Setting the Party Agenda: Interest Groups, Voters and Issue Attention

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 979-1000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Klüver
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Information Campaign ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Issue Attention ◽  
Group Mobilization ◽  
Policy Agendas

Do political parties respond to interest group mobilization? While party responsiveness to voters has received widespread attention, little is known about how interest groups affect parties’ policy agendas. I argue that political parties respond to interest groups as lobbyists offer valuable information, campaign contributions, electoral support and personal rewards, but that party responsiveness is conditioned by voter preferences. Based on a novel longitudinal analysis studying the responsiveness of German parties to interest groups across eleven issue areas and seven elections from 1987 until 2009, it is shown that parties adjust their policy agendas in response to interest group mobilization and that interest groups are more successful in shaping party policy when their priorities coincide with those of the electorate.

scholarly journals When do political parties prioritize labour? Issue attention between party competition and interest group power

2019 ◽  
pp. 135406881987560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Otjes ◽  
Christoffer Green-Pedersen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Election Manifestos ◽  
Issue Attention ◽  
Project Data

This article analyses the conditions under which political parties spend attention to labour issues. This article compares the dominant partisan perspective, which proposes that attention to issues is shaped by party competition, to an interest group perspective, which proposes that strong interest groups, in particular when their power is institutionalized in corporatist systems, can force parties to spend attention to their issue. We use the Comparative Agenda Project data set of election manifestos to examine these patterns in seven West-European countries and corroborate our findings in the Comparative Manifesto Project data set for 25 countries. The evidence supports the interest group perspective over the partisan perspective. This shows that the study of party attention to issues should not isolate party competition from the influence of other political actors.

scholarly journals The contingent character of interest groups–political parties’ interaction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Laura Chaqués-Bonafont ◽  
Camilo Cristancho ◽  
Luz Muñoz-Márquez ◽  
Leire Rincón
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Structural Factors ◽  
Issue Salience ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Western Democracies

Abstract This article examines the conditions under which interest groups interact with political parties. Existing research finds that interest group–political party interactions in most western democracies have become more open and contingent over time. The close ideological and formal organisational ties that once characterised these relations have gradually been replaced by alternative, more pragmatic forms of cooperation. However, most of this research stresses the importance of the structural factors underpinning these links over time and across countries, but sheds little light on the factors driving short-term interest group–party interactions. Here, by drawing on survey data on Spanish interest groups obtained between December 2016 and May 2017, this article seeks to fill this gap by taking into account party status, issue salience and a group’s resources as explanatory variables. It shows that mainstream parties are the primary targets of interest groups, that groups dealing with salient issues are more likely to contact political parties and that the groups with most resources interact with a larger number of parties.

4. Neo-functionalism

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten Strøby Jensen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Driving Force ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
Functionalist Theory ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
Supranational Institutions ◽  
Spillover Hypothesis

This chapter examines the main assumptions of neo-functionalism, especially with regards to European integration. The fundamental argument of neo-functionalists is that states are not the only important actors on the international scene. They claim that supranational institutions and non-state actors, such as interest groups and political parties, are the real driving force behind integration efforts. The chapter first provides an overview of the main features of neo-functionalist theory and its historical development since the 1950s before discussing three hypotheses advanced by neo-functionalists: the spillover hypothesis, the elite socialization hypothesis, and the supranational interest group hypothesis. After explaining the concepts of supranationalism and spillover, the chapter considers the main critiques of neo-functionalist theory. It concludes by describing the revival of interest in neo-functionalism and giving some examples that illustrate how today's neo-functionalists differ from those of the 1950s.

scholarly journals Campaign Spending and Lobbying

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Sasso ◽  
Dan Alexander
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Multiple Channels ◽  
Lobbying Effort ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Interest groups can influence governmental policy through multiple channels. First, they may spend money before elections to help elect their preferred candidate. Second, they may also lobby after the election to affect the implemented policy. We analyze a game-theoretic model of campaign spending and lobbying to understand the strategic relationship between these two means of outside influence. We consider how several lobbying environments, each featuring different access to the elected politician, affect both the willingness to spend during the campaign and the final policy. Campaign spending is a function of both expected final policy due to lobbying and also expected lobbying effort costs. We find that increased policy moderation often, but not always, accompanies decreased campaign spending. When extreme interest groups give campaign contributions in exchange for access, campaign spending decreases as policy becomes more extreme. Open-access lobbying, where all interest groups lobby regardless of ideological alignment, is always best for the voter. We then show that caps on campaign contributions may have minimal effect on policy because of later lobbying efficacy. Finally, we highlight comparative statics that predict different empirical patterns of contributions depending on whether politicians grant lobbying access to all interest groups or only to ideologically-aligned groups. Our results demonstrate that interest-group and candidate polarization must be considered relative to one another; the effect of greater interest-group polarization depends to a large extent on whether it implies more or less ideological proximity to the group's aligned candidate.

Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented

1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur T. Denzau ◽  
Michael C. Munger
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Constrained Maximization ◽  
Committee Assignments ◽  
Organized Interest ◽  
Supply Price

This paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model. In the model, three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes: organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth, voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes, and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection. A given legislator's supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort, as determined by committee assignments, priority and ability, and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district. Two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model. The prediction of the model is that interest groups will, in general, seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks. Thus, voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented, even though they are not organized.

scholarly journals Conceptualizing and measuring party-interest group relationships

2020 ◽  
pp. 135406882094939 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elin Haugsgjerd Allern ◽  
Simon Otjes ◽  
Thomas Poguntke ◽  
Vibeke Wøien Hansen ◽  
Sabine Saurugger ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Resource Sharing ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Scaling Analysis ◽  
Group Relationships ◽  
Organizational Ties ◽  
Party Group

Relationships between political parties and interest groups form structures that enable and constrain political action. Yet there is a lack of consensus on what ‘party-group relationships’ means. We propose a conceptualization focusing on ties as means for structured interaction, which is different from sharing or transfer of resources and ideological kinship. Our conceptual discussion suggests that organizational ties form a single yet hierarchical scale of strength: groups that have many formal ties with particular parties would also have weaker ties with these parties, but not vice versa. To validate our conceptual map, we furthermore check whether the distinction between organizational ties, resource sharing/provision and ideological kinship holds empirically. We explore our expectations by means of novel interest group survey data from seven mature democracies. The results of our scaling analysis provide support for our predictions and have multiple implications for future research on the causes and effects of party-group relationships.

The Power of the Party: Conflict Expansion and the Agenda Diversity of Interest Groups

2019 ◽  
pp. 106591291986714 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. J. Fagan ◽  
Zachary A. McGee ◽  
Herschel F. Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Related Activity ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Political Conflicts ◽  
Policy Conflicts ◽  
Policy Content ◽  
Conflict Expansion

To what extent do political parties have an effect on the policy-related activity of interest groups? Drawing from ideas of conflict expansion and the structure of extended party networks, we argue that political parties are able to pull interest groups into more policy conflicts than they otherwise would be involved in. We posit that parties are able to draw interest groups to be active outside of established issue niches. We suggest that several mechanisms—shared partisan electoral incentives, reciprocity, identification with the means, and cue-taking behavior—lead groups to participate in more diverse political conflicts. By linking data on interest group bill positions and the policy content of legislation, we generate a novel measure of 158 interest groups’ alignment with political parties. We find that the more an interest group is ideologically aligned with a political party, the more diverse their issue agenda becomes.

A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 571-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Bawn ◽  
Martin Cohen ◽  
David Karol ◽  
Seth Masket ◽  
Hans Noel ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Policy Design ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
Position Change ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Party Position ◽  
The Difference

We propose a theory of political parties in which interest groups and activists are the key actors, and coalitions of groups develop common agendas and screen candidates for party nominations based on loyalty to their agendas. This theoretical stance contrasts with currently dominant theories, which view parties as controlled by election-minded politicians. The difference is normatively important because parties dominated by interest groups and activists are less responsive to voter preferences, even to the point of taking advantage of lapses in voter attention to politics. Our view is consistent with evidence from the formation of national parties in the 1790s, party position change on civil rights and abortion, patterns of polarization in Congress, policy design and nominations for state legislatures, Congress, and the presidency.

scholarly journals Patterns of Conflict and Mobilization: Mapping Interest Group Activity in EU Legislative Policymaking

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 136-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arndt Wonka ◽  
Iskander De Bruycker ◽  
Dirk De Bièvre ◽  
Caelesta Braun ◽  
Jan Beyers
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Political Conflict ◽  
Strategy Development ◽  
Body Of Knowledge ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Interest Group Politics ◽  
Group Politics ◽  
Elite Interviews ◽  
Group Mobilization

Contemporary studies on interest group politics have mainly used single interest organizations as their central objects of study. This has led to a rich body of knowledge on the motivations of interest group mobilization, strategy development and even policy access and influence. The focus on single interest groups, however, has resulted in limited knowledge on aggregate patterns of interest groups’ activity. This article seeks to address this lacuna, by examining patterns of mobilization and conflict of interest groups’ activity in EU legislative policymaking. To do so, it adopts a unique policy-centred research design and an empirical assessment of policy mobilization for a sample of 125 EU legislative proposals based on extensive media coding as well as structured elite interviews. We find that levels of policy mobilization vary substantively across different legislative proposals and that political conflict between interest groups is remarkably low. This suggests that interest group conflict and mobilization contribute little to EU politicization and that in cases where interest groups voice opposing positions, conflicts do not occur between business and non-business groups. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of interest groups in EU legislative policymaking.

Media, public opinion and parliamentary agendas’ effect in political parties’ agenda-setting

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-42
Author(s):  
Ana Maria Belchior
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Party Manifesto ◽  
Media Agenda ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
The Media ◽  
Policy Agendas

Abstract Why do parties pay more attention to some policy issues than to others? To what extent does policy attention conveyed by the media, public opinion, and parliament explain party agenda-setting? And, more specifically, to what extent does the media agenda influence other agenda effects? This paper addresses these questions in an original manner by analyzing the influence of these three agendas – media, public opinion, and parliament – in party manifesto elaboration. The analysis relies on an extensive database of the Portuguese Policy Agendas Project that includes media attention, voter preferences, parliamentary questions and pledges in manifestos, between 1995 and 2015. Our findings show that the media agenda is the most influential in party manifesto elaboration, and that the other agendas have a stronger effect when the media also give attention to the issue. This depends, however, on the political party being in cabinet or in opposition, as well as on the economic context. These findings have important implications for party competition literature.

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