Buddhist Moral Thought and Western Moral Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Phenomenology

This essay discusses interpretations of Indian Buddhist moral thought in terms of common categories of Western moral philosophy. Problems are raised for interpretations of Buddhism as being committed to a theory of what makes an action morally right (specifically deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics). Following the lead of the poison arrow simile, a nontheoretical understanding of Buddhist moral thought is proposed: it was implicitly supposed that we do not need to act on the basis of universal moral principles but simply need to overcome the roots of unwholesome actions (greed, hatred, and delusion) and act skillfully. This interpretation is compared with other nontheoretical interpretations of Buddhist moral thought by reference to moral particularism, moral phenomenology, moral pluralism, and a nontheoretical conception of virtue ethics. It is also suggested that we should not be perplexed by the absence of explicit moral theory in Buddhism. Featured figures include Aristotle and Śāntideva.

Moral particularism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Sensitivity ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Theories

Moral particularism is a broad set of views which play down the role of general moral principles in moral philosophy and practice. Particularists stress the role of examples in moral education and of moral sensitivity or judgment in moral decision-making, as well as criticizing moral theories which advocate or rest upon general principles. It has not yet been demonstrated that particularism constitutes an importantly controversial position in moral philosophy.

scholarly journals Foucault as Virtue Ethicist

2004 ◽  
pp. 20-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Levy
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Historical Narrative ◽  
The Self ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Virtue Ethicist ◽  
The Past ◽  
Anglo American

In his last two books and in the essays and interviews associated with them, Foucault develops a new mode of ethical thought he describes as an aesthetics of existence. I argue that this new ethics bears a striking resemblance to the virtue ethics that has become prominent in Anglo-American moral philosophy over the past three decades, in its classical sources, in its opposition to rule-based systems and its positive emphasis upon what Foucault called the care for the self. I suggest that seeing Foucault and virtue ethicists as engaged in a convergent project sheds light on a number of obscurities in Foucault's thought, and provides us with a historical narrative in which to situate his claims about the development of Western moral thought.

Hume and Virtue Ethics

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter shows how Hume’s “sentimentalist” moral theory can be a version of virtue ethics and elaborates the kind of virtue ethics that best describes Hume’s moral philosophy. To accomplish this task, we need a definition of virtue ethics, an account of types of virtue ethical theory, and to place Hume’s ethics within this taxonomy. Three types of virtue ethics, are outlined. Hume is located within a pluralistic virtue ethics where virtue notions are central and a variety of features make traits “naturally fitted” to be approved as virtues. Hume’s virtue ethics is understood as response-dependent, being grounded in an emotional kind of “moral sense” as suitably objective and as conforming to his basic empiricism.

The Many Moral Particularisms

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean McKeever ◽  
Michael Ridge
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Many ◽  
Broad Interest

What place, if any, moral principles should or do have in moral life has been a longstanding question f or moral philosophy. For some, the proposition that moral philosophy should strive to articulate moral principles has been an article of faith. At least since Aristotle, however, there has been a rieh counter-tradition that questions the possibility or value of trying to capture morality in principled terms. In recent years, philosophers who question principled approaches to morality have argued under the banner of moral particularism. Particularists can be found in diverse areas of philosophical inquiry, and their positions and arguments are of broad interest. Despite its importance, a proper evaluation of particularism has been hindered both by the diversity of arguments employed to defend it, and, perhaps more significantly, by the diversity of positions that can fairly claim to be particularist.

Macintyre’s Position on Business: A Response to Wicks

1997 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 125-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Dobson
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Alasdair Macintyre ◽  
Practical Relevance ◽  
Feminist Thought ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
Cultural Force

