Lost Hopes and Mixed Quotes

Let [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] be two rings, [Formula: see text] an ideal of [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] be a ring homomorphism. The ring [Formula: see text] is called the amalgamation of [Formula: see text] with [Formula: see text] along [Formula: see text] with respect to [Formula: see text]. It was proposed by D’anna and Fontana [Amalgamated algebras along an ideal, Commutative Algebra and Applications (W. de Gruyter Publisher, Berlin, 2009), pp. 155–172], as an extension for the Nagata’s idealization, which was originally introduced in [Nagata, Local Rings (Interscience, New York, 1962)]. In this paper, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which [Formula: see text], and some related constructions, is either a Hilbert ring, a [Formula: see text]-domain or a [Formula: see text]-ring in the sense of Adams [Rings with a finitely generated total quotient ring, Canad. Math. Bull. 17(1) (1974)]. By the way, we investigate the transfer of the [Formula: see text]-property among pairs of domains sharing an ideal. Our results provide original illustrating examples.

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Exploitation

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.113 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Benjamin Ferguson

Keyword(s):

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Social Contexts ◽

Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽

Welfare Gains ◽

Unfair Advantage ◽

Necessary And Sufficient ◽

Normative Status ◽

The Way

The concept of exploitation is often invoked in situations where relatively impoverished people are treated unfairly in economic and social contexts. While the claim that exploitation involves taking unfair advantage is broadly accepted, there is little consensus about what fairness requires and whether unfairness is seriously wrong in the context of exchanges. One family of accounts claims that exploitation involves the maldistribution of resources, either because exploitative transactions result in distributions that violate substantive norms of fairness, or because procedural flaws in the way exploitative transactions come about entail that their outcomes are unfair.A second, domination-based approach to exploitation claims that the moral flaw embodied by exploitative relations is the exploiter’s disrespectful use of his power over the exploitee. While exploiters’ domination of others may lead to maldistributions, defenders of the domination-based approach argue that distributive unfairness is neither necessary nor sufficient for exploitative relations.These approaches both face two kinds of challenges. The first concerns the scope. Neither appears to provide necessary and sufficient conditions that are adequate to capture all and only cases commonly described as exploitation. The second concerns the normative status. Exploitation is typically assumed to be morally impermissible, yet neither approach seems to satisfactorily explain how exploitations that nevertheless generate significant welfare gains for both parties can be wrong.

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Personal Identity

10.23943/princeton/9780691161006.003.0010 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Galen Strawson

Keyword(s):

Personal Identity ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽

Human Being ◽

Individual Substance ◽

Past Time ◽

Necessary And Sufficient ◽

The Way

This chapter examines John Locke's idea of personal identity by focusing on the canonical personal identity question: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of the truth of the claim that a person considered now at time t₂, whom we may call [P], is the same person as a person considered at a different past time t₁, whom we may call [Pₓ]? What has to be true if it is to be true that [Pₓ] is the same person as [P]? The canonical question assumes that “person” denotes a thing or object or substance that is a standard temporal continuant in the way that a human being or person1 is (or an immaterial soul, on most conceptions of what an immaterial soul is). The chapter considers how Locke's person differs both from human being (man) and from (individual) substance, material or immaterial, on the same ground, as well as his concept of the field of consciousness in relation to personhood.

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An Extension Theorem for a Sequence of Krein Space Contractions

International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences ◽

10.1155/2018/5178454 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 2018 ◽

pp. 1-7

Author(s):

Gerald Wanjala

Keyword(s):

Krein Space ◽

Extension Theorem ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽

Krein Spaces ◽

Kreĭn Space ◽

Necessary And Sufficient ◽

The Way

Consider Krein spaces U and Y and let Hk and Kk be regular subspaces of U and Y, respectively, such that Hk⊂Hk+1 and Kk⊂Kk+1 (k∈N). For each k∈N, let Ak:Hk→Kk be a contraction. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a contraction B:U→Y such that BHk=Ak. Some interesting results are proved along the way.

