scholarly journals Research on the supply chain model based on the differentiation of green agricultural products

2018 ◽  
Vol 232 ◽  
pp. 02012
Author(s):  
Hui Su ◽  
Yuquan Cui ◽  
Bingjie Liu

This paper studies the supply chain of green agricultural products with "agricultural super docking" mode based on the different management. The "agricultural super docking" mode is a direct connection between supermarkets and farmers (or cooperatives), what the supermarket needs and what the farmers produce. The green degree is used to indicate the quality level of health, safety and nutrition of agricultural products. The greater the green degree is, the better the quality of agricultural products is. In order to meet the needs of all consumers, the supermarket decide to carry out different management. That is to say, supermarket sells ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products at the same time. This paper gives the consumer utility function for ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products separately. We analyze the consumers’ choice behaviors based on the consumer utility function .We discuss the optimal decision of supermarket choosing one farmer and supermarket choosing two farmers based on Stackelberg game. It can be seen from the comparison that supermarket can get more profits when it chooses two farmer to order separately. Finally, a "wholesale price + ordering subsidy" coordination mechanism is proposed to realize supply chain coordination. .

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-118
Author(s):  
Xinning Li ◽  
Kun Fan ◽  
Lu Wang ◽  
Lang Zhou

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to design a contract to coordinate the biomass molding fuel supply chain consisting of a supplier with uncertain supply and a producer with cyclical demand as well as improve the profit of this supply chain. Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the supply chain model was build and all the variables and assumptions are set. Stackelberg game model was used to analyze and solve the problem. Furthermore, the authors give numerical examples and result analysis on the basis of data coming from field study and online information about a real biomass fuel supply chain. Findings The wholesale price with shortage penalty contract the authors proposed can coordinate the supply chain. And as the dominator of the supply chain, the producer can realize the redistribution of profits within the supply chain by determine the contract parameters. Research limitations/implications This one-to-one supply chain is a basic of complex supply chain system. Multi-to-one, one-to-multi and multi-to-multi supply chain can be studied in the future. Originality/value The results obtained in this paper can be used as a reference for enterprises in biomass energy supply chain to make contracts and realize the long-term co-operations among supply chain members.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nana Wan ◽  
Xu Chen

As far as the price increase and the demand contraction caused by inflation are concerned, we establish a Stackelberg game model that incorporates bidirectional option contracts and the effect of inflation and derive the optimal ordering and production policies on a one-period two-stage supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer. Through using the model of wholesale price contracts as the benchmark, we find that the introduction of bidirectional option contracts can benefit both the supplier and the retailer under inflation scenarios. Based on the conclusions drawn above, we design the bilateral coordination mechanism from the different perspective of two members involved and discuss how bidirectional option contracts should be set to achieve channel coordination under inflation scenarios. Through the sensitivity analysis, we illustrate the effect of inflation on the optimal decision variables and the optimal expected profits of the two parties with bidirectional option contracts.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Yang ◽  
Haorui Liu ◽  
Xuedou Yu ◽  
Fenghua Xiao

In consideration of influence of loss, freshness, and secret retailer cost of products, how to handle emergency events during three-level supply chain is researched when market need is presumed to be a nonlinear function with retail price in fresh agricultural product market. Centralized and decentralized supply chain coordination models are studied based on asymmetric information. Optimal strategy of supply chain in dealing with retail price perturbation is caused by emergency events. The research reveals robustness for optimal production planning, wholesale price for distributors, wholesale price for retailers, and retail price of three-level supply chain about fresh agricultural products. The above four factors can keep constant within a certain perturbation of expectation costs for retailers because of emergency events; the conclusions are verified by numerical simulation. This paper also can be used for reference to the other related studies in how to coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric and punctual researches information response to disruptions.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Xu ◽  
Zhaotong Lian ◽  
Xifan Yao

Motivated by the complex product with the feature about error-prone assembly system and supply chain inventory inaccuracy, this paper elaborates on the impact of information technology investment on complex product by establishing a three-stage supply chain model involving two suppliers, one manufacturer, and retailer which carried out Stackelberg games. In addition, it not only compares the manufacturer and the retailer’s optimal decision and maximum profit under the situation of the information asymmetry and free information sharing, but also analyzes their market behavior and changes in market performance. Meanwhile, it points out that the downstream in supply chain masters more information about market demands compared to the upstream one. The optimal cost threshold values of technology investment are also examined both for the centralized and the decentralized scenarios utilizing quantitative and modeling methods. By analyzing and comparing the optimal profit with or without investment on information technology, it establishes a supply chain coordination model which boosts the application of information technology. At the same time, it offers the conditions on which the upstream and downstream enterprises can coordinate with one another. The results of this paper have contributed significantly to making the price and ordering decisions on whether RFID should be adopted among members of the supply chain. Finally, we present numerical analyses, and several extensions of the model are considered as well.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhang Zhijian ◽  
Peng Wang ◽  
Miyu Wan ◽  
Junhua Guo ◽  
Jian Liu

