Personal Identity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galen Strawson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Individual Substance ◽  
Past Time ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines John Locke's idea of personal identity by focusing on the canonical personal identity question: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of the truth of the claim that a person considered now at time t₂, whom we may call [P], is the same person as a person considered at a different past time t₁, whom we may call [Pₓ]? What has to be true if it is to be true that [Pₓ] is the same person as [P]? The canonical question assumes that “person” denotes a thing or object or substance that is a standard temporal continuant in the way that a human being or person1 is (or an immaterial soul, on most conceptions of what an immaterial soul is). The chapter considers how Locke's person differs both from human being (man) and from (individual) substance, material or immaterial, on the same ground, as well as his concept of the field of consciousness in relation to personhood.

Hilbert rings and G(oldman)-rings issued from amalgamated algebras

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 1850023 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Izelgue ◽  
O. Ouzzaouit
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Commutative Algebra ◽  
Quotient Ring ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Ring Homomorphism ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Local Rings ◽  
Finitely Generated ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
The Way

Let [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] be two rings, [Formula: see text] an ideal of [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] be a ring homomorphism. The ring [Formula: see text] is called the amalgamation of [Formula: see text] with [Formula: see text] along [Formula: see text] with respect to [Formula: see text]. It was proposed by D’anna and Fontana [Amalgamated algebras along an ideal, Commutative Algebra and Applications (W. de Gruyter Publisher, Berlin, 2009), pp. 155–172], as an extension for the Nagata’s idealization, which was originally introduced in [Nagata, Local Rings (Interscience, New York, 1962)]. In this paper, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which [Formula: see text], and some related constructions, is either a Hilbert ring, a [Formula: see text]-domain or a [Formula: see text]-ring in the sense of Adams [Rings with a finitely generated total quotient ring, Canad. Math. Bull. 17(1) (1974)]. By the way, we investigate the transfer of the [Formula: see text]-property among pairs of domains sharing an ideal. Our results provide original illustrating examples.

Locke's Theory of Personal Identity

Philosophy ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 54 (208) ◽  
pp. 173-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Helm
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Transitive Relation ◽  
Bodily Continuity ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

It is widely held that Locke propounded a theory of personal identity in terms of consciousness and memory. By ‘theory’ here is meant a set of necessary and sufficient conditions indicating what personal identity consists in. It is also held that this theory is open to obvious and damaging objections, so much so that it has to be supplemented in terms of bodily continuity, either because memory alone is not sufficient, or because the concept of memory is itself dependent upon considerations of bodily continuity. Alternatively it has been suggested that Locke's theory could be modified by allowing that for the purposes of personal identity ‘remember’ should be regarded as a transitive relation. So if A remembers the experiences of B but not those of C, and B remembers the experiences of C, then A, B and C can be regarded as belonging to the same unit of consciousness.

scholarly journals Metaphysical and Cultural Nature of Sacrifice in the Life and Death of E. Stein and S. Weil

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 13-40
Author(s):  
Piotr Duchliński ◽  
Agata Płazińska
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Psychological Needs ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Contemporary Culture ◽  
Life And Death ◽  
Cultural Crisis ◽  
Religious Ideals ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

The article explains the metaphysical, culture-making and creative act sacrificing one’s own life in the name of higher values. At the beginning we discuss the causes of a contemporary cultural crisis and the disap­pearance of metaphysical attitudes. We have formulated a thesis that the revival of metaphysics in contemporary culture can be grounded in the experience of metaphysical qualities that are present in heroic acts of offering one’s own life for another. The next step in our analysis was to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for self-sacrifice, and then, on the examples of E. Stein and S. Weil, we show what the ultimate sacrifice of one’s own life is. Using the method of humanis­tic interpretation, we have reconstructed the descriptive and normative reasons which motivated the two women to their acts of self-sacrifice. And although Weil and Stein do not meet the criteria to be categorized as self-sacrifices, we have found that they indeed were ultimate sacri­fices because they were directed towards the realization of the highest moral and religious ideals. Using the category of “metaphysical quali­ties” developed by the Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, we proposed an interpretation in which the sacrificial act was interpreted as supererogation in which metaphysical qualities such as holiness, sublimity, etc. are phenomenologically present. Such an act also has a cultural-creative dimension, consisting in building a culture and civilization of life in which the value of the existence of another human being is a correlate of a metaphysical desire rather than biological and psychological needs. The thesis is that, contrary to the contemporary crisis in metaphysics and axiology, they are essential and irremovable elements of culture, without which it cannot grow properly.

