Human rights, harm, and climate change mitigation
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AbstractA number of philosophers have resisted impersonal explanations of our obligation to mitigate climate change, and have developed accounts according to which these obligations are explained by human rights or harm-based considerations. In this paper I argue that several of these attempts to explain our mitigation obligations without appealing to impersonal factors fail, since they either cannot account for a plausibly robust obligation to mitigate, or have implausible implications in other cases. I conclude that despite the appeal of the motivations for rejecting the appeal to impersonal factors, such factors must play a prominent role in explaining our mitigation obligations.
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2020 ◽
2013 ◽
Vol 2
(4)
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pp. 361
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2010 ◽
Vol 7
(1)
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pp. 57-78
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2012 ◽
Vol 1
(1)
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pp. 119-135
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