The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nana Wan ◽  
Xu Chen

There exist obvious changes in price and demand during the inflationary period, both of which are regarded as the key factors leading to supply chain uncertainty. In this paper, we focus our discussion on price increase and demand contraction caused by inflation, integrate the effect of inflation and option contracts within the model framework, and analyze how to use option contracts to achieve supply chain coordination under inflation scenarios. We consider a one-period two-stage supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer and explore the effect of inflation on the optimal ordering and production decisions under three different types of contracts: wholesale price contracts, option contracts, and portfolio contracts. Moreover, we explore the impact of option contracts on the supply chain through using wholesale price contracts model as the benchmark. We find that the retailer prefers adopting portfolio contracts, but the supplier prefers providing option contracts under inflation scenarios. Ultimately, option contracts will be implemented owing to the supplier’s market dominant position. In addition, we discuss the supply chain bilateral coordination mechanism with option contracts from the perspectives of two members and derive that option contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement under inflation scenarios.


Author(s):  
Haijun Wang ◽  
Guanmei Liu

This paper studies voucher sale as an operational method to raise working capital for a supply chain, which consists of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer takes advantage of an online platform to sell vouchers and to get access to borrowing from a bank. By formulating a Stackelberg game model, we show the retailer's possible order quantities in the cases without and with bank loan and analyze the impact of voucher sale on the retailer's optimal choice of order quantity and the supplier's optimal wholesale price. We find that a smaller voucher's price induces the retailer to be more likely to order with loan from a bank while a larger voucher's value induces an order quantity with the loan more difficult to be repaid. In addition, if voucher's price is large, the supplier decides a wholesale price which leads the retailer not to borrow from a bank; and if voucher's price is small, the supplier's optimal decision is obtained by anticipating the retailer to borrow from a bank. We also analyze the impact of voucher sale in the presence of trade credit financing on the firms' decisions. The results show that the voucher's price should be small so that the retailer can repay the supplier if voucher's value is large; otherwise, the retailer either does not borrow from the supplier or may not repay the supplier. Besides, the supplier decides a wholesale price so that the retailer does not borrow or can repay the supplier, except that the voucher's value is large and the voucher's price is medium.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-172
Author(s):  
I.W. Fang ◽  
W.-T. Lin

Green closed-loop supply chain management is an important topic for business operations today because of increasing resource scarcity and environmental issues. Companies not only have to meet environmental regulations, but also must ensure high quality supply chain operation as a means to secure competitive advantages and increase profits. This study proposes a multi-objective mixed integer programming model for an integrated green closed-loop supply chain network designed to maximize profit, amicable production level (environmentally friendly materials and clean technology usage), and quality level. A scenario-based robust optimization method is used to deal with uncertain parameters such as the demand of new products, the return rates of returned products and the sale prices of remanufactured products. The proposed model is applied to a real industry case example of a manufacturing company to illustrate the applicability of the proposed model. The result shows a robust optimal resource allocation solution that considers multiple scenarios. This study can be a reference for closed-loop supply chain related academic research and also can be used to guide the development of a green closed-loop supply chain model for better decision making.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yafei Zu ◽  
Lianghua Chen

To better understand the different effects of the myopic and far-sighted behaviors on the advertising coordination in dynamic supply chain, this paper takes the reference price effect into consideration and formulates four differential game models for the two-level supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer in the situation of Stackelberg game. In our models, the market demand is assumed to be affected by the goodwill, reference price, and the advertising investment, in which the advertising investment can promote the construction of goodwill and such goodwill can further enhance the reference price. The results show that the participating members in the supply chain should invest more in advertisement to improve the goodwill and the relative reference price reflected in the minds of consumers. A far-sighted manufacturer will invest more in the advertisement and charge a higher wholesale price regardless of the behavior choice of the retailer. However, such kind of ignorance leads to different results on the retail pricing strategies of the retailer. The numerical analyses are given in the end to verify the effectiveness of the conclusions which provide the theoretical support to the dynamic supply chain coordination in practice.


Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Gaodi Liu ◽  
Xiaohua Wu ◽  
Jiwen Wu

The price risk of fresh agricultural products has been a significant topic in recent years. Taking the two-level fresh agricultural product supply chain as the research object, this paper studies the optimal ordering and coordination of supply chain based on two-period price, wholesale price and option contract. The optimal order decision of the retailer at the single period price and the optimal decision corresponding to the supplier are obtained when the output of the supplier is uncertain under decentralized decision-making. The range of penalty cost parameter that avoids supplier default is also obtained. The effect of two-period price on the optimal order decision and supply chain profits is discussed when the production yield of the supplier is fixed. Cost-sharing contract is introduced to increase the order quantity and achieve coordination because the option contract cannot completely make the supply chain coordination with two-period price. This paper provides a low-cost approach that can be applied in fresh agricultural supply chain to solve financing and order problems.


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