scholarly journals Epistemic Injustice

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Hannah Simpson

<p>“Epistemic injustice” is a fairly new concept in philosophy, which, loosely speaking, describes a kind of injustice that occurs at the intersection of structures of the social world and knowledge. While the concept was first put forward in the 1990’s, the most significant publication on the topic is Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, which was published in 2007. Since then, there has been something of an explosion of literature on the topic of epistemic injustice. However, the concept of epistemic injustice is one that is poorly understood.  While Epistemic Injustice offers extensive analysis of some aspects of epistemic injustice, it does a poor job of explaining, overall, what epistemic injustice actually is, limiting most of that explanation to a small section in the introduction of the book. The way that epistemic injustice is presented in this section is highly ambiguous, with key terms being loosely defined (if at all), and the necessary and sufficient conditions of something being an epistemic injustice are left unclear. This remains unresolved in the literature beyond Fricker’s account: while there has been some progression in how we think about epistemic injustice beyond what Fricker’s work provides us with, there has been a general failure to adequately recognize and address the ambiguities of the Frickerian account of epistemic injustice.  In this thesis, I aim to show that, despite superficial impressions to the contrary, the Frickerian account is fundamentally ambiguous and incomplete. Moreover, later attempts to address these issues by subsequent theorists have failed. This project, however, is not in vain. I conclude by proposing a new account of epistemic injustice that overcomes these problems with the Frickerian account, offering a way of understanding epistemic injustice that is both philosophically satisfying and practically useful.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Hannah Simpson

<p>“Epistemic injustice” is a fairly new concept in philosophy, which, loosely speaking, describes a kind of injustice that occurs at the intersection of structures of the social world and knowledge. While the concept was first put forward in the 1990’s, the most significant publication on the topic is Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, which was published in 2007. Since then, there has been something of an explosion of literature on the topic of epistemic injustice. However, the concept of epistemic injustice is one that is poorly understood.  While Epistemic Injustice offers extensive analysis of some aspects of epistemic injustice, it does a poor job of explaining, overall, what epistemic injustice actually is, limiting most of that explanation to a small section in the introduction of the book. The way that epistemic injustice is presented in this section is highly ambiguous, with key terms being loosely defined (if at all), and the necessary and sufficient conditions of something being an epistemic injustice are left unclear. This remains unresolved in the literature beyond Fricker’s account: while there has been some progression in how we think about epistemic injustice beyond what Fricker’s work provides us with, there has been a general failure to adequately recognize and address the ambiguities of the Frickerian account of epistemic injustice.  In this thesis, I aim to show that, despite superficial impressions to the contrary, the Frickerian account is fundamentally ambiguous and incomplete. Moreover, later attempts to address these issues by subsequent theorists have failed. This project, however, is not in vain. I conclude by proposing a new account of epistemic injustice that overcomes these problems with the Frickerian account, offering a way of understanding epistemic injustice that is both philosophically satisfying and practically useful.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 1850023 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Izelgue ◽  
O. Ouzzaouit

Let [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] be two rings, [Formula: see text] an ideal of [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] be a ring homomorphism. The ring [Formula: see text] is called the amalgamation of [Formula: see text] with [Formula: see text] along [Formula: see text] with respect to [Formula: see text]. It was proposed by D’anna and Fontana [Amalgamated algebras along an ideal, Commutative Algebra and Applications (W. de Gruyter Publisher, Berlin, 2009), pp. 155–172], as an extension for the Nagata’s idealization, which was originally introduced in [Nagata, Local Rings (Interscience, New York, 1962)]. In this paper, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which [Formula: see text], and some related constructions, is either a Hilbert ring, a [Formula: see text]-domain or a [Formula: see text]-ring in the sense of Adams [Rings with a finitely generated total quotient ring, Canad. Math. Bull. 17(1) (1974)]. By the way, we investigate the transfer of the [Formula: see text]-property among pairs of domains sharing an ideal. Our results provide original illustrating examples.