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Applications of the GapSpace Model for Multidimensional Mechanical Assemblies

Journal of Computing and Information Science in Engineering ◽

10.1115/1.1565072 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 3 (1) ◽

pp. 22-30 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Zhihua Zou ◽

Edward P. Morse

Keyword(s):

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Tolerance Analysis ◽

Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽

Important Task ◽

Assembly Model ◽

Worst Case ◽

Mechanical Assemblies ◽

Necessary And Sufficient ◽

The Way

The most fundamental, and perhaps most important, task in the tolerance analysis of assemblies is to test whether or not the components with tolerances are actually able to fit together (called assembleability). Another important task of tolerance analysis is to check how the tolerances affect the quality or functionality of a product when they are assembled together. This paper presents the way the tolerance analyses are implemented by an assembly model, called the GapSpace model. The model can not only capture the necessary and sufficient conditions for assembleability analysis, but also transfers the functionality into the modeling variables (gaps). The assembleability analyses based on the GapSpace model for nominal components and those with worst case or statistical tolerances are introduced through an example. The problems of testing the quality of assemblies and calculating sensitivities are solved quickly and precisely using the model. The GapSpace model is more suitable for certain GD&T tolerancing methods than for parametric plus/minus tolerancing.

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Varieties of Quotation Revisited

Belgian Journal of Linguistics ◽

10.1075/bjl.17.04cap ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 17 ◽

pp. 51-75 ◽

Cited By ~ 13

Author(s):

Herman Cappelen ◽

Ernie Lepore

Keyword(s):

Speech Act ◽

Semantic Account ◽

Mixed Quotation ◽

The Way

This paper develops the view presented in our 1997 paper “Varieties of Quotation”. In the first part of the paper we show how phenomena such as scare quotes, echoing and mimicry can be treated as what we call Speech-Act Heuristics. We then defend a semantic account of mixed quotation. Along the way we discuss the role of indexicals in mixed quotation and the non-cancelability of reference to words in mixed quotation. We also respond to some objections raised by Recanati, Saka, Stainton and Reimer.

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Distributing Collective Obligation

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy ◽

10.26556/jesp.v9i3.91 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 9 (3) ◽

pp. 1-23 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Sean Aas

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Necessary Condition ◽

In Virtue Of ◽

The Way

In this paper I develop an account of member obligation: the obligations that fall on the members of an obligated collective in virtue of that collective obligation. I use this account to argue that unorganized collections of individuals can constitute obligated agents. I argue first that, to know when a collective obligation entails obligations on that collective’s members, we have to know not just what it would take for each member to do their part in satisfying the collective obligation, but also what they should do if they cannot do their part because others will not do theirs. I go on to argue (contra recent proposals) that it is not good enough for members in this situation to reasonably believe that others will not do their part. Rather, for a member of an obligated collective to permissibly escape doing her part in a collective obligation, she must both reasonably doubt that others will do their part and stand ready to act in case others do as well. This necessary condition for collective obligation points the way to plausible sufficient conditions – conditions that, I argue, allow unstructured collectives to bear obligations. For (a) if a collective’s members are individually obligated to be ready to do their part, in a given collective action, and (b) if that individual readiness makes it sufficiently likely that the collective will in fact act, then it is hard to see what could block an attribution of collective obligation. In particular, in that case there ought to be no additional objection that there is no existing, organized “agent” on which the obligation might fall. For agents are, simply, things that can act. To be able to act is just to be able to succeed by trying. Unstructured collectives try to do something, I argue, when each member acts on their willingness to do their part in that thing if others do theirs; sometimes they succeed, producing a collective action. Some unstructured collectives, therefore, can succeed by trying; therefore, they can act; therefore they are agents.

