Conflicts and Cooperation in Brownfield Redevelopment Projects: Application of Conjoint Analysis and Game Theory to Model Strategic Decision Making

2012 ◽  
Vol 138 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. G. J. Blokhuis ◽  
C. C. P. Snijders ◽  
Q. Han ◽  
W. F. Schaefer
2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (8) ◽  
pp. 335-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
AP Marco

How the controversial study of strategic decision-making plays out in our profession.


Author(s):  
Han Smit ◽  
Thras Moraitis

This chapter develops a framework for assessing the value generated by both the option-like and competitive characteristics of an acquisition strategy. The conceptual approach is based on real options and principles from game theory. It illustrates the approach with an example of how real options and games thinking were used in strategic decision making at a major pharmaceutical company. The method treats an acquisition strategy as a package of corporate real options actively managed by the firm in a context of competitive responses or changing market conditions. This framework can help management answer several questions that are important for a successful acquisition strategy: How valuable are the growth opportunities created by the acquisition? How can we best sequence the acquisition options in the strategy? When is it appropriate to grow organically, and when are strategic acquisitions the preferred route? How is the industry likely to respond, and how will that affect the value of our acquisitions and future targets? The subsequent sections present a series of frameworks to address these questions.


2018 ◽  
pp. 14-23
Author(s):  
A. V. Tebekin

Within the framework of the General system of management decision-making methods, the role and place of management decision-making methods based on the optimization of performance indicators are shown. The features and areas of application of methods of game theory as a group of methods of the class of strategic decisionmaking based on the optimization of performance indicators are considered. The classification of a group of methods of management decision-making based on the theory of games on the basis of cooperation, symmetry, the value of the total amount, sequence of actions, completeness of information, finiteness of the number of steps, continuity, purity of strategies, type of winning function.


Author(s):  
Rauno Rusko

This chapter is focused on the possibilities of game theory as a tool of strategists to interpret practical strategic decision-making situations. Simultaneously, there is a need to simplify presentation of game theory and consider the possibilities of mixed strategies. Practical game situations are relatively complex: even the rules of the game might change during the decision-making process, or at least there is need to change several times the strategy during the game, especially in the case of repeated game. This chapter shows some practical examples how to describe the strategic game situations in a manner relatively easy to understand.


Author(s):  
Geraldine Ryan ◽  
Seamus Coffey

We think strategically whenever there are interactions between our decisions and other people’s decisions. In order to decide what we should do, we must first reason through how the other individuals are going to act or react. What are their aims? What options are open to them? In the light of our answers to these questions, we can decide what is the best way for us to act. Most business situations are interactive in the sense that the outcome of each decision emerges from the synthesis of firm owners, managers, employees, suppliers, and customers. Good decisions require that each decision-maker anticipate the decisions of the others. Game theory offers a systematic way of analysing strategic decision-making in interactive situations. It is a technique used to analyse situations where for two or more individuals the outcome of an action by one of them depends not only on their own action but also on the actions taken by the others (Binmore, 1992; Carmichael, 2005; McMillan, 1992). In these circumstances, the plans or strategies of one individual depend on their expectations about what the others are doing. Such interdependent situations can be compared to games of strategy. Games can be classified according to a variety of categories, including the timing of the play, the common or conflicting interests of the players, the number of times an interaction occurs, the amount of information available to the players, the type of rules, and the feasibility of coordinated action. Strategic moves manipulate the rules of the game to a player’s advantage. There are three types of strategic moves: commitments, threats, and promises. Only a credible strategic move will have the desired effect.


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