scholarly journals A HIGHER-ORDER APPROACH TO DISAGREEMENT

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Skipper Rasmussen ◽  
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen ◽  
Jens Christian Bjerring
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
Desirable Feature ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

ABSTRACTWhile many philosophers have agreed that evidence of disagreement is a kind of higher-order evidence, this has not yet resulted in formally precise higher-order approaches to the problem of disagreement. In this paper, we outline a simple formal framework for determining the epistemic significance of a body of higher-order evidence, and use this framework to motivate a novel interpretation of the popular “equal weight view” of peer disagreement – we call it the Variably Equal Weight View (VEW). We show that VEW differs from the standard Split the Difference (SD) interpretation of the equal weight view in almost all cases of peer disagreement, and use our formal framework to explain why SD has seemed attractive but is in fact misguided. A desirable feature of VEW, we argue, is that it gives rise to plausible instances of synergy – an effect whereby the parties to a disagreement should become more (or less) confident in the disputed proposition than any of them were prior to disagreement. Lastly, we show how VEW may be generalized to cases of non-peer disagreement.

PEER DISAGREEMENT AND THE DUNNING-KRUGER EFFECT

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 481-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Wiland
Keyword(s):  
Equal Weight ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Epistemic Peer

ABSTRACTI argue that recent evidence about our self-serving biases has radical implications for the epistemology of peer disagreement. I conclude that much of the time when you are disagreeing with someone you regard as your epistemic peer, you should not merely move halfway to her judgment, as The Equal Weight View has it. That is not conciliatory enough. Surprisingly often, you should be at least weakly confident that you are wrong, and that your disputant is right.

Return to Reason

2019 ◽  
pp. 226-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael G. Titelbaum
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Point ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
First Order ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

This chapter discusses responses to the author’s “Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason).” Among other things, the chapter: explains how the author understands rationality; explains why akrasia is irrational; intuitively overviews the argument from the Akratic Principle to the Fixed Point Thesis; explains why you can’t avoid this argument by distinguishing the rational from the reasonable, ideal rationality from everyday rationality, or substantive from structural norms; responds to the suggestion that misleading higher-order evidence creates rational dilemmas; explains why the Fixed Point Thesis doesn’t assume objectivist or externalist notions of rationality; dismisses complaints about agents who aren’t able to “figure out” what’s rational; then responds to an objection that peer disagreement undermines doxastic justification. Finally, the chapter modifies the author’s steadfast position on peer disagreement to take into account cases in which peer disagreement rationally affects an agent’s first-order opinions without affecting higher-order ones.

scholarly journals Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Killoren
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Moral Decisions ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
Important Exception

There is an ancient, yet still lively, debate in moral epistemology about the epistemic significance of disagreement. One of the important questions in that debate is whether, and to what extent, the prevalence and persistence of disagreement between our moral intuitions causes problems for those who seek to rely on intuitions in order to make moral decisions, issue moral judgments, and craft moral theories. Meanwhile, in general epistemology, there is a relatively young, and very lively, debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement. A central question in that debate concerns peer disagreement: When I am confronted with an epistemic peer with whom I disagree, how should my confidence in my beliefs change (if at all)? The disagreement debate in moral epistemology has not been brought into much contact with the disagreement debate in general epistemology (though McGrath [2007] is an important exception). A purpose of this paper is to increase the area of contact between these two debates. In Section 1, I try to clarify the question I want to ask in this paper – this is the question whether we have any reasons to believe what I shall call “anti-intuitivism.” In Section 2, I argue that anti-intuitivism cannot be supported solely by investigating the mechanisms that produce our intuitions. In Section 3, I discuss an anti-intuitivist argument from disagreement which relies on the so-called “Equal Weight View.” In Section 4, I pause to clarify the notion of epistemic parity and to explain how it ought to be understood in the epistemology of moral intuition. In Section 5, I return to the anti-intuitivist argument from disagreement and explain how an apparently-vulnerable premise of that argument may be quite resilient. In Section 6, I introduce a novel objection against the Equal Weight View in order to show how I think we can successfully resist the anti-intuitivist argument from disagreement.

scholarly journals A Vindication of the Equal-Weight View

Episteme ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 324-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomas Bogardus
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Equal Weight View ◽  
Direct Acquaintance ◽  
Epistemic Peers

ABSTRACTSome philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other's assessment the same weight as her own. I first make the antecedent of this Equal-Weight View more precise, and then I motivate the View by describing cases in which it gives the intuitively correct verdict. Next I introduce some apparent counterexamples–cases of apparent peer disagreement in which, intuitively, one should not give equal weight to the other party's assessment. To defuse these apparent counterexamples, an advocate of the View might try to explain how they are not genuine cases of peer disagreement. I examine David Christensen's and Adam Elga's explanations and find them wanting. I then offer a novel explanation, which turns on a distinction between knowledge from reports and knowledge from direct acquaintance. Finally, I extend my explanation to provide a handy and satisfying response to the charge of self-defeat.

