Study on Discrimination Pricing Model of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Product Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 663-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang

With awareness of environmental protection strengthens and constraints of regulations and laws to environmental protection increasing, more and more enterprises focus on the closed-loop supply chain management. Considering difference between new product and remanufactured product, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with manufacturers recycling used products directly from the consumers based on game theory. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profit of centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. At last, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the two-part tariff contract.

2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 319-322
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang

Based on game theory, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with retailer recycling used products from the consumers incorporating difference between new product and remanufactured product. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profits of centralized coordinated and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. Finally, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the profit sharing contract.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Ji Zhang ◽  
Chenliang Li ◽  
Yizhao Zhao

The remanufacturing warranty strategy has become an effective mechanism for reducing consumer risk and stimulating market demand in closed-loop supply chain management. Based on the characteristics of consumers’ behavior of purchase decisions, this paper studies the warranty decision model of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the Stackelberg game model. The present study discussed and compared the decision variables, including remanufacturing product pricing, extended warranty service pricing, warranty period and supply chain system profit. The research shows that consumers’ decision-making significantly affirms the dual marginalization effect of the supply chain system while significantly affecting the supply chain warranty decision; the improved revenue sharing contract and the two charge contracts respectively coordinates the manufacturer-led and retail-oriented closed-loop supply chain system, which effectively implements the Pareto improvement of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services. In the present study, the model is verified and analyzed by numerical simulation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11357
Author(s):  
Kai Liu ◽  
Chunfa Li ◽  
Runde Gu

With the continuous development of e-commerce, it has become normal for the manufacturer to sell products and to collect used products through e-commerce platforms (platform for short). We consider an electronic closed-loop supply chain (E-CLSC) where we composed a manufacturer with remanufacturing capability and a platform that can provide logistics services. The purpose of this paper is to address whether the manufacturer should directly collect used products from the consumer under the platform. Specifically, we have developed four game models, namely model N (no collection), model M (the manufacturer collects), model E (the platform collects), and model T (the third-party collects) and derived the optimal pricing decisions, logistics service level, and collection rate for E-CLSC members. We found that remanufacturing used products is conducive to increasing the profits of the manufacturer and the platform as well as to increasing the utility of the consumer. Under the same conditions, for the manufacturer, the platform, and the consumer, the optimal choice is that the manufacturer directly collects the used products from the consumer. If the manufacturer is unable to establish an effective collection channel, he should consider outsourcing to a contractor and should consider the platform to be under the same conditions. Numerical examples are also given to verify the proposed results.


2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (01) ◽  
pp. 1240003 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIE WEI ◽  
JING ZHAO ◽  
YONGJIAN LI

This paper studies pricing problem for a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in a fuzzy environment. The purpose of this paper is to explore how the manufacturer makes his decisions about wholesale price and transfer price and how the retailer makes her decisions about retail price and collecting price in the expected value standard. Each firm's optimal pricing strategies are established by using game theory under the centralized and decentralized decision cases, respectively. Managerial insights into the economic behavior of firms are also investigated, which can serve as the basis for empirical study in the future. Moreover, we analyze numerically the results and give some insights on the influence of some parameters.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Chunmei Ma

In order to improve the efficiency of collection and green manufacturing level in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system, the manufacturer invests green manufacturing efforts in product design and production process and intends to cooperate with other CLSC members to achieve excellent performance. In a two-period CLSC system consisting of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-service provider, a game-theoretical approach is adopted to compare the optimal decisions and profits of the three green manufacturing cooperation modes, namely, the manufacturer cooperates with the retailer and third-service provider, respectively, and the noncooperation mode is a benchmark. Moreover, the impact of different cooperation modes on CLSC decision-making is analyzed as well. The results indicate that the influence of difference among cooperation modes on CLSC decision is significant, and cooperation is always better than noncooperation. From the perspective of consumers as well as recycling and profit, although the collection rate of used products is not the highest when the manufacturer cooperates with the retailer, the price of product is the lowest and the green property of product is the most obvious; thus, this is regarded as the suitable cooperation mode after a comprehensive analysis. Besides, a coordination mechanism is designed to solve the inefficiency caused by double marginalization. Finally, numerical examples are presented to intuitively observe the relationships between decisions and profits and the impact of different parameters on them in the three modes, and some management inspirations are proposed ultimately.


2012 ◽  
Vol 236-237 ◽  
pp. 321-325
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang

This paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain system with the manufacturer recycling waste products from the retailer based on game theory in heterogeneous market in which the price of the new product is different from that of the remanufactured product. The optimal pricing decisions of the supply chain without remanufacturing and the closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing are obtained. Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, we obtain the optimum production and pricing strategies, and analyze the impact of the consumers’ acceptance for the remanufactured product on product pricing, which provides a basis for the closed-loop supply chain’s production decisions.


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