Andrew Wicks recently reflected “On The Practical Relevance of Feminist Thought to Business.” Part of his reflection focussed on my contributions to this subject. In critiquing my work, Wicks notes the similarity between my views on business and those of Alasdair MacIntyre. He goes on to give a brief overview of our position as he sees it. Wicks’s overview, although insightful, is misleading in certain key respects. My purpose in this response, therefore, is to clarify MacIntyre’s views on business. In doing this I will, by default, clarify my own.MacIntyre himself might be surprised by the frequency with which his name appears in the business-ethics discourse. Although, over a period spanning nearly fifty years, he has written prolifically on the subject of ethics, he has only, as far as I am aware, written two brief articles directly addressing the subject of business ethics. Why then should we in business or in business ethics concern ourselves with his views? I think our interest in MacIntyre stems from our interest in virtue ethics, specifically our interest in the applicability of the virtues to business. When it comes to virtue ethics MacIntyre is recognized as an authority, if not the authority. Even his fiercest detractors would, I hope, admit that he has been largely responsible for the resurrection of classical philosophy in the latter half of this century. His book After Virtue, in which he criticizes modernity and praises a classical virtue-based approach to ethics, is undoubtedly one the most influential books on moral philosophy written this century. Indeed, as postmodernism gains steam as a cultural force, its full influence is perhaps yet to be determined. If MacIntyre’s critique of modernity proves correct, then much of business-ethics theory—not to mention moral theory in general—would be discredited. Thus interest in MacIntyre’s thesis, from many quarters, is understandable.

Basic Premises and Method

2019 ◽  
pp. 21-42
Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Just War ◽  
Causal Structure ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Test Cases ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
High Level

The reigning method in moral philosophy is the search for reflective equilibrium. An interesting feature of contemporary moral philosophy is how much weight most theorists put on matching intuitions in test cases, rather than finding plausible, relevant, high-level moral principles that can be used to generate mid-level principles and judgments in particular situations. This chapter covers four themes in two groups. The first group concerns the author’s general approach to moral theory. It includes the role of theory and cases in the author’s own work and the role of evidence and facts in justification. The second group concerns two topics specifically relevant to just war theory: reductive individualism and the distinctive causal structure of eliminative killing.

scholarly journals Reasons and Moral Principles

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pekka Väyrynen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Moral Principles

Moral particularism and generalism are families of views united by their denial or affirmation (respectively) that general moral principles play some fundamental role in morality. In this survey of the generalism/particularism debate, I distinguish between contributory and overall moral principles and between two distinct roles, standards and guides, which either sort of principles might be claimed to play. Next I describe three different forms which particularist opposition to any of these kinds of principles can take. I then survey debates about whether moral principles play a fundamental role either as standards or as guides. Throughout I pay particular attention to issues and arguments which involve claims about normative reasons that favor or justify things or explanatory reasons that explain their moral features. I also note some broader implications of these arguments for both moral theory and the theory of reasons, and point to questions that merit further work.

The Critique of Moral Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 15-44
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Influential Points ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Classic Papers

This chapter surveys criticisms raised against moral theory from positions such as virtue ethics, particularism, anti-theory, and Wittgensteinian moral philosophy in order to identify the most central and damaging objections. It locates the origin of theory critique in two classic papers by Iris Murdoch and Elizabeth Anscombe and proceeds to give an overview of the most influential points of criticism from the second half of the twentieth century. This overview is contrasted with an explication of the dominant understanding of moral theory presented in the work of Martha Nussbaum, which allows for an identification of the crucial objections to moral theory, here presented in the form they take in the work of Bernard Williams. The objections are that theories cannot provide a foundation for moral practice, and that they do not possess the authority necessary to serve as action-guiding in any substantial sense. The conclusion of the chapter is that proponents of the dominant understanding of moral theory cannot offer convincing answers to these objections, and that this points to a need to re-evaluate our understanding of both the role and the form of moral theories.

Justice as a Personal Virtue and Justice as an Institutional Virtue: Mencius’s Confucian Virtue Politics

2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 277-294
Author(s):  
Yong Huang
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Affirmative Answer ◽  
The State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Social Policies ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Government

AbstractIt has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern (Larmore 1996: 19–23), is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived as having an obvious weakness in comparison with its two major rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with character traits of individual persons, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them, including my own (see Huang 2014: Chapter 5), are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important those attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtues. Yet obviously the government has many other jobs to do such as making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for the purpose of making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology have their ready answers in the light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provide its own answer? This paper attempts to argue for an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.

scholarly journals The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
PATRICK FRIERSON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Maria Montessori ◽  
Individual Character ◽  
Individual Self ◽  
Shared Agency

Abstract This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.

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