Higher-Order Evidence

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Rational Beliefs ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Normative Significance ◽  
Distinguished Group ◽  
First Time ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us about what our shared evidence supports. Or perhaps we learn that our beliefs have been afflicted by motivated reasoning or other cognitive biases. These are examples of higher-order evidence. While it may seem plausible that higher-order evidence should somehow impact our beliefs, it is less clear how and why. Normally, when evidence impacts our beliefs, it does so by virtue of speaking for or against the truth of their contents. But higher-order evidence does not directly concern the contents of the beliefs that they impact. In recent years, philosophers have become increasingly aware of the need to understand the nature and normative role of higher-order evidence. This is partly due to the pervasiveness of higher-order evidence in human life, for example in the form of disagreement. But it has also become clear that higher-order evidence lies at the heart of a number of central epistemological debates, spanning from classical disputes between internalists and externalists to more recent discussions of peer disagreement and epistemic akrasia. Many of the controversies within these and other debates stem, at least in part, from conflicting views about the normative significance of higher-order evidence. This collection brings together, for the first time, a distinguished group of leading and up-and-coming epistemologists to explore a wide range of interrelated issues about higher-order evidence.

scholarly journals Actively revealing card attack on card-based protocols

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Takashima ◽  
Daiki Miyahara ◽  
Takaaki Mizuki ◽  
Hideaki Sone
Keyword(s):  
Secure Computation ◽  
Malicious Attack ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
Almost All ◽  
And Function

AbstractIn 1989, den Boer presented the first card-based protocol, called the “five-card trick,” that securely computes the AND function using a deck of physical cards via a series of actions such as shuffling and turning over cards. This protocol enables a couple to confirm their mutual love without revealing their individual feelings. During such a secure computation protocol, it is important to keep any information about the inputs secret. Almost all existing card-based protocols are secure under the assumption that all players participating in a protocol are semi-honest or covert, i.e., they do not deviate from the protocol if there is a chance that they will be caught when cheating. In this paper, we consider a more malicious attack in which a player as an active adversary can reveal cards illegally without any hesitation. Against such an actively revealing card attack, we define the t-secureness, meaning that no information about the inputs leaks even if at most t cards are revealed illegally. We then actually design t-secure AND protocols. Thus, our contribution is the construction of the first formal framework to handle actively revealing card attacks as well as their countermeasures.

Effect of Flaw Dimensions on Ductile Fracture Behavior of Non-Aligned Multiple Flaws in a Plate

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katsumasa Miyazaki ◽  
Kunio Hasegawa ◽  
Koichi Saito
Keyword(s):  
Ductile Fracture ◽  
Flat Plate ◽  
Fracture Behavior ◽  
Maximum Load ◽  
Surface Flaws ◽  
Fracture Tests ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Maximum Minimum

The fitness-for-service codes require the characterization of non-aligned multiple flaws for flaw evaluation, which is performed using a flaw proximity rule. Worldwide, almost all such codes provide their own proximity rule, often with unclear technical bases of the application of proximity rule to ductile or fully plastic fracture. In particular, the effect of flaw dimensions of multiple surface flaws on fully plastic fracture of non-aligned multiple flaws had not been clear. To clarify the effect of the difference of part through-wall and through-wall flaws on the behavior of fully plastic fracture, the fracture tests of flat plate specimens with non-aligned multiple part through-wall flaws were conducted. When the flaw depth a was shallow with 0.4 in ratio of a to thickness t, the maximum load Pmax occurred at penetration of multiple flaws and the effect of vertical distance of non-aligned multiple flaws H on Pmax was not so significant. However, when flaw depth was deep with 0.8 in a/t, Pmax occurred after penetration of flaws and the effect of H on Pmax could be seen clearly. It was judged that the through-wall flaw tests were appropriate for discussion of the effect of H on Pmax and the alignment rule of multiple flaws. In addition, in order to clarify the appropriate length parameter to estimate Pmax of test specimens with dissimilar non-aligned through-wall multiple flaws, the fracture tests of plate specimens were also conducted. The effect of different flaw length on Pmax was discussed with maximum, minimum and averages of dissimilar non-aligned multiple flaw lengths. Experimental results showed that the maximum length lmax would be an appropriate length parameter to estimate Pmax, when the non-aligned multiple through-wall flaws were dissimilar.

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