The Many Moral Particularisms

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean McKeever ◽  
Michael Ridge
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Many ◽  
Broad Interest

What place, if any, moral principles should or do have in moral life has been a longstanding question f or moral philosophy. For some, the proposition that moral philosophy should strive to articulate moral principles has been an article of faith. At least since Aristotle, however, there has been a rieh counter-tradition that questions the possibility or value of trying to capture morality in principled terms. In recent years, philosophers who question principled approaches to morality have argued under the banner of moral particularism. Particularists can be found in diverse areas of philosophical inquiry, and their positions and arguments are of broad interest. Despite its importance, a proper evaluation of particularism has been hindered both by the diversity of arguments employed to defend it, and, perhaps more significantly, by the diversity of positions that can fairly claim to be particularist.

Moral particularism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Sensitivity ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Theories

Moral particularism is a broad set of views which play down the role of general moral principles in moral philosophy and practice. Particularists stress the role of examples in moral education and of moral sensitivity or judgment in moral decision-making, as well as criticizing moral theories which advocate or rest upon general principles. It has not yet been demonstrated that particularism constitutes an importantly controversial position in moral philosophy.

Buddhist Moral Thought and Western Moral Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Phenomenology

This essay discusses interpretations of Indian Buddhist moral thought in terms of common categories of Western moral philosophy. Problems are raised for interpretations of Buddhism as being committed to a theory of what makes an action morally right (specifically deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics). Following the lead of the poison arrow simile, a nontheoretical understanding of Buddhist moral thought is proposed: it was implicitly supposed that we do not need to act on the basis of universal moral principles but simply need to overcome the roots of unwholesome actions (greed, hatred, and delusion) and act skillfully. This interpretation is compared with other nontheoretical interpretations of Buddhist moral thought by reference to moral particularism, moral phenomenology, moral pluralism, and a nontheoretical conception of virtue ethics. It is also suggested that we should not be perplexed by the absence of explicit moral theory in Buddhism. Featured figures include Aristotle and Śāntideva.

Principle Ethics, Particularism and Another Possibility

Philosophy ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 72 (280) ◽  
pp. 269-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soran Reader
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Rational Analysis ◽  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
Moral Principles

One of the most striking contributions of particularism to moral philosophy has been its emphasis on the relative opacity of the moral scene to the tools of rational analysis traditionally used by philosophers. Particularism changes the place of the philosopher in relation to the moral life, pointing up the limits to what philosophy can do here. The modern moral philosopher who takes particularism seriously no longer has the luxury, endemic in our tradition, of imagining that moral philosophy can be done with only passing illustrative reference to experience, or that the truth about the whole of our moral life may be read of a list of a priori moral principles, whose rationality is underwritten by the mechanistic account of what it is to follow a rule that pre-Wittgensteinian philosophers took for granted.

scholarly journals Czwarty synod archidiecezji warszawskiej

2009 ◽  
Vol 52 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 23-49
Author(s):  
Janusz Gręźlikowski
Keyword(s):  
Canon Law ◽  
Religious Life ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Second Vatican Council ◽  
Holy See ◽  
John Paul Ii ◽  
Vatican Council ◽  
The Many ◽  
Administrative Structures ◽  
The Church

The 4th Synod of the Warsaw Archdioceses was debating during the five-year period, between 19th March 1998 and 19th March 2003 when the Warsaw Church had been run by the primate of Poland, cardinal Joseph Glemp. He proposed, summoned and carried out the synod and promulgated its resolutions. The initiative of summoning the synod was connected with the need for overall renewal of the religious and moral life of the Warsaw archdiocese. The synod’s deliberations and its resolutions were to cause the betterment of the organization and functioning of administrative and pastoral apparatus in the archdiocese, to normalize the many issues concerning the church and religious life, as well as to improve the laity and clergy’s religious, social and moral level. To achieve, a wide representation of clergy, catholic laity and monks were engaged. The synodical resolutions with its jurisdictional and pastoral nature are signified by strong setting in the teachings of the Second Vatican Council, the Canon Law, the documents of the Holy See and John Paul II, as well as by the resolutions of the Second Polish Plenary Second and the instructions of the Conference of the Polish Episcopate. At the same time they refer to the tradition of the Warsaw archdiocese and remain fully opened for the “tomorrow” of the Church, evangelizing and pastoral objective. Furthermore they undertake, organize and regulate many difficult pastoral issues. Thus the synodical legislator contributed to the renewal, revival and activation of the church and administrative structures of the archdioceses, so they could serve to various pastoral, church and administrative assignments.

Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties

2021 ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
The Real ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Prima Facie Duty ◽  
Principle Theory

This paper follows a path that takes us from utilitarianism to particularism. Utilitarianism is the leading one-principle theory; its falsehood is here simply asserted. W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duty is offered as the strongest many-principle theory. Ross’s two accounts of his notion of a prima facie duty are considered and criticized. But the real criticism of his view is that being a prima facie duty is a context-sensitive notion, since a feature that is a prima facie duty-making feature in one case may be prevented from playing that role in another. Since the strongest many-principle theory is therefore false, the only conclusion is a no-principle theory: a theory that allows moral reasons but does not suppose that they behave in the regular way required for there to be moral principles—namely, moral particularism.

Moral sentiments

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Enlightenment

Moral sentiments are those feelings or emotions central to moral agency. Aristotle treated sentiments as nonrational conditions, capable of being moulded into virtues through habituation. The moral sense theorists of the Enlightenment took sentiments to provide the psychological basis for our common moral life. Kantian approaches deny the primacy of sentiments in moral personality, and treat moral sentiments as conditioned by our rational grasp of moral principles. A central issue is whether moral sentiments incorporate moral beliefs. Accounts which affirm a connection with moral beliefs point to the complex intentionality (object-directedness) of such states as resentment or indignation. Against this, some observe that moral emotions may be felt inappropriately. Of special interest are the sentiments of guilt and shame. These seem to reflect different orientations towards moral norms, and questions arise about the degree to which these different orientations are culturally local, and whether either orientation is superior to the other.

Needs, Moral Demands and Moral Theory

Utilitas ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
SORAN READER ◽  
GILLIAN BROCK
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Demandingness ◽  
Moral Demands

In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if they cannot describe simple needs-meeting cases. We argue that the elimination or reduction of need to other concepts such as value, duty, virtue or care is unsatisfactory, in which case moral theories that make those concepts fundamental will have to be revised. In conclusion, we suggest that if moral theories cannot be revised to accommodate needs, they may have to be replaced with a fully needs-based theory.

Hare's Universal Prescriptivism

Dialogue ◽  
1964 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-198
Author(s):  
C. D. MacNiven
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Substantial Role ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy

R.M. Hare's new book, Freedom and Reason, is a welcome contribution to modern moral philosophy and should be read with care by anyone who believes that ethics should be relevant to the moral life, and that reason should have a substantial role to play in that life. Freedom and Reason, though not simply a sequel to Hare's earlier work, The Language of Morals, should be read with the earlier work in mind. This is important, not only because it presupposes some of the conclusions of that work, but also because of the strong criticism which the earlier work provoked, and which Freedom and Reason to a large extent answers.

Functional Words, Facts and Values

1976 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. W. Cragg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Significant Part ◽  
Recent Discussion ◽  
The Many ◽  
Substantial Interest

Functional words are of substantial interest in moral philosophy because they appear to lie at the juncture of description and evaluation. This is no doubt the reason that they have played a significant part in much recent discussion of the relation between facts and values. Yet, in spite of the many discussions in which functional words have made an appearance, their significance for an understanding of the relation between facts and values remains unclear. A thorough-going examination of the nature of functional words would appear to be in order. And while such a study is beyond the scope of a single article it should nevertheless be possible to make a beginning. That, at any rate, is my objective in what follows.

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