Pragmatist moral philosophy and moral life

2021 ◽  
pp. 147-163
Author(s):  
Todd Lekan
Keyword(s):  
Utilitas ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
SORAN READER ◽  
GILLIAN BROCK

In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if they cannot describe simple needs-meeting cases. We argue that the elimination or reduction of need to other concepts such as value, duty, virtue or care is unsatisfactory, in which case moral theories that make those concepts fundamental will have to be revised. In conclusion, we suggest that if moral theories cannot be revised to accommodate needs, they may have to be replaced with a fully needs-based theory.


Dialogue ◽  
1964 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-198
Author(s):  
C. D. MacNiven

R.M. Hare's new book, Freedom and Reason, is a welcome contribution to modern moral philosophy and should be read with care by anyone who believes that ethics should be relevant to the moral life, and that reason should have a substantial role to play in that life. Freedom and Reason, though not simply a sequel to Hare's earlier work, The Language of Morals, should be read with the earlier work in mind. This is important, not only because it presupposes some of the conclusions of that work, but also because of the strong criticism which the earlier work provoked, and which Freedom and Reason to a large extent answers.


Dialogue ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
C. D. MacNiven

“What has ethical theory to do with the moral life?”. This is a question which continually confronts moral philosophers, especially those who identify themselves with the analytic tradition of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Continental European moral philosophers and those Anglo-Americans who identify themselves with them are seldom confronted with this question. Existentialism, for example, has an obvious connection with the moral life which contemporary analytic philosophy seems to lack. For many people outside professional philosophic circles analytic moral philosophy appears completely irrelevant to the moral life. Since the analysts conceive ethics, to quote R. M. Hare, as “the logical study of the language of morals”, they never seem to get past linguistic analysis to the concrete moral problems which are its main incentive in the first place.


Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

This is a work in moral philosophy and its ambition is to contribute to a renewed understanding of moral philosophy, the role of moral theory, and the relation between moral philosophy and moral life. It is motivated by the belief that the lack of a coherent answer to the question of the role and status of moral philosophy and the theories it develops, is one of the most important obstacles for doing work in moral philosophy today. The first part of the book untangles various criticisms of the dominant view of moral theories that challenges the explanatory, foundational, authoritative, and action-guiding role of these theories. It also offers an alternative understanding of moral theory as descriptions of moral grammar. The second part investigates the nature of the particularities relevant for an understanding of moral life, both particularities tied to the moral subject, her character, commitments, and moral position, and particularities tied to the context of the subject, her moral community and language. The final part marks a return to moral philosophy and addresses the wider question of what the revised conception of moral theories and the affirmation of the value of the particular mean for moral philosophy by developing a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. The scope of the book is wide, but its pretensions are more moderate, to present an understanding of descriptive moral philosophy which may spur a debate about the status and role of moral philosophy in relation to our moral lives.


Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

This chapter provides the motivation for the book by arguing for a need to address the question of the role and status of moral philosophy in light of the criticisms directed against the theory-based understanding of moral philosophy of the twentieth century. The chapter also presents the three main aims of the book, to discuss what form of moral theory—if any—can be a fruitful part of moral philosophy; to investigate the moral importance of the particular; and to offer an alternative descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. In addition, it identifies the context of the discussion which is that of contemporary analytical moral philosophy, broadly conceived, and it determines the central categories of the book, moral philosophy, moral theory, and moral life; all chosen to avoid the ambiguity of ‘ethics’ which covers both moral philosophy and what is investigated in moral philosophy, the moral. Finally, the chapter clarifies the philosophical approach adopted in the book which is modelled on an understanding of the dialogical structure and the conception of philosophy found in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later writings. The final section of the chapter offers a short summary of the remaining chapters and an overview of the overall argument of the book.


2010 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-39
Author(s):  
Seth Lobis

AbstractIn his colloquy Amicitia, Erasmus uses Pliny's Historia naturalis as the primary source for an energetic and inventive exploration of the topic of friendship. Like certain animals and objects in the natural world, friends share a natural affinity, but Erasmus goes further than this natural-historical observation, concluding that the moral life requires from us a more active relationship to our instincts and inclinations. Apposing two senses of the word amicitia, natural affinity and personal friendship, Erasmus ultimately suggests an intimate relationship between natural history and moral philosophy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-280
Author(s):  
Lucy Bolton

Reading the moral philosophy of Iris Murdoch alongside film enables us to see Murdoch's notions of practical moral good in action. For Murdoch, moral philosophy can be seen as “a more systematic and reflective extension of what ordinary moral agents are continually doing”. Murdoch can help us further by her consideration of the value of a moral fable: does a morally important fable always imply universal rules? And how do we decide whether a fable is morally important? By bringing Murdoch and Margaret (Kenneth Lonergan, 2011) together in an exploration of the moral decision making of the film's protagonist and our assessment of her choices, we can learn more about the idea of film as a morally important fable rather than a fable that is purely decorative.


Author(s):  
Owen Ware

This book develops and defends a new interpretation of Fichte’s moral philosophy as an ethics of wholeness. While virtually forgotten for most of the twentieth century, Fichte’s System of Ethics (1798) is now recognized by scholars as a masterpiece in the history of post-Kantian philosophy and a key text for understanding the work of later German idealist thinkers. This book provides a careful examination of the intellectual context in which Fichte’s moral philosophy evolved and of the specific arguments he offers in response to Kant and his immediate successors. A distinctive feature of the study is a focus on the foundational concepts of Fichte’s ethics—freedom, morality, feeling, conscience, community—and their connection to his novel but largely misunderstood theory of drives. By way of conclusion, the book shows that what appears to be two conflicting commitments in Fichte’s ethics, a commitment to the feelings of one’s conscience and a commitment to engage in open dialogue with others, are two aspects of his theory of moral perfection. The result is a fresh understanding of Fichte’s System of Ethics as offering a compelling resolution to the personal and interpersonal dimensions of moral life.


Author(s):  
Robert Gay

Virtue ethics is a way of viewing the moral life in terms of the necessary dispositions which shape human action towards the good, and towards human flourishing. Thinking of the moral life in terms of virtue was the dominant approach to moral philosophy in ancient and medieval thought. Although largely absent as a major strand of thought in moral philosophy after the Enlightenment, it has key features which challenge the dominant approaches in moral philosophy. The second half of the twentieth century saw a revival in virtue ethics, inspired by philosophers such as Anscombe and MacIntyre. The Hippocratic tradition provides a virtue framework for medicine, and the revival of virtue ethics has led to further work to explore the importance of virtue in medical practice. In the morally and technically complex world of medical practice, the virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are necessary for the doctor to act according to the best interests of the patient, which are in line with the proper ends of medicine. The law has a role in prohibiting acts which are not in accordance with the ends of medicine, which cannot be virtuous. It also has a role in helping to arrive at prudential decisions in cases where there are disputes between patients or their families and medical teams about a best course of action. Finally, medical law should have a role in cultivating virtue within medicine for the benefit of patients and doctors.


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