater the green degree is, the better the quality of agricultural products is. In order to meet the needs of all consumers, the supermarket decide to carry out different management. That is to say, supermarket sells ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products at the same time. This paper gives the consumer utility function for ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products separately. We analyze the consumers’ choice behaviors based on the consumer utility function .We discuss the optimal decision of supermarket choosing one farmer and supermarket choosing two farmers based on Stackelberg game. It can be seen from the comparison that supermarket can get more profits when it chooses two farmer to order separately. Finally, a "wholesale price + ordering subsidy" coordination mechanism is proposed to realize supply chain coordination. .

Input Quantity Decision and Coordination Mechanism with Two Production Chances and Yield Uncertainty

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Jianhu Cai ◽  
Haining Sun ◽  
Xuejiao Li ◽  
Daji Ergu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Input Quantity ◽  
Optimal Input ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Production Run ◽  
Yield Uncertainty

Conducting a second production run can improve the company’s capability of meeting the market demand. Few works examine optimal input quantity decisions under the mode with two production chances considering demand and yield uncertainty. We propose a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. The supplier has two production chances and faces yield uncertainty in each production run. It is necessary for the supplier to make trade-offs between the cost and benefit of the second production run, then decide whether to conduct the second production run. We investigate the supplier’s optimal input quantity decision in each production run and obtain the supply chain members’ expected profits. As a comparison, the mode with one production chance is also developed. We find that two production chances can help improve the performance of the supply chain under yield uncertainty. A revenue-sharing contract is introduced to coordinate the supply chain with two production chances, and efficient profit allocation is achieved through adjusting the revenue-sharing ratio and the wholesale price. An extension is conducted for a sensitivity analysis of unit punishment cost on the supplier’s input quantity decisions.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Bilateral Coordination with Option Contracts under Inflation Scenarios

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nana Wan ◽  
Xu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Model Framework ◽  
Bilateral Coordination ◽  
Option Contracts ◽  
Optimal Ordering ◽  
The Impact

There exist obvious changes in price and demand during the inflationary period, both of which are regarded as the key factors leading to supply chain uncertainty. In this paper, we focus our discussion on price increase and demand contraction caused by inflation, integrate the effect of inflation and option contracts within the model framework, and analyze how to use option contracts to achieve supply chain coordination under inflation scenarios. We consider a one-period two-stage supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer and explore the effect of inflation on the optimal ordering and production decisions under three different types of contracts: wholesale price contracts, option contracts, and portfolio contracts. Moreover, we explore the impact of option contracts on the supply chain through using wholesale price contracts model as the benchmark. We find that the retailer prefers adopting portfolio contracts, but the supplier prefers providing option contracts under inflation scenarios. Ultimately, option contracts will be implemented owing to the supplier’s market dominant position. In addition, we discuss the supply chain bilateral coordination mechanism with option contracts from the perspectives of two members and derive that option contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement under inflation scenarios.

scholarly journals Dynamic Pricing and Supply Coordination with Reimbursement Contract under Random Yield and Demand

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guo Li ◽  
Lun Ran ◽  
Xiaohang Yue ◽  
Zhaohua Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Decentralized System ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Production Quantity ◽  
Order Quantities ◽  
Centralized System

This paper investigates the dynamic pricing and supply chain coordination in a decentralized system that consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, in which both the market demand and production yield are stochastic. We show that the centralized expected profit is jointly concave in the production quantity and order quantity when the price is ex-ante selected. We also derive the equilibrium strategies in the decentralized system and prove that the entire profit of supply chain is inevitably lower than that under centralized system. Based on this, we propose a reimbursement contract to coordinate the decentralized supply chain so as to achieve the maximized profit. It is worth mentioning that, under reimbursement contract, the equilibrium production and order quantities are irrelevant to the manufacturer's risk sharing coefficient but are only determined by the supplier’s risk sharing coefficient.

scholarly journals Assessing the coordinated revenue-sharing contract of China’s farmer-supermarket direct-purchase model

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Peng Liang ◽  
Melat Sima ◽  
Yu Huang ◽  
Xiaoyu Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Long Term Stability ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Promotional Efforts

China began connecting farmers directly with supermarkets 10 years ago, when they were at a disadvantage and forced to sell products at low prices, as unstable cooperation among supply chain participants led to inequitable distribution of revenue. Revenue-sharing contracts offer a risk-sharing approach to ensure supply chain coordination and optimize profit for all. Research on short life cycle products with revenue-sharing contracts assume stable prices or investigate the effects of revenue-sharing contracts on supply chain coordination. This study introduced a revenue-sharing contract model into a ‘farmer-supermarket direct-purchase’ supply chain, considering price fluctuation and retail promotional efforts, stochastic market demand, among other factors. Revenue-sharing contracts achieved long-term stability in supply chain coordination, all participants obtained more profits, and the size of revenue-sharing parameter depends on the position and bargaining power of all participants. A case study on Tianhong supermarket and Nanxia farmer cooperative verified these findings, eliciting practical implications for professionals and policymakers.

scholarly journals Myopic versus Far-Sighted Behaviors in Dynamic Supply Chain Coordination through Advertising with Reference Price Effect

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yafei Zu ◽  
Lianghua Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Reference Price ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Price Effect ◽  
Theoretical Support ◽  
Behavior Choice

To better understand the different effects of the myopic and far-sighted behaviors on the advertising coordination in dynamic supply chain, this paper takes the reference price effect into consideration and formulates four differential game models for the two-level supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer in the situation of Stackelberg game. In our models, the market demand is assumed to be affected by the goodwill, reference price, and the advertising investment, in which the advertising investment can promote the construction of goodwill and such goodwill can further enhance the reference price. The results show that the participating members in the supply chain should invest more in advertisement to improve the goodwill and the relative reference price reflected in the minds of consumers. A far-sighted manufacturer will invest more in the advertisement and charge a higher wholesale price regardless of the behavior choice of the retailer. However, such kind of ignorance leads to different results on the retail pricing strategies of the retailer. The numerical analyses are given in the end to verify the effectiveness of the conclusions which provide the theoretical support to the dynamic supply chain coordination in practice.

scholarly journals Coordinating a fresh-product supply chain with demand information updating: Hema Fresh O2O platform

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiawu Peng ◽  
Honglin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Profit Allocation ◽  
Information Updating ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Production Quantity ◽  
Theoretical Results

Motivated by Hema Fresh's new-retail case, we study the coordination of a two-echelon fresh-product supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single retailer. Due to a long production lead time, the supplier has to make production decision in advance based on early demand information. The market demand can be updated during the supplier's production lead time. Hence, the retailer would make order decision according to the latest demand information. Incorporating risk-sharing mechanism of overproduction and overstock, we propose a novel bi-directional risk-sharing contract to coordinate such a supply chain with demand information updating. We construct a two-stage optimization model in which the supplier first decides production quantity, and then the retailer decides final order quantity not exceeding the supplier’s initial production. In both the centralized and decentralized systems, we analytically derive the unique equilibrium of production and order decisions in a Stackelberg supplier-led game. We prove that the proposed contract can realize supply chain perfect coordination and explore how the proposed contract affects the members'decisions. The theoretical results show that, by turning the risk-sharing proportions, the supply chain profit can be arbitrarily split between the members, which is a desired property for supply chain coordination. Compared with the single risk-sharing contract, the proposed contract results in a greater supply chain profit and achieves Pareto improvement for both members. Furthermore, we also explore how the risk preference and negotiating power affect the contract selection and the additional profit allocation of the supply chain. Numerical examples are presented to verify our theoretical results.

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