Conscientious Objection to Military Service as a Human Right

Abstract This article will argue that the term ‘conscientious objection’ can be applied beyond its associations with military service and reproductive healthcare, to explain the situation of a registrar of marriages, who, in carrying out his or her employment, has an objection based on religious beliefs to a specific aspect of his or her job requirements—namely the conduct of civil partnerships. It is argued that this objection is worthy of recognition and potential accommodation because of the weight of the burden which conscience imposes on the registrar, a burden that outweighs the case against recognition. The article then turns to examine critically the options for accommodating such a conscientious objection within United Kingdom law to the extent of considering three broad options, each with attendant advantages and disadvantages. Finally the article comes to the conclusion that re-configuring discrimination law might be the most pragmatic solution.

Part 1 Freedom of Religion or Belief, 1.3.11 Conscientious Objection

10.1093/law/9780198703983.003.0016 ◽

2016 ◽

Author(s):

Bielefeldt Heiner, Prof ◽

Ghanea Nazila, Dr ◽

Wiener Michael, Dr

Keyword(s):

Military Service ◽

Conscientious Objection ◽

Refugee Status ◽

National Anthem ◽

Conscientious Objectors ◽

Lethal Force ◽

Compulsory Military Service ◽

Normative Basis ◽

Military Expenditures ◽

Alternative Service

This chapter addresses issues concerning conscientious objection, notably the refusal by individuals to perform compulsory military service based on their genuinely held religious or other beliefs that forbid the use of lethal force. Throughout the past five decades, various international and regional human rights mechanisms have significantly changed their interpretation with regard to the existence and normative basis of a right to conscientious objection to military service. This chapter also discusses the question of who can claim conscientious objection; procedural issues; the problem of repeated trials and punishment of conscientious objectors; the nature and length of alternative service; refugee status claims based on persecution arising from conscientious objection; and conscientious objection in disputed territories. In addition, there are several issues of interpretation related to ‘selective’ objection against participating in certain wars and ‘total’ objection even against alternative civilian service. In addition to conscientious objection to military service, also other issues may give rise to objections, for example against the obligation to pay taxes for military expenditures; against carrying out abortions; against a duty to join a hunting association; against singing the national anthem or saluting the flag; and conscientious objection in the employment sphere.

Baptist ethics of conscientious objection to military service in South Africa: the watershed case of Richard Steele

Acta Theologica ◽

10.4314/actat.v25i2.49013 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 25 (2) ◽

Author(s):

F Hale

Keyword(s):

South Africa ◽

Military Service ◽

Conscientious Objection ◽

Richard Steele

“The War Power Is Not a Blank Check”: The Supreme Court and Conscientious Objection, 1917–1973

Journal of Policy History ◽

10.1017/s0898030619000095 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 31 (3) ◽

pp. 303-325

Author(s):

Megan Threlkeld

Keyword(s):

World War Ii ◽

Vietnam War ◽

Military Service ◽

Civil Liberties ◽

Conscientious Objection ◽

Conscientious Objector ◽

Compulsory Military Service ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Changing Attitudes ◽

War Power

Abstract:This article examines the Supreme Court’s role in the development of federal conscientious objector policy in the twentieth century. Focusing on two key periods—the three years following the end of World War II, and the era of the Vietnam War—I argue that the policy’s evolution was more complex than previous studies have indicated, and that the Court’s changing attitudes toward conscientious objection can be traced to the justices’ increasing but irresolute concern for civil liberties. By the early 1970s, the Court was interpreting federal statutes much more broadly than Congress ever intended, but the justices remained divided over just how broad those interpretations should be. While the end of the draft rendered the question of compulsory military service moot, the Court’s failure to arrive at a clear position on conscientious objection has had lasting implications on other issues.