Exploring the proportionality of representation in interest group mobilization and political access: the case of the Netherlands

Acta Politica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcel Hanegraaff ◽  
Joost Berkhout ◽  
Jens van der Ploeg
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Political Access ◽  
Group Mobilization

Public Interest Group Entrepreneurship and Theories of Group Mobilization

1996 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony J. Nownes ◽  
Grant Neeley
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Group Mobilization

scholarly journals United in fear: Interest group coalition formation as a weapon of the weak?

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcel Hanegraaff ◽  
Andrea Pritoni
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
European Union ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
The European Union

Although many interest groups work together perpetually, most academic studies agree that coalition formation does not lead to more influence. In this article, we try to explain these puzzling findings. While former research generally tends to frame the decision of forming an interest group coalition as a strength, in this paper, we argue that coalition building should be considered as a ‘weapon of the weak’. Interest groups fearing that they are insufficiently influential, and whose very existence as an organisation is at risk, are more likely to coalesce. This theoretical framework is tested on a sample of around 3000 interest groups in six European countries – Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden – and the European Union. Empirical findings clearly demonstrate that perceived fears – oriented towards both organisational survival and policy influence – have an effect on how likely it is that an interest group will decide to build a coalition.

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