Challenging the Ordinality of Police Use-of-Force Policy

Most use-of-force policies utilized by U.S. police agencies make fundamental ordinal assumptions about officers’ force responses to subject resistance. These policies consist of varying levels of force and resistance along an ordinally ranked continuum of severity. We empirically tested the ordinal assumptions that are ubiquitous to police use-of-force continua within the United States using 1 year’s use-of-force data from a municipal police department. Applying a quantitative technique known as categorical regression with optimal scaling, we found the assumptions of ordinality within the studied department’s use-of-force continuum (which is similar to many police use-of-force continua within the United States) are not met. Specifying physical force as a “lower” force option than less-lethal tools is associated with increased officer injury and decreased subject injury. Our findings call into question use-of-force continua featuring ordinal rankings for varying categories of less-lethal force.

Testing the Efficacy of a 1-Day Police Decision-Making and Autonomic Modulation Intervention: A Quasi-Random Pragmatic Controlled Trial

Contemporary discourse has identified several urgent priorities concerning police training and education, including: (a) empirically testing and validating the effectiveness of current programming in reducing lethal force decision-making errors; (b) integrating evidence-based content and pedagogical approaches into police curriculum; and (c) understanding the breadth and length of programming necessary to ensure learning and transfer of skills to operational field settings. Widespread calls to identify effective and actionable training programs have been met with numerous research studies, systematic reviews, and policy recommendations that reveal the need to train officers’ internal physiological awareness, which is foundational in shaping cognitive decision-making, emotion regulation, and behavior under stressful conditions. Several investigations have shown improvements to both lethal force errors and physiological recovery following a multi-day autonomic modulation (AM) intervention. Immediate and sustained training gains are observed following repeated practice with clinically validated protocols integrated into training scenarios. Despite evidence-based support for AM in addressing the aforementioned priorities, police organizations are faced with limited time and funding for training and education. The goal of the current quasi-random pragmatic controlled trial was to evaluate the effectiveness of a modified 1-day version of an established AM intervention. A sample of active-duty police officers were quasi-randomly assigned to an AM intervention (n = 82) or waitlist control group (n = 105). Lethal force errors and objective measures of autonomic arousal and recovery were measured during reality-based scenarios pre- and post-training and at 12-month follow-up. In contrast to previous investigations of longer AM intervention protocols, no significant training-related improvements to behavioral or physiological outcomes were found immediately post-intervention or at follow-up. The current results suggest that single-day training is insufficient to learn the physiological awareness and regulation skills necessary to perform effectively during lethal force encounters, as demonstrated by a lack of immediate or sustained training effects. Practical considerations, such as resource allocation, that may undermine the effectiveness of implementing evidence-based police training are discussed.

Covid 19: Human Rights and State Responsibility

Human rights dimensions of the Covid-19 response escalate the obligations of governments. Since the time Covid was first identified in December 2020 in Wuhan, China, Human Rights Watch has reported several human rights abuses including the authoritarian responses in some countries.  Many governments are expanding public health measures by abandoning universal human rights. People are arrested for violating lockdown measures and curfews. Police and/or security forces are using violence, including lethal force, to enforce public health measures such as curfews and the wearing of masks. Lockdowns have imposed restrictions on individual movement by restraining them from leaving their place of residence. Some countries have imposed partial lockdowns. While restrictions on freedom of movement are necessary in the interest of protecting public health, states still are accountable to ensure that such restrictions are proportionate, evidence-based, and time-limited.  There were grievances and inequalities across countries, some of which were based on racist, gender-specific or other discrimination. There is also increased oppression of those who think differently. The pandemic exposes the failures in the context of political action and cooperation. The article makes recommendations on how governments can confront the pandemic while respecting basic human rights.