Author(s):  
Benjamin Ferguson

The concept of exploitation is often invoked in situations where relatively impoverished people are treated unfairly in economic and social contexts. While the claim that exploitation involves taking unfair advantage is broadly accepted, there is little consensus about what fairness requires and whether unfairness is seriously wrong in the context of exchanges. One family of accounts claims that exploitation involves the maldistribution of resources, either because exploitative transactions result in distributions that violate substantive norms of fairness, or because procedural flaws in the way exploitative transactions come about entail that their outcomes are unfair.A second, domination-based approach to exploitation claims that the moral flaw embodied by exploitative relations is the exploiter’s disrespectful use of his power over the exploitee. While exploiters’ domination of others may lead to maldistributions, defenders of the domination-based approach argue that distributive unfairness is neither necessary nor sufficient for exploitative relations.These approaches both face two kinds of challenges. The first concerns the scope. Neither appears to provide necessary and sufficient conditions that are adequate to capture all and only cases commonly described as exploitation. The second concerns the normative status. Exploitation is typically assumed to be morally impermissible, yet neither approach seems to satisfactorily explain how exploitations that nevertheless generate significant welfare gains for both parties can be wrong.


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson

This chapter examines John Locke's idea of personal identity by focusing on the canonical personal identity question: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of the truth of the claim that a person considered now at time t₂, whom we may call [P], is the same person as a person considered at a different past time t₁, whom we may call [Pₓ]? What has to be true if it is to be true that [Pₓ] is the same person as [P]? The canonical question assumes that “person” denotes a thing or object or substance that is a standard temporal continuant in the way that a human being or person1 is (or an immaterial soul, on most conceptions of what an immaterial soul is). The chapter considers how Locke's person differs both from human being (man) and from (individual) substance, material or immaterial, on the same ground, as well as his concept of the field of consciousness in relation to personhood.


2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bear F. Braumoeller

Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) has become one of the most prominent methods in the social sciences for capturing causal complexity, especially for scholars with small- and medium- N data sets. This research note explores two key assumptions in fsQCA’s methodology for testing for necessary and sufficient conditions—the cumulation assumption and the triangular data assumption—and argues that, in combination, they produce a form of aggregation bias that has not been recognized in the fsQCA literature. It also offers a straightforward test to help researchers answer the question of whether their findings are plausibly the result of aggregation bias.


Author(s):  
Gerald Wanjala

Consider Krein spaces U and Y and let Hk and Kk be regular subspaces of U and Y, respectively, such that Hk⊂Hk+1 and Kk⊂Kk+1  (k∈N). For each k∈N, let Ak:Hk→Kk be a contraction. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a contraction B:U→Y such that BHk=Ak. Some interesting results are proved along the way.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhihua Zou ◽  
Edward P. Morse

The most fundamental, and perhaps most important, task in the tolerance analysis of assemblies is to test whether or not the components with tolerances are actually able to fit together (called assembleability). Another important task of tolerance analysis is to check how the tolerances affect the quality or functionality of a product when they are assembled together. This paper presents the way the tolerance analyses are implemented by an assembly model, called the GapSpace model. The model can not only capture the necessary and sufficient conditions for assembleability analysis, but also transfers the functionality into the modeling variables (gaps). The assembleability analyses based on the GapSpace model for nominal components and those with worst case or statistical tolerances are introduced through an example. The problems of testing the quality of assemblies and calculating sensitivities are solved quickly and precisely using the model. The GapSpace model is more suitable for certain GD&T tolerancing methods than for parametric plus/minus tolerancing.


1992 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 774-783 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. M. Burton ◽  
A. R. Dabrowski

AbstractInfinite sequences of exchangeable binary random variables have strong positive dependence properties; in particular, we show they are strong FKG. If the infinite exchangeable sequence is allowed to have multiple values this is no longer true. Positive dependence conditions such as association still have natural application in this context. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for an infinite exchangeable sequence to be associated. This result shows that exchangeable Polyà urn processes are associated. We also establish necessary and sufficient conditions for finite exchangeable sequences to be weakly associated. The match set distribution of a random permutation has recently been shown to be associated by an extensive analysis of cases. Our result easily yields the weak association of such distributions.


Author(s):  
María Jesús Ávila-Gutiérrez ◽  
Francisco Aguayo-González

The concept of autopoiesis created by scientists Maturana and Varela to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions of living systems has been strongly criticized by different authors. In spite of the constant attempts to introduce it to the sciences in general, it has only managed to be partially installed, although very strongly, in the social sciences. This chapter will seek to clarify what kind of problems the concept of autopoiesis presents and, in accordance with this, will present a new perspective. The concept of autopoiesis will be analyzed, placing it within the systems theory, critically evaluated, and its deficiencies made evident. Based on this, the concept of interpoiesis for the resolution of the deficiencies presented in the autopoiesis will be presented in order to install this new concept in the discussion. Finally, the concept will be evaluated from the Holonic paradigm shortened a case of application for business from the circular economy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document