Exploitation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Ferguson
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Welfare Gains ◽  
Unfair Advantage ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Normative Status ◽  
The Way

The concept of exploitation is often invoked in situations where relatively impoverished people are treated unfairly in economic and social contexts. While the claim that exploitation involves taking unfair advantage is broadly accepted, there is little consensus about what fairness requires and whether unfairness is seriously wrong in the context of exchanges. One family of accounts claims that exploitation involves the maldistribution of resources, either because exploitative transactions result in distributions that violate substantive norms of fairness, or because procedural flaws in the way exploitative transactions come about entail that their outcomes are unfair.A second, domination-based approach to exploitation claims that the moral flaw embodied by exploitative relations is the exploiter’s disrespectful use of his power over the exploitee. While exploiters’ domination of others may lead to maldistributions, defenders of the domination-based approach argue that distributive unfairness is neither necessary nor sufficient for exploitative relations.These approaches both face two kinds of challenges. The first concerns the scope. Neither appears to provide necessary and sufficient conditions that are adequate to capture all and only cases commonly described as exploitation. The second concerns the normative status. Exploitation is typically assumed to be morally impermissible, yet neither approach seems to satisfactorily explain how exploitations that nevertheless generate significant welfare gains for both parties can be wrong.

scholarly journals An Extension Theorem for a Sequence of Krein Space Contractions

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Gerald Wanjala
Keyword(s):  
Krein Space ◽  
Extension Theorem ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Krein Spaces ◽  
Kreĭn Space ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
The Way

Consider Krein spaces U and Y and let Hk and Kk be regular subspaces of U and Y, respectively, such that Hk⊂Hk+1 and Kk⊂Kk+1  (k∈N). For each k∈N, let Ak:Hk→Kk be a contraction. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a contraction B:U→Y such that BHk=Ak. Some interesting results are proved along the way.

Applications of the GapSpace Model for Multidimensional Mechanical Assemblies

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhihua Zou ◽  
Edward P. Morse
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Tolerance Analysis ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Important Task ◽  
Assembly Model ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Mechanical Assemblies ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
The Way

The most fundamental, and perhaps most important, task in the tolerance analysis of assemblies is to test whether or not the components with tolerances are actually able to fit together (called assembleability). Another important task of tolerance analysis is to check how the tolerances affect the quality or functionality of a product when they are assembled together. This paper presents the way the tolerance analyses are implemented by an assembly model, called the GapSpace model. The model can not only capture the necessary and sufficient conditions for assembleability analysis, but also transfers the functionality into the modeling variables (gaps). The assembleability analyses based on the GapSpace model for nominal components and those with worst case or statistical tolerances are introduced through an example. The problems of testing the quality of assemblies and calculating sensitivities are solved quickly and precisely using the model. The GapSpace model is more suitable for certain GD&T tolerancing methods than for parametric plus/minus tolerancing.

scholarly journals Personal Identity and Science

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (39) ◽  
pp. 191-220
Author(s):  
Mariana Córdoba ◽  
María Marta Quintana
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Genetic Approach ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Pluralistic Perspective

The philosophical problem of personal identity –the issue of finding the necessary and sufficient conditions for a past or future being to be a certain present being– has been treated by analytical metaphysics mostly. In this framework, plenty of references to thought experiments can be found, but they exhibit no connection to practical problems and scientific outcomes. Our purpose is to involve philosophy of science in that debate, since a genetic approach regarding identity can be considered supported by contemporary scientific knowledge. In order to do that, we will focus on the Argentinian case of the approximately 500 children who were appropriated during the most recent dictatorship (1976-1983). The appropriations deprived them, precisely, of their identities, but some of them managed to be recovered thanks to Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (apm) and genetics. Our final purpose is to argue that a pluralistic perspective in philosophy of science, according to which values contribute to the very constitution of ontology science aims to describe and explain, will allow us to defend apm strategy but reject, at the same time, a reductive conception of identity.  

