Interest group mobilization and lobbying patterns in Britain: A newspaper analysis

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Bernhagen ◽  
Brett Trani
1996 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony J. Nownes ◽  
Grant Neeley

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk De Bièvre ◽  
Arlo Poletti

Over the last decade, European Union (EU) trade agreement negotiations in the form of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada have been strongly contested. By contrast, many other EU trade negotiations have sailed on with far less politicization, or barely any at all. In this contribution, we assess a series of plausible explanation for these very varying degrees of politicization across EU trade agreement negotiations—conceived of as the combination of polarization of opinions, salience given to them in public debate, and the expansion of the number of societal actors involved therein. Through a review of existing explanations, we show how each of these explanations faces a set of challenges. In the third section, we argue it is useful to conceive of these existing explanations as structural background conditions enabling agency on the part of interest group and civil society organizations. We therefore close by sketching how literature on the relationship between interest group mobilization and public opinion could inform further comparative research on trade policy negotiations, and on politicization of EU policy making in general.


2001 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Nossiff

In 1965 abortion was illegal in every state in America except when the woman's life was endangered. Eight years later, in its decision in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that a woman's decision to have an early elective abortion was constitutionally protected.


2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 979-1000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Klüver

Do political parties respond to interest group mobilization? While party responsiveness to voters has received widespread attention, little is known about how interest groups affect parties’ policy agendas. I argue that political parties respond to interest groups as lobbyists offer valuable information, campaign contributions, electoral support and personal rewards, but that party responsiveness is conditioned by voter preferences. Based on a novel longitudinal analysis studying the responsiveness of German parties to interest groups across eleven issue areas and seven elections from 1987 until 2009, it is shown that parties adjust their policy agendas in response to interest group mobilization and that interest groups are more successful in shaping party policy when their priorities coincide with those of the electorate.


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