Unconfirmed peers and spinelessness

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Sherman
Keyword(s):  
Equal Weight ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Epistemic Peers

AbstractThe Equal Weight View holds that, when we discover we disagree with an epistemic peer, we should give our peer’s judgment as much weight as our own. But how should we respond when we cannot tell whether those who disagree with us are our epistemic peers? I argue for a position I will call the Earn-a-Spine View. According to this view, parties to a disagreement can remain confident, at least in some situations, by finding justifiable reasons to think their opponents are less credible than themselves, even if those reasons are justifiable only because they lack information about their opponents.

PEER DISAGREEMENT AND THE DUNNING-KRUGER EFFECT

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 481-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Wiland
Keyword(s):  
Equal Weight ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Epistemic Peer

ABSTRACTI argue that recent evidence about our self-serving biases has radical implications for the epistemology of peer disagreement. I conclude that much of the time when you are disagreeing with someone you regard as your epistemic peer, you should not merely move halfway to her judgment, as The Equal Weight View has it. That is not conciliatory enough. Surprisingly often, you should be at least weakly confident that you are wrong, and that your disputant is right.

scholarly journals A Vindication of the Equal-Weight View

Episteme ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 324-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomas Bogardus
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
Epistemic Peers

ABSTRACTSome philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other's assessment the same weight as her own. I first make the antecedent of this Equal-Weight View more precise, and then I motivate the View by describing cases in which it gives the intuitively correct verdict. Next I introduce some apparent counterexamples–cases of apparent peer disagreement in which, intuitively, one should not give equal weight to the other party's assessment. To defuse these apparent counterexamples, an advocate of the View might try to explain how they are not genuine cases of peer disagreement. I examine David Christensen's and Adam Elga's explanations and find them wanting. I then offer a novel explanation, which turns on a distinction between knowledge from reports and knowledge from direct acquaintance. Finally, I extend my explanation to provide a handy and satisfying response to the charge of self-defeat.

scholarly journals What is the “Equal Weight View”?

Episteme ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 280-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Jehle ◽  
Branden Fitelson
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Equal Weight View

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we investigate various possible (Bayesian) precisifications of the (somewhat vague) statements of “the equal weight view” (EWV) that have appeared in the recent literature on disagreement. We will show that the renditions of (EWV) that immediately suggest themselves are untenable from a Bayesian point of view. In the end, we will propose some tenable (but not necessarily desirable) interpretations of (EWV). Our aim here will not be to defend any particular Bayesian precisification of (EWV), but rather to raise awareness about some of the difficulties inherent in formulating such precisifications.

scholarly journals A HIGHER-ORDER APPROACH TO DISAGREEMENT

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Skipper Rasmussen ◽  
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen ◽  
Jens Christian Bjerring
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
Desirable Feature ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

ABSTRACTWhile many philosophers have agreed that evidence of disagreement is a kind of higher-order evidence, this has not yet resulted in formally precise higher-order approaches to the problem of disagreement. In this paper, we outline a simple formal framework for determining the epistemic significance of a body of higher-order evidence, and use this framework to motivate a novel interpretation of the popular “equal weight view” of peer disagreement – we call it the Variably Equal Weight View (VEW). We show that VEW differs from the standard Split the Difference (SD) interpretation of the equal weight view in almost all cases of peer disagreement, and use our formal framework to explain why SD has seemed attractive but is in fact misguided. A desirable feature of VEW, we argue, is that it gives rise to plausible instances of synergy – an effect whereby the parties to a disagreement should become more (or less) confident in the disputed proposition than any of them were prior to disagreement. Lastly, we show how VEW may be generalized to cases of non-peer disagreement.

scholarly journals Desacuerdo entre pares epistémicos en el debate naturaleza-cultura

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-506
Author(s):  
Nahuel Pallitto
Keyword(s):  
Life Sciences ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Practices ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Epistemic Peers

Scientific disagreements constitute valuable resources for reflecting on epistemic peer disagreements. In this essay I engage in the debate whether epistemic peers who disagree should be conciliatory or steadfast by examining how scientists actually react in the so called nature-nurture debate. The main conclusion of the analysis is that, when taking into consideration concrete epistemic practices with peers responding to different epistemic perspectives, scientists have good reasons to be steadfast. At the same time, the theoretical conceptualizations of the epistemology of peer disagreement illuminates certain aspects of the nature-nurture debate, such as its long persistence. Therefore, this article contributes both to the debate over the epistemology of disagreement and to the understanding of a never-ending controversy in the life sciences.

REASONABLE DOUBT AND DISAGREEMENT

Legal Theory ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 203-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youngjae Lee
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Reasonable Doubt ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Normative Issues ◽  
The Right ◽  
Jury Decision

ABSTRACTThe right to trial by jury and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are two of the most fundamental commitments of American criminal law. This article asks how the two are related, that is, whether disagreement among jurors implies anything about whether the beyond a reasonable doubt standard has been satisfied: Does the due process requirement of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard also require jury unanimity in criminal cases? Drawing on literature about the epistemological significance of disagreement, this article considers the “equal-weight view” and its implications for the unanimity rule in criminal jury decision-making. The equal-weight view says that, roughly speaking, when people disagree on a topic, each view should be given equal weight. This implies, this article concludes, that the unanimity rule is required as a way of enforcing the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement. This article further concludes, however, that jurors should not always be instructed to apply the equal-weight view in their deliberation. Jurors, when applying crime definitions to particular cases, make determinations about both historical facts and normative issues through moral terms like “reckless,” “unjustifiable,” “depraved,” “cruel,” and “heinous,” which are common in criminal law. This article argues that while the equal-weight view should guide the jurors in determining factual issues, it is not the correct model for moral issues, not only because it would imply that acquittals are appropriate in many cases involving controversial moral questions but also because having the jurors follow it would undermine the basic justification for having the criminal jury as an articulator and enforcer of morality.

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