Optimal pricing decisions for a closed-loop supply chain with retail competition under fuzziness

2017 ◽  
Vol 69 (9) ◽  
pp. 1468-1482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hua Ke ◽  
Yong Wu ◽  
Hu Huang ◽  
Zhiyi Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Retail Competition ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions

Study on Discrimination Pricing Model of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Product Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 663-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Product ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions

With awareness of environmental protection strengthens and constraints of regulations and laws to environmental protection increasing, more and more enterprises focus on the closed-loop supply chain management. Considering difference between new product and remanufactured product, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with manufacturers recycling used products directly from the consumers based on game theory. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profit of centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. At last, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the two-part tariff contract.

Research on Coordination in the Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 319-322
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Product ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions

Based on game theory, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with retailer recycling used products from the consumers incorporating difference between new product and remanufactured product. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profits of centralized coordinated and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. Finally, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the profit sharing contract.

scholarly journals Pricing and Logistics Service Decisions in Platform-Led Electronic Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Remanufacturing

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11357
Author(s):  
Kai Liu ◽  
Chunfa Li ◽  
Runde Gu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
The Third

With the continuous development of e-commerce, it has become normal for the manufacturer to sell products and to collect used products through e-commerce platforms (platform for short). We consider an electronic closed-loop supply chain (E-CLSC) where we composed a manufacturer with remanufacturing capability and a platform that can provide logistics services. The purpose of this paper is to address whether the manufacturer should directly collect used products from the consumer under the platform. Specifically, we have developed four game models, namely model N (no collection), model M (the manufacturer collects), model E (the platform collects), and model T (the third-party collects) and derived the optimal pricing decisions, logistics service level, and collection rate for E-CLSC members. We found that remanufacturing used products is conducive to increasing the profits of the manufacturer and the platform as well as to increasing the utility of the consumer. Under the same conditions, for the manufacturer, the platform, and the consumer, the optimal choice is that the manufacturer directly collects the used products from the consumer. If the manufacturer is unable to establish an effective collection channel, he should consider outsourcing to a contractor and should consider the platform to be under the same conditions. Numerical examples are also given to verify the proposed results.

PRICING DECISIONS FOR A CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN IN A FUZZY ENVIRONMENT

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (01) ◽  
pp. 1240003 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIE WEI ◽  
JING ZHAO ◽  
YONGJIAN LI
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Fuzzy Environment

This paper studies pricing problem for a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in a fuzzy environment. The purpose of this paper is to explore how the manufacturer makes his decisions about wholesale price and transfer price and how the retailer makes her decisions about retail price and collecting price in the expected value standard. Each firm's optimal pricing strategies are established by using game theory under the centralized and decentralized decision cases, respectively. Managerial insights into the economic behavior of firms are also investigated, which can serve as the basis for empirical study in the future. Moreover, we analyze numerically the results and give some insights on the influence of some parameters.

scholarly journals Retail Services and Pricing Decisions in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Remanufacturing

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 2373-2396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen-Zheng Zhang ◽  
Zong-Jun Wang ◽  
Li-Wen Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Retail Services

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions in a Competitive Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Duopolistic Recyclers

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doo Ho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Experiment ◽  
End Of Life ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Game Model ◽  
New Materials ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Equilibrium Prices

In this study, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a collector, and two duopolistic recyclers. In the supply chain, the collector collects end-of-life products from consumers in the market. Then, both recyclers purchase the recyclable waste from the collector, and each recycler turns them into new materials. The manufacturer has no recycling facilities; therefore, the manufacturer only purchases the recycled and new materials for its production from the two recyclers. Under this scenario, price competition between recyclers is inevitable. With two pricing structures (Nash and Stackelberg) of the leaders group and three competition behaviors (Collusion, Cournot, and Stackelberg) of the followers group, we suggest six different pricing game models. In each of them, we establish a pricing game model among the members, prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium prices of the supply chain members, and discuss the effects of competition on the overall supply chain’s profitability. Our numerical experiment indicates that as the price competition between recyclers intensifies, the supply chain profitability decreases. Moreover, the greater the recyclability degree of the waste is, the higher the profits in the supply chain become.

Optimal pricing for a multi-echelon closed loop supply chain with different power structures and product dual differences

2020 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
pp. 120281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenjie Liu ◽  
Dingzhi Qin ◽  
Ningning Shen ◽  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Mingzhou Jin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain
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