Fire and Forget: A Moral Defense of the Use of Autonomous Weapons Systems in War and Peace

Setting aside the military advantages offered by Autonomous Weapons Systems for a moment, international debate continues to feature the argument that the use of lethal force by “killer robots” inherently violates human dignity. The purpose of this chapter is to refute this assumption of inherent immorality and demonstrate situations in which deploying autonomous systems would be strategically, morally, and rationally appropriate. The second part of this chapter objects to the argument that the use of robots in warfare is somehow inherently offensive to human dignity. Overall, this chapter will demonstrate that, contrary to arguments made by some within civil society, moral employment of force is possible, even without proximate human decision-making. As discussions continue to swirl around autonomous weapons systems, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that fire-and-forget weapons are not morally exceptional or inherently evil. If an engagement complied with the established ethical framework, it is not inherently morally invalidated by the absence of a human at the point of violence. As this chapter argues, the decision to employ lethal force becomes problematic when a more thorough consideration would have demanded restraint. Assuming a legitimate target, therefore, the importance of the distance between human agency in the target authorization process and force delivery is separated by degrees. A morally justifiable decision to engage a target with rifle fire would not be ethically invalidated simply because the lethal force was delivered by a commander-authorized robotic carrier.

Programming Precision? Requiring Robust Transparency for AWS

The possibility of allowing a machine agency over killing human beings is a justifiably concerning development, particularly when we consider the challenge of accountability in the case of illegal or unethical employment of lethal force. We have already seen how key information can be hidden or contested by deploying authorities, in the case of lethal drone strikes, for example. Therefore, this chapter argues that any effective response to autonomous weapons systems (AWS) must be underpinned by a comprehensive transparency regime that is fed by robust and reliable reporting mechanisms. This chapter offers a three-part argument in favor of a robust transparency regime. Firstly, there is a preexisting transparency gap in the deployment of core weapon systems that would be automated (such as currently remote-operated UCAVs). Second, while the Pentagon has made initial plans for addressing moral, ethical, and legal issues raised against AWS, there remains a need for effective transparency measures. Third, transparency is vital to ensure that AWS are only used with traceable lines of accountability and within established parameters. Overall this chapter argues that there is an overwhelming interest and duty for actors to ensure robust, comprehensive transparency, and accountability mechanisms. The more aggressively AWS are used, the more rigorous these mechanisms should be.

Understanding AI and Autonomy: Problematizing the Meaningful Human Control Argument against Killer Robots

The physical and temporal removal of the human from the decision to use lethal force underpins many of the arguments against the development of autonomous weapons systems. In response to these concerns, Meaningful Human Control has risen to prominence as a framing concept in the ongoing international debate. This chapter demonstrates how, in addition to the lack of a universally accepted precise definition, reliance on Meaningful Human Control is conceptually flawed. Overall, this chapter analyzes, problematizes, and explores the nebulous concept of Meaningful Human Control, and in doing so demonstrates that it relies on the mistaken premise that the development of autonomous capabilities in weapons systems constitutes a lack of human control that somehow presents an insurmountable challenge to existing International Humanitarian Law.

Wargaming the use of intermediate force capabilities in the gray zone

This work reviews the development and tests of an intermediate force capability (IFC) concept development hybrid wargame aimed at examining a maritime task force’s ability to counter hybrid threats in the gray zone. IFCs offer a class of response between doing nothing and using lethal force in a situation that would be politically unpalatable. Thus, the aim of the wargame is to evaluate whether IFCs can make a difference to mission success against hybrid threats in the gray zone. This wargame series was particularly important because it used traditional game mechanics in a unique and innovative way to evaluate and assess IFCs. The results of the wargame demonstrated that IFCs have a high probability of filling the gap between doing nothing and using lethal force. The presence of IFCs provided engagement time and space for the maritime task force commander. It also identified that development of robust IFC capabilities, not only against personnel, but against systems (trucks, cars, UAVs, etc.), can also effectively counter undesirable adversarial behavior

When the response does not match the threat: The relationship between threat assessment and behavioural response in ambiguous lethal force decision-making

Deciding when to use lethal force inherently depends on assessing threat, a process that itself incorporates numerous perceptual factors. This study assessed this relationship between perception-based threat assessment and behaviour-based threat response. Specifically, participants completed multiple tasks designed to elicit either a threat rating (e.g., perception-informed threat assessment) or a binary behavioural response (e.g., shoot/don’t-shoot). Actor posture and weapon presence significantly affected the threat assessment, which was an extremely powerful omnibus predictor of threat response. However, for ambiguous threat stimuli, perceived threat became a poor predictor for threat response relative to the omnibus test. Participants appeared to adopt additional rules to inform behaviour independent of the threat assessment when faced with an ambiguous situation. These results demonstrate an intriguing disparity between subjective threat assessment and the behavioural response to use force that does not apply well to ambiguous cases or adequately explain errors in lethal force decisions.