Locke on Being Self to My Self

2021 ◽  
pp. 118-144
Author(s):  
Ruth Boeker
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Final Section ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Present Moment ◽  
Intuitive Knowledge ◽  
The Past ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Over Time

John Locke accepts that every perception gives me immediate and intuitive knowledge of my own existence. However, this knowledge is limited to the present moment when I have the perception. If I want to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of my continued existence over time, Locke argues that it is important to clarify what “I” refers to. According to Locke, persons are thinking intelligent beings who can consider themselves as extended into the past and future and who are concerned for their happiness and accountable for their actions. I show that the concept of self that he develops in the context of his discussion of persons and personal identity is richer and more complex than the I-concept that he invokes in his version of the cogito. In the final section I turn to the reception of Locke’s view by some of his early critics and defenders, including Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, an anonymous author, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn.

scholarly journals Epistemic Injustice

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Hannah Simpson
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Social World ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Small Section ◽  
Extensive Analysis ◽  
The Social ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Key Terms ◽  
The Way

<p>“Epistemic injustice” is a fairly new concept in philosophy, which, loosely speaking, describes a kind of injustice that occurs at the intersection of structures of the social world and knowledge. While the concept was first put forward in the 1990’s, the most significant publication on the topic is Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, which was published in 2007. Since then, there has been something of an explosion of literature on the topic of epistemic injustice. However, the concept of epistemic injustice is one that is poorly understood.  While Epistemic Injustice offers extensive analysis of some aspects of epistemic injustice, it does a poor job of explaining, overall, what epistemic injustice actually is, limiting most of that explanation to a small section in the introduction of the book. The way that epistemic injustice is presented in this section is highly ambiguous, with key terms being loosely defined (if at all), and the necessary and sufficient conditions of something being an epistemic injustice are left unclear. This remains unresolved in the literature beyond Fricker’s account: while there has been some progression in how we think about epistemic injustice beyond what Fricker’s work provides us with, there has been a general failure to adequately recognize and address the ambiguities of the Frickerian account of epistemic injustice.  In this thesis, I aim to show that, despite superficial impressions to the contrary, the Frickerian account is fundamentally ambiguous and incomplete. Moreover, later attempts to address these issues by subsequent theorists have failed. This project, however, is not in vain. I conclude by proposing a new account of epistemic injustice that overcomes these problems with the Frickerian account, offering a way of understanding epistemic injustice that is both philosophically satisfying and practically useful.</p>

scholarly journals Epistemic Injustice

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Hannah Simpson
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Social World ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Small Section ◽  
Extensive Analysis ◽  
The Social ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Key Terms ◽  
The Way

<p>“Epistemic injustice” is a fairly new concept in philosophy, which, loosely speaking, describes a kind of injustice that occurs at the intersection of structures of the social world and knowledge. While the concept was first put forward in the 1990’s, the most significant publication on the topic is Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, which was published in 2007. Since then, there has been something of an explosion of literature on the topic of epistemic injustice. However, the concept of epistemic injustice is one that is poorly understood.  While Epistemic Injustice offers extensive analysis of some aspects of epistemic injustice, it does a poor job of explaining, overall, what epistemic injustice actually is, limiting most of that explanation to a small section in the introduction of the book. The way that epistemic injustice is presented in this section is highly ambiguous, with key terms being loosely defined (if at all), and the necessary and sufficient conditions of something being an epistemic injustice are left unclear. This remains unresolved in the literature beyond Fricker’s account: while there has been some progression in how we think about epistemic injustice beyond what Fricker’s work provides us with, there has been a general failure to adequately recognize and address the ambiguities of the Frickerian account of epistemic injustice.  In this thesis, I aim to show that, despite superficial impressions to the contrary, the Frickerian account is fundamentally ambiguous and incomplete. Moreover, later attempts to address these issues by subsequent theorists have failed. This project, however, is not in vain. I conclude by proposing a new account of epistemic injustice that overcomes these problems with the Frickerian account, offering a way of understanding epistemic injustice that is both philosophically satisfying and practically useful.</p>

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