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Epistemic Injustice

10.26686/wgtn.17139902.v1 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

◽

Hannah Simpson

Keyword(s):

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Social World ◽

Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽

Epistemic Injustice ◽

Small Section ◽

Extensive Analysis ◽

The Social ◽

Necessary And Sufficient ◽

Key Terms ◽

The Way

<p>“Epistemic injustice” is a fairly new concept in philosophy, which, loosely speaking, describes a kind of injustice that occurs at the intersection of structures of the social world and knowledge. While the concept was first put forward in the 1990’s, the most significant publication on the topic is Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, which was published in 2007. Since then, there has been something of an explosion of literature on the topic of epistemic injustice. However, the concept of epistemic injustice is one that is poorly understood. While Epistemic Injustice offers extensive analysis of some aspects of epistemic injustice, it does a poor job of explaining, overall, what epistemic injustice actually is, limiting most of that explanation to a small section in the introduction of the book. The way that epistemic injustice is presented in this section is highly ambiguous, with key terms being loosely defined (if at all), and the necessary and sufficient conditions of something being an epistemic injustice are left unclear. This remains unresolved in the literature beyond Fricker’s account: while there has been some progression in how we think about epistemic injustice beyond what Fricker’s work provides us with, there has been a general failure to adequately recognize and address the ambiguities of the Frickerian account of epistemic injustice. In this thesis, I aim to show that, despite superficial impressions to the contrary, the Frickerian account is fundamentally ambiguous and incomplete. Moreover, later attempts to address these issues by subsequent theorists have failed. This project, however, is not in vain. I conclude by proposing a new account of epistemic injustice that overcomes these problems with the Frickerian account, offering a way of understanding epistemic injustice that is both philosophically satisfying and practically useful.</p>

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Epistemic Injustice

10.26686/wgtn.17139902 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

◽

Hannah Simpson

Keyword(s):

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Social World ◽

Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽

Epistemic Injustice ◽

Small Section ◽

Extensive Analysis ◽

The Social ◽

Necessary And Sufficient ◽

Key Terms ◽

The Way

<p>“Epistemic injustice” is a fairly new concept in philosophy, which, loosely speaking, describes a kind of injustice that occurs at the intersection of structures of the social world and knowledge. While the concept was first put forward in the 1990’s, the most significant publication on the topic is Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, which was published in 2007. Since then, there has been something of an explosion of literature on the topic of epistemic injustice. However, the concept of epistemic injustice is one that is poorly understood. While Epistemic Injustice offers extensive analysis of some aspects of epistemic injustice, it does a poor job of explaining, overall, what epistemic injustice actually is, limiting most of that explanation to a small section in the introduction of the book. The way that epistemic injustice is presented in this section is highly ambiguous, with key terms being loosely defined (if at all), and the necessary and sufficient conditions of something being an epistemic injustice are left unclear. This remains unresolved in the literature beyond Fricker’s account: while there has been some progression in how we think about epistemic injustice beyond what Fricker’s work provides us with, there has been a general failure to adequately recognize and address the ambiguities of the Frickerian account of epistemic injustice. In this thesis, I aim to show that, despite superficial impressions to the contrary, the Frickerian account is fundamentally ambiguous and incomplete. Moreover, later attempts to address these issues by subsequent theorists have failed. This project, however, is not in vain. I conclude by proposing a new account of epistemic injustice that overcomes these problems with the Frickerian account, offering a way of understanding epistemic injustice that is both philosophically satisfying and practically useful.</p>

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A support theorem for Hilbert schemes of planar curves, II

Compositio Mathematica ◽

10.1112/s0010437x20007745 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 157 (4) ◽

pp. 835-882

Author(s):

Luca Migliorini ◽

Vivek Shende ◽

Filippo Viviani

Keyword(s):

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Total Space ◽

Independent Interest ◽

Hilbert Schemes ◽

Support Theorem ◽

Planar Curves ◽

Compactified Jacobian ◽

The Way

We study the cohomology of Jacobians and Hilbert schemes of points on reduced and locally planar curves, which are however allowed to be singular and reducible. We show that the cohomologies of all Hilbert schemes of all subcurves are encoded in the cohomologies of the fine compactified Jacobians of connected subcurves, via the perverse Leray filtration. We also prove, along the way, a result of independent interest, giving sufficient conditions for smoothness of the total space of the relative compactified Jacobian of a family of locally planar curves.

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